THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR

Vol. 11 *Autumn* · 1942 *No.* 4

Editorial	*Henry Hazlitt*
The Pattern of Indian Nationalism	*Raleigh Parkin*
The Electron Microscope	*E. F. Burton*
The Philosopher, the Common Man and William James	*Justus Buchler*
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The Evolution of Farm Relief	*Asher Hobson*

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Contents

Editorial	Henry Hazlitt	387
The Pattern of Indian Nationalism	Raleigh Parkin	389
The Electron Microscope	E. F. Burton	403
The Philosopher, the Common Man and William James	Justus Buchler	416
Jean Sans Terre, *Poems*	Yvan Goll	427
The National Debt: Means to Postwar Prosperity	William Victor Strauss	437
The Trouble with Aldous Huxley	W. Y. Tindall	452
War on the Visual Front	Heinz Soffner	465
There'll Always Be an England	Giovanni Costigan	477
In the Workshop		
The Evolution of Farm Relief	Asher Hobson	495
Discussion		
Interdependence and War	Clyde Eagleton	502
Justice, Not Sentimentality	Lionel Gelber	503
International Authority and National Sovereignty	Howard Comfort	504
"Hath Made of One Blood All Nations of Men"	Ed. M. Haymaker	506
Art Patterns as Communication	Rudolf Arnheim	507
About Our Authors		509
Index to Volume 11		511

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Editorial

Why are we fighting this war? We are fighting it, for one thing, to preserve all that is precious in civilization. We are fighting for freedom, but not merely freedom to do as we wish. We are fighting for freedom to push forward in our conquest of poverty and disease, in our understanding of ourselves and of nature, in our cultural and spiritual growth. And because this is so it seems no breach of modesty for the editors of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR to feel that this periodical symbolizes in its own way one of the chief reasons why we are fighting this war. For among its ideals is the freedom of the spirit to pursue the multitudinous interests that make up human culture as we know it.

In the midst of war the praises of men are showered chiefly, as they should be, on the sacrifices and courage of the fighter. But after war has ended men look back and are proud to recall that in the midst of death and terror there were those who could quietly pursue the life of the mind. Diogenes asking Alexander not to stand between him and the sun, Goethe calmly pursuing his optical and morphological studies in the era of Napoleonic oppression are among the heroes of this spiritual detachment.

Not that the reader of the present issue of THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR will find it a secluded ivory tower. On the contrary the articles on India and on England, on farm relief and the national debt are all closely related to the present conflict. The article "War on the Visual Front" is directly concerned with it. But perhaps some future historian or antiquary happening by chance on this issue will feel a thrill of pride in human dignity when he is thus reminded that at the very height of this savage war our scientists and inventors were not solely concerned with turning out new and deadlier instruments of destruction. For our

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future historian will here learn how, by a series of triumphs of the human intellect, the scientists of today invented the electron microscope. And many present readers, though they now read every day the dramatic story of the struggle for some island in the far Pacific, or the bombing of some German city, or the stupendous campaign in Russia, are likely to find the account in this issue of how the electron microscope came to be invented as exciting in its way as any of these. It has all the fascination of a superb detective story. The electron microscope itself may prove as important an instrument as any that man has ever devised for conquering disease and increasing his control over nature. But the discovery is in itself a magnificent victory of the human mind. It is a discovery, in short, worth achieving for its own sake apart from any practical application.

I have been speaking of the soldier and the scholar as if they were two different types of men. But, indeed, we are not so much comparing two types of men as two aspects of the same man. Every first-rate man has in him both the qualities of a good soldier and of a good scholar. An inspiring demonstration of this was reported by Harold Denny, a correspondent of *The New York Times*, in his account of his life in a prisoner-of-war camp for British officers at Poppi, Italy. The prisoners there might have sat around bemoaning their lot. Instead, they decided to pool their knowledge. They organized themselves into what they called "Poppi University." They formed classes in French, German and Italian. One prisoner, who had been a chartered accountant, taught bookkeeping. Several New Zealand doctors gave popular courses in physiology, medicine and psychology. Captured British pilots lectured on aviation science. There were classes in contract bridge, ropemaking and American government. The prisoners rented a piano; one gave up part of his food ration to buy a sheaf of Beethoven; some British officers wrote out from memory the scores of several musical classics.

These men, one cannot help feeling, knew what kind of world they had been fighting for.

HENRY HAZLITT

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The Pattern of Indian Nationalism

RALEIGH PARKIN

INDIA contains within her borders about one sixth of the entire human race. She can boast of a civilization as ancient, rich and varied as any other country in the world. We who live on a continent where the elementary forms of settlement and social order have attained any sort of geographical completion only within living memory can afford to recall that men in India have been making history throughout the length and breadth of their country in rich profusion for several thousand years. For the past two hundred or so years the political and economic course of this country of ancient civilization and deep culture has been primarily determined by its relations with Western Europe, and in particular by its relations with the people and Government of Great Britain.

Even if it was once, perhaps, possible to argue that the affairs of India concerned Great Britain and India solely it is certainly so no longer. Two recent events combined to cause a sudden and wide American interest in India. These were, of course, the entrance of the United States into the war and the subsequent Japanese victories throughout the Pacific area which led them to the very gates of India; and the decision of the British Government, announced in March 1942, to seek once more a basis of political agreement with the various Indian groups in order to resolve the political stalemate that had existed in India since September 1939 and that clearly was an obstacle to the ability of the United Nations (including India) to exert their maximum effective strength against the Axis powers in what had become one of the key strategic areas in the world conflict.

Throughout North America—both in the United States and in Canada—there has been a widespread instinctive sympathy with Indian aspirations toward complete self-government. It

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could hardly have been otherwise in two countries where the national spirit has in each case derived so largely from its own struggles for independence from external control at an earlier period. But to us in North America an awareness of Indian affairs has been largely an awareness of the most outstanding single element in the Indian nationalist movement, the Congress Party, and of the two remarkable personalities, Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, who are its best-known leaders.

For over twenty years now a group of able and brilliant men have been reporting to America on almost every significant area of the world. Thanks largely to these men and to the newspapers they have represented we have had an opportunity of getting to know more than a little about the problems and peoples of areas such as Central Europe, Scandinavia, Russia, China and Japan. But India has been almost entirely passed by. In the case of India there has been nothing comparable to the sustained, careful and highly intelligent reporting done, for instance, on China and Japan—backed up, as this has been, by much other scholarly study. This study itself, in turn, has stimulated and been stimulated by the inclusion in certain American university curricula of courses in Japanese and Chinese history and institutions. To say this is not to criticize but merely to draw attention to a fact. There have been reasons, good and sufficient reasons, why this has been so but these need not detain us here. The fact underlines the importance attaching to an increased understanding in America of Indian affairs.

This article attempts no more than a simple portrayal of the attitudes of the principal Indian groups on contemporary political issues in terms of the specific attitudes taken by them toward the British Government's proposals carried to India by Sir Stafford Cripps in March 1942. It is one thing to describe the views officially held and advocated by any political party and quite another to explain underlying motives and interests determining political action. I shall do no more than very broadly sketch the former while I shall not even touch on the latter.

Ever since the final stages of the first World War the im-

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portant problem in India has lain in the political sphere—in the differences of opinion within and between the nationalist elements in India and successive Governments in Great Britain as to the precise form that self-government in India should assume and the pace at which change in this direction should proceed. Two things can be said: that no significant group of Indians in British India have ever in the contemporary period been opposed to the development of their own independent political institutions, and that for many years successive British Governments have accepted complete self-government for India as ultimately desirable as well as necessary. The essential difference of opinion, at times flaring up into crises and for years constantly stimulating the organization and activity of Indian parties and groups, has centered around questions of form and pace. The situation has been complicated, moreover, by other elements outside of British India, such as the Indian States, and by political and economic factors arising from the century and a half old link with Great Britain. The result has been that over the last twenty-five years there has been continuous discussion and agitation for political reform at the Indian end, punctuated from the British end by periods of inquiry, negotiation and legislative action. There was the Montagu-Chelmsford Inquiry of 1917-1918 from which dates the modern period of Indian political reform; the Simon Commission of 1927-29; and the Round Table Conferences of 1930-32 which resulted in the Government of India Act of 1935—an Act implemented in the sphere of Provincial self-government in April 1937. Finally, there were the offers to Indian political parties made by the British Government in October 1939 and again in August 1940. These offers aimed at securing wartime participation by Indian political leaders and parties in the Government of India.

Two main forces have operated to produce the pattern of Indian politics. The first of these is nationalism, which finds its concrete expression at the present time in a desire to secure for India freedom from any form of external control, whether

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political, economic or cultural. The second force has been religious and economic sectionalism, arising from the presence in India of numerically substantial minority groups, differing in religious beliefs or in economic and social status and differing also in historical background. It has been the purpose of these groups, in greater or less degree, to prevent so far as lay within their power any major change in Indian political organization that might result in the subordination of their groups to the will of a dominant religious and racial majority which, in the case of India, would be a Hindu majority. Indian hopes have centered around the first, Indian fears around the second.

How then do these Indian hopes and fears express themselves today? When Sir Stafford Cripps left India on April 14th he had spent three weeks in long discussions with the leaders of every significant Indian group, each of whom formally recorded their views in the shape of comments on the British Government's proposals. These groups or parties were: Congress Party, Moslem League, Hindu Mahasabha, Untouchables (Scheduled Castes), Sikh All-Parties Committee, Non-Party Group (also known as Moderates) and, from outside British India, the Princes, who are the rulers of the Indian States with whom Great Britain has a special relationship derived from treaties and also, it should be noted, from the "paramountcy" which Great Britain exercises over them. Five of these groups for a variety of reasons rejected the proposals; the Non-Party Group indicated a qualified agreement; while the Princes expressed themselves in exceedingly noncommittal terms.

Let us remind ourselves, however briefly, of the broad features of the British proposals. They can be divided into two parts, those relating to the interim war period and those relating to the post-war period. At the outset the general object was described as the creation of a new Indian Union enjoying the independent status of a Dominion associated on a basis of complete equality with the other members of the British Commonwealth, and therefore free to exercise the right of secession that accompanies Dominion status. For the interim war period the pro-

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posals were expressed in very general and rather vague terms. They consisted of an invitation to Indian political leaders to participate in the direction of the war effort at every level, but were specific in stating that the British Government felt obliged to retain control during the war of the defense of India.

For the period immediately succeeding hostilities the Draft Declaration proposed: (1) A constitution-making body composed entirely of Indians indirectly elected by the method of proportional representation from an electoral college consisting of the Lower Houses of the Indian Provinces, freshly elected after the war under the provisions already existing for the holding of Provincial elections in the Government of India Act of 1935, and including also representatives appointed by the rulers of the Indian States on a proportionate basis; (2) the immediate implementation by the British Government of any constitution formulated and agreed on by this body; (3) the right of any Province, to be determined under certain circumstances by a plebiscite, not to accede to this constitution and equally its right at any later date to change its mind and to accede; (4) the right of any non-acceding Province (or Provinces) to have a constitution of its own which, to quote the words of the Draft Declaration, would have "the same full status as Indian Union and arrived at by a procedure analagous to that here laid down" (that is, a status equal to and as independent as that held by the other Provinces acceding to the new Indian Union); (5) the right of Indian States to join this Union—but in any case the revision, to suit the new conditions, of the individual treaty arrangements between Great Britain and the various Indian States; (6) a *treaty* to be negotiated between Great Britain *and the constitution-making body* which, inter alia, would provide for the protection of racial and religious minorities; (7) complete freedom of the new Indian Union to determine its future relations with the other member states of the British Commonwealth.

Every politically important Indian group (if we omit the Non-Party Group, whom it is fair to describe as a group of

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able and distinguished leaders deriving their inspiration from 19th-century liberalism and unable to attract any numerically significant political support) turned down the British proposals either because of their hopes or their fears.

The Congress Party turned down the proposals because they did not conform with Congress Party hopes. Congress has always claimed to be an all-inclusive national party, admitting all races and creeds and looking to a political constitution for India which will gradually serve to eliminate communal feeling and communal strife and will make possible the building of a national political unity on the basis of the underlying unity of India's age-old culture. It has therefore welcomed to its membership Moslems, Sikhs, Christians and others. It has been claimed at times that Congress has included in its paid-up membership more Moslems than the Moslem League itself. At the same time it is a fact that the great majority of Congress members are Hindus. But while its dominant *membership* is Hindu its political *platform* is all-inclusive and noncommunal. It has continually demanded a "national" government as the essential basis for any Indian unity; it has maintained that minority problems can and must and will be solved within a framework of all-Indian unity and all-Indian majority rule. It has strenuously objected to the communal basis of voting as hindering the growth of any national attitude on Indian matters. That this Party, whose membership extends from peasants to large industrialists, has maintained a considerable degree of unity over a considerable period of years is in part, no doubt, attributable to the fact that political struggle has thus far centered largely around problems of political nationalism rather than problems involving economic interest.

Given the rigidities that arise either from revolutionary temperament or from political positions taken in the past and therefore difficult to recede from it was not surprising, even if it was disappointing, that Congress rejection of the British proposals centered around two particular features of these proposals. These were, first, the refusal of the British Government

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to offer, immediately and without any important qualification, complete authority to an all-Indian government over policy and administration—which, in the middle of war, would necessarily include the most important of all policies, defense; and, second, the implied acceptance—in the provision giving any Province the right of nonaccession to the Indian Union—of the hated policy of Pakistan (separate Moslem states) advocated by the Moslem League and tending, in the Congress view, to an accentuation in the worst possible form of all the forces in India making for sectionalism and against unity.

The question how far the Moslem League can properly claim to be representative of the great majority of Indian Moslem opinion is one of the most disputed matters in Indian politics. However, the Moslem League is a political fact and, at the lowest estimate, it must be said that it has come to express a certain Moslem view and, especially in quite recent years, that it has come to play an increasingly influential role in Indian politics. There are other Moslem organizations, some of them associating themselves in political matters with Congress; but it has been the Moslem League alone which has tended to be recognized as the political voice of Moslem opinion and which alone "represented" Moslem opinion in the recent Cripps negotiations.

From the Moslem League's objections to the British proposals its basic point of view can be discerned. It objected in principle to the whole idea of India as one Indian Union (the main stated objective of the British proposals) "composed of the two principal nations." Note its use of the word "nations," for the League's other main objection to the proposals related to the procedure by which nonaccession on the part of any Province could be achieved. This procedure stipulated a vote of the Provincial legislative assembly and further provided that, if the majority for accession should prove to be less than 60 per cent, the minority could demand a plebiscite of the adult male population of the Province. To this method the Moslem League strongly objected, claiming that in such a matter the

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vote should be a vote of the Moslem community only. Clearly the Moslem League doubted its ability in practice to secure in any Province a majority of the population as a whole, even in those Provinces where Moslems constitute a majority. Unlike Congress, the Moslem League felt that its policy of Pakistan received only "veiled recognition" in the British proposals.

Behind all this lay the Moslem League's fear that a single Indian Union, operating politically on the principle of majority rule, would be in fact a Hindu-dominated Union in which scant respect would be paid to Moslem susceptibilities and Moslem interests—at any rate as these are conceived of by the Moslem League. Thus Moslem League fears dictated its rejection of the proposals.

Similarly, fear dictated the rejection of the proposals by both the Sikh All-Parties Committee and the Depressed Classes (alternatively known as the Untouchables or Scheduled Castes). The Sikh objection lay in the fear of the Sikhs that the Punjab where they live might be separated, under a non-accession vote of the Moslem majority, from the new Indian Union. (In the Punjab the Moslems comprise 56 per cent, the Hindus 27 per cent and the Sikhs 13 per cent of the total population.) On the other hand the Depressed Classes, not unlike the Moslem League, also feared Hindu domination in an Indian Union because this, to them, meant perpetuation of the disabilities that the Hindu caste system had imposed on them.

The Hindu Mahasabha stands for extreme orthodox Hinduism and as such opposes any concessions either to the Moslems or to the Depressed Classes. It therefore took strong exception to the idea of political partition because, in its own words, "the basic principle of the Hindu Mahasabha is that India is one and indivisible." Moreover it took issue with the whole idea of nonaccession on the part of any Province, claiming, not without good reason, that there was no analogy between the existing Indian Provinces, which had been constituted for convenience as administrative units, and sovereign states entering into a federation and renouncing a portion of their sovereignty for

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certain common purposes. Also, like the Congress Party, the Hindu Mahasabha refused to see why the proposed treaty should not completely satisfy the fears of the minorities, two of whom—the Sikhs and the Depressed Classes—had expressed doubt as to the value such a treaty would have once Great Britain had disappeared from the picture. The Sikhs claimed that "the treaty . . . will have no sanction behind it"; and, again like the Congress Party, the Hindu Mahasabha complained of the vagueness of the interim proposals, especially the failure to give India a real control immediately over defense policies. Every word of the Hindu Mahasabha's communication to Sir Stafford Cripps expressed the determination to see a single united India governed on the basis of simple majority rule.

As Cripps was leaving India he spoke of the failure to reach agreement, saying that Congress "wanted all or nothing—they couldn't have all, so they got nothing." His comment serves to draw attention to one important difference between the moderates of the Non-Party Group and such Indian groups as the Moslem League or Congress. It would be a mistake to believe that the current of nationalism flows any less strongly in these moderates, otherwise an essentially conservative group of liberals, all of whom can point to distinguished records of public service in Indian and Commonwealth affairs. But they are more willing to compromise on immediate issues and have, ever since the war started, appeared reluctant to embarrass Great Britain by undue expression of their nationalist opinion. There is little doubt that if the decision had lain with them they would have accepted the British proposals and endeavored to build on them for the future in a spirit of hope and cooperation. But they were also sharply critical of and concerned over certain features, especially what they obviously considered to be the unimaginative approach to the question of defense and the grave danger to unity inherent in the proposals for separate Indian Unions and the use of the plebiscite as a means of determining this issue. A single quotation, which indicates their

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approach to the defense issue, must serve. After urging the necessity of a "complete non-officialization of Government" they went on to stress the importance of "a defense member drawn from the people," pointing out that there were "large and inexhaustible resources of manpower remaining untapped in the youth of the country" and that "his approach to this storehouse of strength will be by methods vitally different from those which the British official mind has hitherto employed with such little effect."

The position of the Indian States has always been a complicating factor in Indian politics. After the middle of the 19th century the British ceased further incorporation into British India of any Indian-ruled portions of India, preferring for various reasons to leave these areas under their autocratic Indian rulers but on the basis of a certain suzerainty exercised over them by Britain. In addition, however, to the regulation of the position of these Indian States by treaties with Great Britain, the British also invented the principle of "paramountcy," under which the suzerain power retained an undefined and indefinite right of overriding control.

One interesting feature of British rule in India over the last eighty or so years has lain in the fact that British Governments have from time to time varied their policy toward the Indian States, sometimes laying emphasis on the rights and obligations deriving from the treaties and at other times utilizing the doctrine of paramountcy to override treaty rights where necessary. But for over thirty years now little has been heard of paramountcy from the British side and it is therefore not surprising to find that the Princes, up to and including the recent period of the Cripps negotiations, have steadily and unremittingly stressed the sanctity of their own sovereign position under these treaties while at the same time asserting that they have no intention of standing in the way of India's constitutional progress —two attitudes which it seems difficult to reconcile.

To the Congress Party, with its platform of a single India united on the basis of India's underlying cultural unity and

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operating within the framework of democratic institutions, the attitude of the Princes and the insistence by the British Government, undue insistence as it seems to Congress, on Britain's treaty obligations to the Princes have been anathema. Congress insists it is outrageous that the 90,000,000 inhabitants of the States should be unable to express themselves on Indian affairs through democratic institutions, and specifically that these inhabitants should have no voice in determining who will be the representatives of the States in the proposed constitution-making body. Other groups however, such as the Moslem League, the Sikhs or even the Hindu Mahasabha, do not show the same concern and it is difficult to say how far the Congress Party attitude is influenced by consideration of the fact that the great majority of the population of the States is in fact Hindu and therefore might be expected to constitute an important addition to Congress political strength.

Such, in brief and somewhat oversimplified form, are the varying attitudes of Indian groups toward Indian domestic political issues as these exist today. It would lead us too far afield to speculate on the motives that may have prompted the All-India Congress Committee to commit the Party to the policy of a civil disobedience campaign and to hand over leadership and initiative once more to Gandhi. But mention of certain facts relating to Congress leadership, especially as these concern relations between Nehru and Gandhi, may contribute to an understanding of recent events.

At the time of the Cripps mission Gandhi was not the "leader" of the Congress Party. He had resigned from this position when in January 1942 the All-India Congress Committee had refused to endorse his policy of nonviolence as the means whereby India should seek to defend itself against any Axis aggression, and had been succeeded as "leader" by Nehru, who favored a policy of fighting to defend India. Thus Gandhi was not one of the Congress Committee's representatives appointed to participate in the discussions with Cripps. Nevertheless, the influence of Gandhi continually made itself felt.

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After Cripps's departure Nehru began to call for violent resistance to possible invasion, challenging the official Gandhi-inspired passive resistance formula. Said Nehru, "I want to fight this idea that we must remain passive and cannot do anything about the Japanese invader." At the same time another important Congress leader, Rajagopalachariar (who subsequently resigned from the Congress Working Committee) once more made clear his own disbelief in the appropriateness of any passive resistance policy. Gandhi's comment on all this was characteristic: "I am sorry Nehru has developed a fancy for guerilla warfare . . . it will take no effect. It is foreign to Indian soil . . . . I am not perturbed by the apostasy of either Jawaharlal or Rajaji. They will return to non-violence." Now Nehru (although not Rajagopalachariar) seems to have acted almost precisely as Gandhi foretold—something which will not surprise those who have read Nehru's own account, in his revealing *Autobiography*, of his complex relations and intellectual difficulties with "the paradox that is Gandhi." For Nehru the socialist, who has for years disagreed with almost every social and economic view advocated by Gandhi, nevertheless seems always to have felt the Congress Party's need for Gandhi's leadership whenever it was seeking support from the masses of India and the consequent necessity on such occasions of subordinating his own views to those of Gandhi. Most of the other Congress leaders seem to have been similarly affected. It is for instance interesting now to recall that when Gandhi resigned his leadership in January, Azad, President of the Congress Party, took care to point out that although the Party's leaders had disagreed with Gandhi on the issue of nonviolence they could still look to him for guidance and advice. Any appraisal, therefore, of Congress Party attitudes, particularly as these develop at times of crisis, must never overlook the dominant influence exercised by Gandhi.

In conclusion a few very brief comments should be made on Indian attitudes toward the outside world. This matter has two aspects. There is the question of India's relations to the

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British Commonwealth as a whole and there is the wider question of India's relations to the Western World. The first, because of past historical fact, is primarily a political question whereas the second raises wide social and cultural issues.

It is difficult to say with any precision how deeply divided Indian opinion is on the question of the country's future relations with the British Commonwealth. British Governments and statesmen in recent years have always expressed the hope, and usually made the assumption, that India's future, however free politically, should somehow and if possible lie within the political framework of the British Commonwealth. But there exists both English and Indian opinion which clearly questions this assumption. At the time of the Cripps negotiations the English liberal *New Statesman and Nation* said:

> . . . the word "Dominion" has no magic for them. They can never feel, as Australians and New Zealanders do, that theirs is a daughter nation of the Motherland in Europe. The constitutional plan which fits that relationship can never seem to them the natural expression of a family tie. The more important ties, economic as well as cultural, in their future development, may be those which will link them with China and other Asiatic neighbours. Words, it may be, matter more to Indians than to realistic Anglo-Saxons.

Nehru in his *Autobiography* said:

> The whole idea underlying the demand for independence was this: to make people realize that we were struggling for an entirely different political system and not just an Indianized edition. . .of the present order. . . .

And again, as recently as December 1941:

> . . . it is impossible for me to think of dominion status even with a time limit. What we contemplate is complete independence. . . .

There seems little doubt that at least some substantial elements of Indian political opinion are increasingly coming to think in terms of ultimate political separation from the British

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Commonwealth even if, as proved to be the case with Eire, they should find it advantageous to maintain many close economic relations. On the other hand the Hindu Mahasabha, at the time of the Cripps negotiations, was very definite in expressing its desire to see "the proclamation of the independence of India with co-partnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth"; while various minority groups such as the Sikhs, as well as the Princes, undoubtedly feel that some form of continuing relationship with the British Commonwealth might constitute a safeguard for their minority interests.

The question of India's relations to the Western World generally raises wide issues which can be no more than touched on here. Many people, including some Indians, have hoped for an India associated freely with the British Commonwealth and through this political association creating a bridge between East and West. Today in America there is an increasing awareness of the importance of achieving some degree of understanding between the common folk as well as between the rulers of Eastern and Western countries. In this connection there has been one aspect of India's external relationships which has been a potent but too often overlooked factor in the development of Indian nationalism. This is the desire, universally held by all Indians, that there should be an end to discrimination by other countries against Indians on account of their race. Discrimination in such matters as immigration, civil rights, economic and social status and so forth have brought India into dispute, sometimes passionate dispute, both with the British Government concerning the status of Indians in colonial areas (for instance Kenya) and with the independent Dominions (notably the Union of South Africa). More recently some observers have come to wonder whether the logic of political and geographical strategy, added to long-standing cultural associations, does not make inevitable India's ultimate inclusion in some regional grouping of contiguous Asiatic countries, extending from the Middle East to the Orient, rather than in the geographically scattered and culturally alien British Commonwealth.

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The Electron Microscope

E. F. BURTON

I. The Dual Theory of Light and Electrons

THE electron miscroscope is a typical, practical by-product of the most recent developments in theoretical physics, namely, the conclusion that both radiation and matter must be looked upon as having each a dual character: a wave property and a corpuscular discreteness.

A perusal of the table which follows shows that as new properties of natural phenomena reveal themselves in our experiments our theories of what is happening must be revamped to fit new experiences. The attempt to produce a satisfactory theory of natural phenomena is just an attempt on our part to imagine a "machine" which, working according to the laws of "machines" familiar to us in this workaday world, will accomplish what really happens in nature. For example, when Dr. Thomas Young in 1800 showed that interference and diffraction of light could be explained by supposing that light is a wave motion in some medium pervading all space, the wave theory of light won general acceptance.

In these days, however, in order to provide a satisfactory mechanical model for light we must be prepared to look upon it, on occasion, as a wave motion in space and, on occasion, as a stream of corpuscles. A completely analagous statement may be made regarding an electron. In order to provide a satisfactory mechanical model for the electron we must be prepared to look upon it, on occasion, as a wave motion in space and, on occasion, as a corpuscle, a small material particle of mass 9×10^{-28} grams and bearing a negative charge equal to 1.6×10^{-19} coulombs.

The illustrations used in this article are from the book, *The Electron Microscope*, by E. F. Burton and W. H. Kohl, recently published by the Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, N. Y. This volume develops in greater detail the principles discussed in this article.

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

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This is the same as saying that when experimenting with either light or electrons some results can be represented satisfactorily only by assuming the existence of a wave motion in space, while other experimental results can be accounted for only by assuming that we are dealing with small discrete entities shooting through space. These entities for light are called quanta or photons; the original conception of the electron was that it was a corpuscle.

These rather revolutionary conclusions are the result of converging streams in the historical development of the science of physics. In a sense they are looked upon as a great achievement of the human mind while in another sense they are really a confession of our ignorance of the complicated processes involved in natural phenomena.

The table on page 404 illustrates how this unification has come about historically. From the earliest times until the beginning of the 19th century the phenomena which, in the study of Natural Philosophy, were denoted by the terms "magnetism," "light" and "electricity" were looked upon as quite separate and distinct indications of nature's powers. With the discoveries of Oersted, Henry and Faraday in the early part of the last century the essential interdependence of these phenomena was experimentally revealed. It was shown conclusively that light was really a combination of electrical and magnetic actions. This interdependence is indicated in the terms describing Maxwell's Electromagnetic Theory of Light.

These great accomplishments awoke in the physicists of that period a sense of power and understanding of nature. This sense of satisfaction and finality was rudely shattered, however, by the discovery of X rays, radioactivity and the photoelectric effect. The wave theory of light, so useful in accounting for interference and diffraction, was useless in providing an explanation for the photoelectric effect, while this effect was quite satisfactorily accounted for on a corpuscular basis. This is what we mean by the dual theory of light: sometimes we must think of light as a wave motion, sometimes as a shower of corpuscles. By the

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year 1925 the same conclusions were arrived at regarding electrons, which also present the same dual aspect.

II. The Ordinary Microscope Limited by the Nature of Light

Although the first microscope was constructed some 300 years ago the greatest strides in the development of the compound microscope were made during the last 100 years. In spite of the advances made in the geometrical design of the lens systems and in the use of various types of optical glasses, it was proved experimentally that the accomplishments of the microscope were limited by the nature of light itself. We are accustomed in our elementary study of light, in school, to represent a lens as reproducing each point of an object by an ideal point in an image. As a matter of fact a point on the object is really reproduced as a more or less fuzzy disk in the image and the clearness or sharpness of an image is dependent on our being able to separate in the image *the two disks* which correspond to *two object points*. In short the image disks must not overlap.

The theory that light was a wave motion gave a perfectly good explanation of this phenomenon; it also demonstrated that two points on an object would never appear differentiated in the image if they happened to be closer together than approximately one third the wave length of light. This also sets the limit to the smallness of a particle visible in the microscope because we should not be made aware of the existence of say, a spherical particle unless we were able to differentiate in the image two points separated from one another by a distance equal to the diameter of the particle.

If the small microscopic particle is less than one third of a wave length (of light) in diameter it makes no impression on the light wave and, therefore, no impression in our eyes. The wave lengths to be assigned to different colors in the spectrum have been carefully worked out. That belonging to light near the middle of the spectrum—the yellowish orange—is approximately $\frac{6}{250,000}$ of an inch. The smallest particle that ordinary

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light can reveal to us is consequently about one third of this or $\frac{1}{125,000}$ of an inch. Since this limit is fixed we can easily understand that the function of any microscope is delimited by factors outside the control of the microscope maker.

Of what use then is a microscope? The normal "naked" eye cannot see anything in detail held closer to it than 10 inches. At this distance the smallest object that can be seen must have a linear dimension of at least $\frac{1}{250}$ of an inch. Consequently if we are to see small particles $\frac{1}{125,000}$ in diameter with our eyes, such objects must be magnified at least 500 times $\left(500 \times \frac{1}{125,000} = \frac{1}{250}\right)$ and the magnified image must be at least 10 inches from the eye. If we magnify the object 2000 times it makes it easier for the eye to see. No amount of further magnification will reveal any finer detail. This represents then the impasse reached by the finest microscope by 1900.

III. Attempts to Push Down the Limit of Visibility to Smaller Particles

In 1900 the so-called ultramicroscope was invented by Zsigmondy and Siedentopf. This device was merely an adaptation of dark-background illumination; it gave evidence only of the *existence* of particles of dimensions less than the above limit, but it did not allow direct observation of the *size* or *shape* of such particles.

Again, since the lower limit depends on the wave length of the light used, smaller particles are revealed by using ultraviolet light which has a wave length of only about one third that of visible light. Since, however, ultraviolet light does not give an impression on the retina all such observations must be recorded on photographic plates (or films). Use of ultraviolet light enables us to photograph particles as small as $\frac{1}{300,000}$ of an inch.

In 1895 X rays were discovered. In the course of time it was shown that these rays resemble ordinary light in many ways but the wave length to be assigned to X rays is very much smaller than that for ordinary light. If this new light could be used

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instead of visible or ultraviolet light we should be able to see or photograph very much smaller particles. But no material lens can be constructed which will act on X rays in the way that glass lenses act on ordinary light to produce visible images. X rays do enable us to learn something of crystal structure but this is dependent on a diffraction effect and not on any image-forming property of X rays.

IV. Electrons in Motion Have a Wave Property

When the discovery of "electrons" was first announced in the 1890's it was evident that they had the properties of electrically charged particles of matter in motion. This conclusion was arrived at after a rather spirited exchange between English and German scientists; the latter believed the electron beam was a kind of light.

Although the idea of *duality* as applied to light was fairly well established by 1910 nobody seemed to consider that an electron beam might exhibit the same kind of duality. This point of view was first definitely set forth by de Broglie of Paris in 1923. Experiments were soon under way to find out whether an electron beam showed the phenomena of interference and diffraction, the *sine qua non* of a wave motion. That it did was proved almost simultaneously (1927) by Davisson and Germer of the Bell Telephone Laboratories in New York City and by G. P. Thomson, then at Aberdeen University.

It is a remarkable fact that before the experimental proof of the existence of electron waves was accomplished de Broglie gave an expression by which one could measure the *wave length of electron waves* accompanying electrons in motion. The expression is the following: $\lambda = \frac{12.24}{\sqrt{V}} \times 10^{-8}$ cm. where λ stands for the wave length and V (in volts) is the potential difference applied to the electrical field by which the electron is given its velocity. From this formula it is apparent that the greater the intensity of the electrical field, i.e. the faster the electron is made to move, the shorter will be the wave length. With very ordinary and practical values of V, in the above formula, we

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can obtain a value of the wave length, λ, which is only $\frac{1}{1000}$ of that belonging to visible light. This means that we should be able to photograph things as small as $\frac{1}{1000}$ of the smallest particle visible with ordinary light.

Here again, then, we had, as in the case of X rays, wave lengths much shorter than those of ordinary light. The question at once was asked, "Can these electron waves be used in a microscopic fashion to produce images?" In other words, "Can we devise electron lenses?"

V. Electron Lenses

In the development of the dual theory of the electron de Broglie demonstrated that the *path of an electron*, its so-called trajectory, as it moves through space bears the same relation to its wave property as *the ray of light* does to the wave property of light. Just as we trace the path of light through a series of lenses, the refractive media, in order to determine the image of an object, so, if we could direct the paths of electrons, we might be able to focus electrons arising from an object to make them form an image. This *has* been accomplished by the use of either electrical fields or magnetic fields; we have produced electrostatic electron lenses and magnetic electron lenses.

(a) Electrostatic Electron Lens

A simple example of the regular way in which an electron path may be deflected in an electric field is shown in Fig. 1.



FIG. 1. How the path of an electron bends when travelling through a potential field.

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The plate A is maintained at a potential of +500 volts and the plate B at a potential of +1500 volts; the dotted lines show the distribution of the lines of equal potential and the heavy line, OP, shows the path of the electron.

That we have here a phenomenon to which the term "refraction" might well be applied is quite apparent when we compare Fig. 1 with Fig. 2 which illustrates the phenomenon of refraction of light through the atmosphere. It is this phenomenon that enables us to see the sun for some time after it has set.



FIG. 2. To show the analogy between the refraction of light and the bending of the path of electrons.

The electrostatic electron lens is ridiculously simple—merely a hole or aperture in a metal plate. In Fig. 3, F is a cathode, the source from which electrons shoot out as indicated by the small arrows, B is a metal plate with a hole in the center and C a second metal plate. The plate A acts as a shield to the cathode F and, as represented here, F, A and B are maintained at the same potential (zero) while C is at a potential of + 100 volts.

The broken lines represent the lines of equipotential. At the opening in the plate, B, the electrical field is distorted as indicated by the bulging of the equipotential lines, and the paths

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

FIG. 3. The influence of an electrode with an aperture near the cathode.

of the electrons are refracted as they are in Fig. 1. As a result, electrons coming from a small area at F are focused at the small area F_1 on the plate C.

(*b*) *Magnetic Electron Lens*

The analogous case of "refraction" in a magnetic field is not quite so simple as that in an electric field.

When electrons were first discovered they were described as small negatively charged particles on account of the action of a magnetic field on the fluorescent beam in a vacuum tube;



FIG. 4. The deflection produced in the path of an electron passing through a magnetic field.

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the path of the beam is marked by fluorescence caused by ionization of the gas by the electrons, which are themselves invisible. When the magnet was held so that the magnetic force was at right angles to the electron beam, the latter moved as though it were a conductor bearing negative electricity in the direction of motion of the electrons. This direction was at right angles to both the direction of motion of the electrons and the direction of the magnetic field. This is demonstrated in Fig. 4.

There are three characteristics of the interaction of electrons and magnetic fields:

1. A magnetic field has no effect on an electron at rest.

2. A magnetic field has no effect on an electron moving in the direction of the magnetic force, i.e. along the magnetic lines of force.

3. Electrons moving at right angles to the magnetic field are deflected in circular paths in a plane perpendicular to the direction of the field. This motion is shown in Fig. 5.



(a) (b)

FIG. 5. The path of an electron entering a magnetic field in a direction at right angles to the lines of force is changed to a circle. Fig. 5b gives an end-on view of the circular path; the dots represent the sections of the lines of force.

From the latter two facts we can deduce the effect of a magnetic field on an electron moving in a direction making any angle with the direction of the magnetic field. In Fig. 6 this motion is illustrated. The side of a solenoid is cut away so as to picture what transpires in the interior where the direction of the magnetic field is along the axis of the solenoid. If an electron starts from P with a velocity represented by the line PB we may resolve this velocity into two component velocities:

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

FIG. 6. The focusing action of a magnetic field on an electron diverging from the direction of the field.

(1) that at right angles to the field and (2) that parallel to the magnetic field. The first component determines the circular motion in a plane perpendicular to the axis and the second component carries the electron along the axial direction to the right but without distortion. Combining these two motions, it is apparent that electrons shooting out in random directions from a point P on the axis will describe a spiral path to another point P_1 on the axis; or P and P_1 are analogous to object point and image point.

VI. Compound Electron Microscopes

Once the principles of regulated refraction in electric or magnetic fields were successfully mastered, the development of electron miscroscopes followed as an immediate consequence. The motion of the electrons is possible only in a high vacuum and their paths cannot pass through anything but the slightest thickness of matter; fortunately we have in electric and magnetic fields non-material fields of force which can be maintained in a vacuum and we are therefore able to maintain the electron lens system in such a vacuum.

The plate illustrations shown here were all taken with a compound electron miscroscope using magnetic fields as lenses,

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but there is no doubt that before long similar instruments will be produced with electrostatic instead of magnetic lenses.

The following description refers to the magnetic type of electron microscope developed at the University of Toronto.

VI. Compound Electron Microscope
Magnetic Lenses

In Fig. 7 drawings are given (a) showing the layout of the lens systems of a light microscope, (b) tracing the rays of light from source to image for the light microscope and (c) an analogous tracing of the paths of electrons in the electron microscope.



FIG. 7. Comparison of light microscope and magnetic electron microscope.

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The substage condenser focuses the light on the object in order to make the latter approach as nearly as possible to a self-luminous object, from which light scatters to form the image. In the electron miscroscope the first magnetic lens focuses the electrons from the source on the object, which scatters the electrons from its points. The objective lens forms the first image, which in turn is magnified by the projector lens.

All of the magnetic fields must be enclosed in a vacuum and the final image formed on a photographic plate or film. At various stages the images may be formed on fluorescent screens and thus sharply focused by the eye. The focusing is carried out principally by varying the strength of the magnetic fields thereby altering the strength of the currents through the coils.

VIII. The Future Possibilities

Since the electron microscope reveals a completely new world of small things and new detail of design in objects already made visible by the light microscope, we have really a new problem in the interpretation of the electron microscope pictures.

For example, as some of the plates show, we have pictures of bacilli and viruses which have not been seen before. It is of hardly any use asking the physicist to interpret the details of such pictures; neither the physicist, nor anyone else, can at once interpret what he sees for the first time. We shall have to wait until hundreds of pictures have been taken of a single type of object before we can offer an explanation. But there is distinctly a hope that such a long series of photographs may reveal to us even the life history of the smallest virus, germ or bacillus. To the commercial person interested in various dusts, smokes or powders used in manufacturing operations, the size, shape and surface of the fine particles are directly evident. This promises to be extremely important.

However, merely to have achieved the present results is satisfaction enough to the physicist!

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The Philosopher, the Common Man and William James

JUSTUS BUCHLER

THE common man, the vague but unmistakable being that resides in all men, has been dealt with kindly by philosophers. Aristotle credited him with a natural desire to know. Descartes proclaimed that "good sense is of all things in the world the most equally distributed" and that "Reason is by nature equal in all men." Even Hobbes, who was so distrustful of democracy, believed that "every man brought Philosophy, that is, Natural Reason, into the world with him." Philosophers themselves have experienced rougher historical weather. They have been accused by the common man of contradicting one another and they have accused one another of self-contradiction. They have all more or less felt obliged to pay homage to common sense, partly because of a desire to associate their ideas with universal interests and perhaps more immediately because of their craving for a universally accepted base on which to rest the claim of validity. A few philosophers have ventured to emphasize the most striking fact of all—that in confusion and self-contradiction the common man himself is the greatest offender. He is cleft by fiercely opposite impulses. On the one hand he is a natural skeptic, meeting the opinions of another with the attitude of "show me" and "seeing is believing." But on the other hand he is constantly driven to easy generalization by the most superficial evidence in his own experience. Crass doubt and natural suspicion are of his essence, but with the same force hearsay rules him and he will create deities for himself if none are supplied him by tradition and gospel. And what is the common element in the common man's

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beliefs? If philosophers have championed common sense they have failed to agree on what constitutes it.

We like to think, and our historians have helped us to do so, that within the last century the common man has been discovered by American philosophers, who have announced his natural wisdom, his "human orthodoxy," as Santayana calls it. Obviously the appeal of these philosophers to common sense as such is hardly an innovation. But their study of it has been more detailed and more critical. They flatter the common man less and respect common sense more. Like other philosophers their allegiance to common sense demands an uncommon language and no two of them use the same. One among them, however, could use the tongue of the many in philosophizing. He found the common man intelligible to an extent that others did not and he was as intelligible to the common man as a philosopher can be. William James is the symbol of the plain man's aspiration to understand. But is it proper to call James or Dewey "philosopher of the common man"? In what sense can anyone be a philosopher of the common man, and is such a title praiseworthy or derogatory? So far as the common man in his universality is concerned, many philosophers represent him as well as if not better than James and Dewey. What is probably meant, when it is not said, is that James and Dewey are philosophers of the American common man, our average man; that they formulate his spirit as Walt Whitman sings it. Georges Sorel sees James's philosophy as an attempt to justify all the assumptions of American society. Santayana thinks that this characterization fits not James but Dewey, whom he regards as "the devoted spokesman of the spirit of enterprise, of experiment, of modern industry." There is a sense in which both of these judgments are sound. For if by the assumptions of American society we mean the principles on which the ideals of American civilization rest, then James is their genuine representative; and if by "enterprise," "experiment" and "industry" we imply adherence to the spirit of scientific inquiry and the perfection of our order of living, then Dewey is indeed

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their devoted spokesman. But James is no agent of "assumptions" in the sense of existing tendencies: he hated imperialism, the "genteel tradition," the success ideal and academic hypocrisy. And if the concepts of enterprise and industry be construed in their usual unimaginative sense they have no more potent enemy than the logic, the educational theory and the religious philosophy of Dewey.

William James is the symbol less of the universal common man, less of the American average man, than of every man's bewilderment in a stubborn universe. This does not mean that his answers have extraordinary compulsion or that he thought they have. He laid less of a claim to certainty than any other philosopher, for he discerned the vanity of every such claim. "The word 'and' trails along after every sentence," he said, magnificently expressing what he took to be the endless incompletion of the universe—the "multiverse" he called it—and the relativity, tentativeness and pathos of human knowledge. In James are embodied the doubt and confusion of the lay mind that has awakened to the possibilities of speculation and the ultimate aching dissatisfaction of the philosophic mind that has formulated answers. Plato tells us that philosophy begins in wonder. Through James we learn that it ends in wonder too.

Recently much has been said about how necessary it is to trace ideas to their cultural environments if they are to be understood, since philosophers inevitably reflect their age. But the effect of philosophers upon their own and later ages, though an older and less fashionable truth, is at least as important and certainly more impressive. Aristotle's thought, Charles Peirce used to point out, still tyrannizes over the thoughts of butchers and bakers who never heard of him. If any one philosopher molded the characteristic intellectual responses of the last generation in America it was James. His version of pragmatism, itself in part an echo of Peirce's pragmatism and the successes of 19th-century science and technology, was echoed vociferously. When he persuasively suggested that the meaning and truth of ideas are determined by their workability, their prac-

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ticability, their effects upon our conduct, no one including James felt it necessary to define these terms critically. The schoolteacher, the journalist, the after-dinner toastmaster took up the cry. For the old Greek maxim "Man is the measure of all things," the old Christian admonition "By their fruits ye shall know them," and the homelier proverb that the proof of the pudding is in the eating, James's posterity substituted the interrogative chant "Does it work?" "What does it mean to me?"

A hundred years ago, when James was born, many of the movements now almost synonymous with "19th century" were still gestating. Marxism and Darwinism were some years away, pragmatism was not to be formulated until the '70's, American laboratory psychology and its great theoretical expression were to await James himself, and the peculiarly social period of conflict between religion and science that agitated everyone down to the last ignoramus had not yet come to the fore. When James died in 1910 the religion-science conflict had spent itself, everyone was using the label "pragmatism" for his own opinions, psychoanalysis was well under way and relativity physics was emerging. Nowhere in the stream of all these tendencies is the conflict and paradoxy of the plain man's mind so eloquently reflected as in James's speculations on the religious implications of philosophy. The plain man's attitude to religion, like his intellectual demeanor in general, is by no means as consistent as his natural conservatism would seem to imply. Whatever his outward habits may be, his inner impulses have led him in at least three directions. Most often perhaps he embraces church organization, the counsel of ecclesiastical elders and the authority of Holy Writ. When the spirit of natural forces and an aesthetic realization of immensity move him he becomes dissatisfied with convention and takes refuge in a religious consciousness private to him. And when sometimes he is gripped by the immediacy of his worldly interests he becomes irreligious or nonreligious, cynical and defiant or simply indifferent. Early modern Protestantism tried vehemently to unite the first two directions. In the 1920's, to mention only

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one familiar instance, the third was regnant. Of recent years church organization in America has begun again to flourish, the natural concomitant of impending crisis. The flock returns to the fold, yet devoid of piety and religious consciousness. The common man strays and returns and strays again, both in his own lifetime and in the course of history. But it is far from a secret that church membership has never been a necessary condition of religious feeling. The church has always looked with suspicion on the most devout of religious mystics, for to the mystic individual insight and private illumination are paramount.

James's reflection of the plain man's conflict consists not in the fact that he too shifts from one alternative to another but rather in the quality of his perplexity. Organized religion meant little to him. It implied dogma and he had no sympathy with allegations of fixed, eternal principles in a universe that he found pregnant with unlimited novelty. Only in the individual's immediate consciousness, he believed, can the secret of things be revealed in any degree at all, since there only can we arrive at the particular, the specific, the concrete. But although he found organization and elaborate theologies distasteful he called himself a supernaturalist; a "crass" supernaturalist, moreover, not a "refined" one; an advocate of the plain man's confidence in a literal deity, not an apologist for an abstraction. The warring strains in James now begin to appear. He tried to restrict himself to "a strictly positivistic point of view" and to abstain from "metaphysical" inquiry in order to arrive at the most fruitful conclusions, yet he was impressed by the primacy of mystical phenomena and subconscious feeling as the key to ultimate knowledge. He found supernaturalism inevitable at the same time that his pragmatism bade him stick doggedly to the experiential and the workable. In this war of moods and of methods he established peace of a sort. Natural science for its limited purpose shuns metaphysics, but metaphysics can utilize the results of science toward a deeper interpretation of the universe. Pragmatism tells us to test the

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meaning and truth of all ideas in experience. But is not subconscious and mystical experience equally experience? A theory must "work." But does not supernaturalism work in the sense that it is the theory which best explains these mysterious experiences? And does it not also "work" in the sense that it offers us hope and expectation? In this attempted synthesis of the quest for hidden causes and the doctrine of workability James emerges as arbiter of the common man's contradictions. For him too natural skepticism and show-me logic were powerful forces, revealing themselves in his love of the sensuous and the immediate. And when he appeased his hunger for the super-cosmic—what the common man's speculation gropes at despite his confidence in the immediately present—it was only through the idea that immediate experience can convey far more than what is immediately present.

If James thus seemed to find peace where the plain man could not, deep down his dissatisfaction still lived and the vague mending of his opinions satisfied his mind but not his heart. Another approach gave him greater comfort. It was at the turn of the century that he and Santayana, in the heat of the religion-science deadlock, offered strikingly different solutions to the problem. Admit frankly, Santayana urged, that only science can yield truth and that religion cannot contribute to our knowledge of fact. Admit further that naturalism is the inevitable philosophy consequent upon this attitude. The proper domain of religion may then be seen clearly. It is to symbolize and bring home to us dramatically the highest of human ideals. Religion is poetry, the poetry of man's basic moral strivings. Let us liberate ourselves from superstition and understand by "God" a symbol of the ideal of perfection rather than an incomprehensible magical power. To James such a position was unintelligible. What *is* religion if not a guarantor of human destiny? Why *must* science be the only guide to truth? May not our emotions and our will justify us in our deepest beliefs? Here was the approach that really satisfied him. What can we lose if we adhere to what we think ought to be the case? Where

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science cannot fathom the depths of subconscious feeling, cannot our will guide us to what is? The will to believe is the right to believe. The common man in William James had found the language to clothe his craving.

Whether the notion of a will to believe is any more plausible than a will to disbelieve or reduces to a will to make-believe is of importance as a philosophic issue; but it is secondary so far as the evaluation of James is concerned. The idea should be regarded less as the statement of a doctrine than as the expression of a temper. In the expression of this temper James revealed the rare human virtue that was his. He caused the words that he wrote to coincide with the things that he felt. This was not mere honesty. It was not the mere recording of belief. It was thinking out loud, with the desire that others should hear and do the same. It was the trait that made James a representative of no one but himself. The will to believe was for him if for no one else a sentiment and not a rationalization; and to his eyes this was absolutely fundamental because he saw all logic as in the last analysis a sentiment. James did not love strict logic but neither did he fear logical consequences. And he conceived of philosophy not as vision but as "passionate vision." In this remarkable phrase is reflected his unusual respect for emotion and will and his idea of inquiry as a process of growing. "One always felt that the pencil, not the pen, was the lever with which he ought to have moved the world," Peirce said of him; "and yet no! it was not the externals of things but their souls he could have pictured."

As a symbol of ideals peculiarly American James has been portrayed too much in biographical and too little in philosophical terms. Of one ideal especially, the union of moral tolerance with rational discrimination, his whole intellectual attitude is a perfect embodiment. It is easier to tolerate men than ideas. Yet for James the attempt to embrace the good in every system of thought that he knew was a native appetite. In anyone else the result of such a tendency would have been a mediocre eclecticism. In him, however, critical severity was no mere ap-

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pendage to toleration but an integral aspect of it. A biographical emphasis might cite as illustration of this severity his love of shocking audiences or of embarrassing college presidents. And perhaps, after all, even the philosophic virtues of James are most clearly visible in the human setting. Once in a lecture on immortality he began by expressing his deep sympathy with the idea. As a scientific psychologist he tolerated the Christian dogma and hope; as a religious man he tolerated the right of psychology to analyze and dissolve mystery. The idea of immortality, he said, need not be accepted as magic; it is at least consistent with the best scientific theory of the brain and thought. But, he reminded the audience with an earthy democratic glee, if it should follow from the very nature of the brain that immortality is a fact, then immortality belongs to all who have a brain—to Christian and heathen, to sheep and goat, to saint and sinner, indeed to man and beast. Critical severity, going hand in hand with a wink, as it always did in James, here replaced tolerance of opinion and led to the subtler Socratic tolerance of logical consequences.

When American thought is surveyed in its entirety it seems at first that the earlier period, say from Jonathan Edwards to Emerson, is preoccupied primarily with moral issues and that the later period, beginning around 1870, introduces experimental philosophy and a concern with logical method. But so far as the later period is concerned this is far from accurate, for there is a sense in which moral issues literally dominate it. The ideas which Royce adapted from modern mathematics and the pragmatism of his day were placed in the ethical setting of his religious idealism, while the antithetical philosophy of Santayana posed as its major problem the development of moral ideals in a framework of naturalism. Among the most persistent themes in Peirce is the moral character of disinterested scientific inquiry; the theme second to none in Dewey is the scientific basis of moral truth. In the midst of all this the man who might be expected to stand in the foreground of the concern with the moral has no specific moral theory. The paradox

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is best explained in paradoxical terms. Looked at from one side James's logic is a disguised morality and his who philosophy is simply a system of ethics not conscious of itself as such; yet from the other side it is the kind of dispassionate study that ignores moral issues as irrelevant. As a religious philosopher James could not help identifying the true and the good. As a philosophical scientist he could not help separating the two.

In spite of his many virtues it is difficult to say specifically just where James's strength as a philosopher lies. His tentativeness and opposition to dogmatism spring not from considerations of logic, but from an intellectual humility in itself infinitely admirable. His philosophy of religion is deficient in poetry—which cannot, any more than philosophy or science, arise merely from the existence of genuine sentiment. If a man's greatness is measured in the usual way by the intensity and extent of his influence, then James stands with the vanguard in philosophic history. Still this does not answer the question. It is necessary to ask: What philosophic trait is responsible for the force of the influence? May not the power of James have lain in his being a learner first and a teacher second? This quality was more than an attribute of personality; it was the animation or soul of his thought. So that even in the best of his works, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* or *The Principles of Psychology*, the specific conclusions ultimately count for less than the spirit which seeks them out. They are developed rather than expounded. Interpreted in this way the principle of workability ceases to be a vulgar dictum by which ideas are mechanically accepted or rejected and becomes a vital reminder to achieve verification. It is transformed from a justification of the common man's myopia into an exhortation that his beliefs should come alive. James's love of verification compensated for his failure to define it precisely. The passion for learning was an objective constituent of his work. Because his desire for communication was subordinate to his desire for discovery he communicated with the greatest possible effectiveness.

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The Common Man and William James

If it is uncertain whether and in what sense anyone is a philosopher of the common man it is clear that James is his prophet. By nature he looked to the better rather than the worse and he could not help seeing the earth as the center of the cosmos. What Santayana sensed in Royce, however, "forced optimism and pulpit unction," was completely absent from James. He sought to reform without being a reformer, to convert with a minimum of missionary zeal. "I was conceived and born in philosophic sin," he could write in answer to criticism. By entering philosophic combat without armor and refusing to become the object of his own piety he achieved a unique invulnerability. Though he may have been a false prophet in so far as falsity is determined by logic and fact he was not false to himself or mistaken in the knowledge of his own mind, the prophecy having been simply the inevitable offspring of his makeup.

Heine did justice to both poetry and philosophy when he distinguished between commonplace ideas and ideas encased in green leather. These are the poles between which the philosophy of James tries to mediate. Its ideas aim to be common in more than one sense yet not commonplace, and critically philosophic yet not dessicated. Like all significant philosophies it has contributed to a cumulative philosophic fund of ideas and of perspectives. It cannot be considered a rich contribution if the standard of appraisal is the magnitude of the individual ideas or their number, nor does it loom especially impressive as a stimulus to the thought of the present. But as soon as its historical function is defined its significance for the present too becomes more apparent. When attention is turned to emphases instead of assertions, to methods instead of proposals, and the unique and the permanent is sorted out from the inessential in a man's thinking, there can be discerned a historical path that leads to and beyond James.

Over three centuries ago Descartes suggested to the common man that he believe as true what he really comes to feel as true and not what happens to be written down somewhere.

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Bacon reminded him of the pitfalls that threaten his unaided common sense and his uncriticized human traditions. Spinoza showed him that is is possible to be at once pious and masterful and to attain peace without delusion. Locke revealed to him the dangers of language. Hume showed him how even the most cherished principles of science and philosophy can never be regarded as absolutely certain. Kant suggested that the character of our knowledge is at least partly determined by the nature of the knowing process; Hegel that the progress of knowing lies in a creative reconciliation of opposing ideas. If we can call a philosopher of the common man one whose thought exists to be shared by the common man, then there has been no other kind of philosopher. And if James merits the title in a very special way it is because his suggestion was somewhat more intimate and humble. Nourish your abstractions with the meat of your common experience, he confided, and test the abstractions of others in the same manner. Lend yourself to the free play of thought and to the spontaneous hints of all fact and all feeling. Reckon with your imagination the "dramatic probabilities" of nature. Obey some of the impulses that philosophic traditions have imprisoned. So in a sense James returned for his inspiration to the great principle of sincerity expressed by Descartes, hammering now not at the bonds of authority but at the stonelike rigor of intellectual habit and the awful silence of dead ideas.

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Jean Sans Terre Devant Le Printemps Et La Mort

YVAN GOLL

Jean sans Terre: embrasse
De tes bras serrés
Les saisons qui passent
Passent sans arrê

Car la vie remonte
De toutes les morts
Car le doute a honte
Et la nuit a tort

Quand l'ardente aurore
Immuablement
Ranime et redore
Tout commencement

Entre l'herbe sèche
Du moindre talus
S'élance la flèche
Du premier crocus

Ecoute les cloches
Du muguet pascal
Entends sous la roche
L'orgue du cristal

L'assemblée des aulnes
Devant le ruisseau
Répète les psaumes
Du règne nouveau

Pour ses fiançailles
Le champ reverdi
Frappe les médailles
D'or du pissenlit

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Les plus pauvres saules
Et les plus bossus
Portent sur l'épaule
L'oiseau revenu

Oh toi qui termines
Bientôt ton destin
Chargé d'albumine
Mordu de chagrin

Toi qui sens ta corne
Lentement durcir
Le cheveu qui t'orne
Déjà s'alanguir

Qui entends la nacre
De ta dent sauter
Que nul simulacre
Ne pourra sauver

Toi qui dans la moelle
Pourrie de tes os
Sais que ton étoile
Te voue au chaos

Est-ce toi qui chantes
Le long du chemin
Où les communiantes
S'en vont le matin?

Toi qui t'agenouilles
Dans le trèfle blanc
Et du crâne fouilles
Le sol odorant?

Oh ta lourde tête
Pâle: penche-la
Sur la violette
Qu'un mars viola

Car tu n'es pas autre
Que ces végétaux
Bagnard ou apôtre
Toi qui mourras tôt

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Jean Sans Terre

Sache que ton âme
Toujours renaîtra
Dans le cerf qui brâme
Dans le mimosa

La suprême essence
De tes yeux taris
Croîtra d'abondance
Dans les myosotis

L'inquiète ancolie
Aura la couleur
De mélancolie
Qui teignait ton coeur

Lorsqu'un jour trois mètres
De terreau tassé
Couvriront ton être
Calme trépassé

Jean Sans Terre Fait Sept Fois Le Tour De La Terre

Au blond matin
D'une vie entière
Il s'en va loin
Vers la grand'terre

Il part tout seul
Soldat du mystère
Rien qu'une fleur
A la boutonnière

Souriant toujours
Battant des paupières
Il trompe l'amour
A chaque frontière

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Dans les cités
Bouillantes de bière
Toute gaité
Tourne en misère

Au bar des ports
L'épient les moukères
Les garçons forts
Ne l'aiment guère

Amant des mers
Des îles de fièvre
Les vents amers
Baisent sa lèvre

Il fait sept fois
Le tour de la terre
Portant la foi
Dans sa tête fière

Barbier Cireur
Prêtre Corsaire
Pion Empereur
Métiers de chimère

Mais c'est bien peu
De courir la terre
De manger du feu
De faire la guerre

Oh toute part
La même misère
Arrivées départs
Aux débarcadères

Soir et matin
La chair et le rêve
Le pain et le vin
Tiens! Mange et crève!

Individu
Sans nom sans terre
Coeur triste et nu
Qui s'exaspère

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Jean Sans Terre

Sans passeport
Sans père sans frère
Mendie ta mort
Aux cimetières

Jean L'Apatride

Je suis Jean l'apatride
De la vieille tribu
Qui marche dans le vide
Sans bagage et sans but

Combien de grands ancêtres
Déjà m'ont précédé
En jouant tout leur être
Sur la chute d'un dé

Ils montent des ténèbres
Des caves du destin
Rapportant de l'Erèbe
L'énigme silurien

Et de ces patriarches
Le docile filleul
Je marche marche marche
Décisivement seul

La vitesse du Gange
La lenteur du Jourdain
N'altèrent ni ne changent
Le cours de mon destin

De cime en cimetière
Et de site en cité
Ma solitude altière
Ne m'a jamais quitté

Je tiens dans ma main moite
Le bâton tout chenu
Que la terre est étroite!
Et que le sol est nu!

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The American Scholar

La terre toute entière
Brousse de barbelés
Oppose ses frontières
Au pas des harcelés

Ni la juste montagne
Ni le vallon rêveur
Paria n'accompagne
Ma fuite vers l'ailleurs

Et ni le vert Danube
Ni le Mississippi
De tous leurs mètres cubes
N'emportent mon dépit

J'ai cueilli les absinthes
M'agenouillant au sol
J'ai orchestré les quintes
En sol du rossignol

J'ai vu dans les cuisines
Les cuivres miroiter
Les lits de mousseline
Dans l'alcove ouaté

J'ai prié sous la palme
Et j'ai dormi sous l'if
Sans obtenir le calme
De mon coeur évasif

Jean Sans Terre Sur Les Cimes

Puisque Jean sans Terre
N'a pas arraché
De la vaste terre
Un mètre carré

Il cherche les cimes
D'où l'homme transi
Jette aux dieux sublimes
L'affront de son cri

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Jean Sans Terre

La jeune tempête
Souffle dans son coeur
La neige lui prête
Sa plus douce fleur

L'ombre du mélèze
Roux et svelte sur
La colline pèse
Moins qu'un bleu d'azur

Sur les cols de glace
Il lit plein d'émoi
L'adorable trace
Des tendres chamois

Enfin Jean sans Terre
Conquiert le sommet
Où l'immense terre
Toute se soumet

Cent pics l'environnent
Et dansent en rond
Vibrante couronne
Autour de son front

Sera-t-il une heure
Un vrai souverain?
Oh déjà l'écoeure
Un règne si vain!

Oh déjà l'agace
L'égale splendeur
Trop d'or! Trop d'espace
Et trop de grandeur!

Cette cime pure
Qui tant l'attirait
Fond sous sa chaussure
Le roc se défait

Une eau sale suinte
Du puissant glacier
La flamme est éteinte
Sur les champs d'acier

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The American Scholar

Mais là-bas s'élèvent
Vers les occidents
Les pays de rêve
Les vrais Chanaans

Là-bas s'illuminent
Les sommets royaux
Et gisent les mines
Des réels joyaux

Là-bas Jean sans Terre
La foule t'attend
Où l'homme se terre
Loin des éléments

Un nuage rose
Glisse doucement
Et couvre de roses
Tout un continent

Qu'il est difficile
D'être seul et grand!
Là-bas mille villes
Te rappellent: Jean!

Vite il faut descendre
Plein de repentir
Dans la nuit de cendre
Aller se blottir

Là-bas! Jean sans Terre!
Pas ici! Là-bas
Sont les joies entières!
Là où tu n'es pas!

Jean Sans Terre Achète Manhattan

Rocher Manhattan: fantôme d'argile
Ton port accueille mon navire inquiet
Je tire mon vieux chapeau de fossile
Devant tes débardeurs et tes banquiers

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Jean Sans Terre

L'océan baise ton Alpe inhumaine
Que la sueur humaine échafauda
Alpe où paissent les troupeaux de la peine
Où chantonnent les sources de soda

Le Hudson lance ses rouges ferries
Comme les navettes du tisserand
Qui tisse une ancienne tapisserie
Dont le sujet déteint dans le courant

Mais le fer rouille et le gazon s'oxyde
Ici tout vieillit plus vite qu'ailleurs
Cinquante étages sont meublés de vide
La solitude appelle en vain sa soeur

Dépose ton bilan: ère prospère
Chasse les pauvres de la Bowery
Près des géants innocents de la terre
Un cimetière de gloire pourrit

Le tourniquet des subways moud la foule
La pâte à papier la pâte à destin
C'est un torrent de sperme qui s'écoule
Et va se perdre dans les traversins

42. Rue: les marchands de tempête
Soldent les tambours troués de la mort
Au rabais les chandeliers de la fête
Assurances contre le mauvais sort

Prends une hypothèque sur la sagesse
Loue le rural brin d'herbe à Central Park
Le sens de l'ironie est à la baisse
Et le coton est stocké par les Parques

Tu as renié ton père et ta mère
Le boeuf gros sel et le dieu de cristal
Mais le Chinois te vend de la chimère
Et le Négresse du philtre ancestral

L'homme est monté au cinquantième étage
Tout en haut de l'échelle de Jacob
Mais il redescend l'escalier de l'âge
Et se retrouve au pourrissoir de Job

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Vendre le blé pour acheter Floride
Acheter Dieu vendre la liberté
Vendre l'amour acheter l'arachide
Vendre vendre vendre pour acheter

Vendre le cuivre acheter le mystère
Vendre le rêve acheter la gaîté
Vendre le pétrole acheter la guerre
Vendre vendre vendre sans acheter

J'achète Manhattan pour un sourire
Je le revends pour l'immortalité
Un jour ce sable aura cessé de luire
Le Rocher rêvera d'une Cité

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The National Debt: Means to Postwar Prosperity

WILLIAM VICTOR STRAUSS

THE size of the national debt is in itself a matter of utter unimportance. Whether the debt is large or small it can play a significant role in the life of the nation only to the extent that it serves to alter the distribution of wealth and income among the various economic groups within the community. There is no necessary relation between the size of the debt and the extent of this effect. It is possible for a large national debt to have no such effect whatever whereas the impact of a smaller national debt upon the distribution of wealth and income might under some conditions be very great.

During the period when the debt is being built up, expendible funds are withdrawn from the hands of their private owners and turned over to the government for the latter's use. These borrowed funds are as completely removed from their owners' current use as if they had been taken through taxation. They are in the government's possession, to be administered in the interest of the nation as a whole.

When interest is paid on these borrowings or when the capital amount of the outstanding debt is reduced these funds, or a portion of them, are restored to private hands. The interest payments and the repayments of principal are made out of the general tax revenues of the nation. If the heaviest burden of taxation rests upon those groups who are the primary owners of the national debt no net restoration of wealth or of income will take place through these payments. The funds paid out merely balance the funds being collected through taxation.

The national debt, under such conditions, serves simply as a record of the fact that at some date in the past a certain sum

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of money has been turned over to the government for the latter's use at that time. The sum total of the debt—whether it be $50 billion or $100 billion or $500 billion—serves simply as a bookkeeping record of the magnitude of the funds removed from private hands in previous years. The government's securities have no more significance than a tax receipt.

Under these conditions there are no limitations upon the size of the national debt other than the sheer capacity of the government to persuade its citizens to give up the use of their capital funds or their current incomes by lending these sums to the government.

The situation outlined above, however, is more likely to occur in theory than in practice. Such perfect correspondence between the ownership of the national debt and the incidence of taxation is not found in the actual world. All existing national debts do result in the transfer of wealth and income from one economic group within the nation to another. And the true significance of any national debt lies in the extent to which the transfers of wealth and income which it acts to bring about serve useful or harmful purposes within the economic and social life of the nation.

But these transfers cannot be large enough to have a significant effect unless the actual size of the debt itself is very great. If the national debt bears interest at the rate of 3 per cent the debt must be double the size of the annual national income before the interest payments amount to as much as 6 per cent of the national income. It is most unlikely that more than one third of the sum thus paid out in interest will be transferred from one group within the nation to another. Under these assumptions a national debt of $200 billion would be necessary in the United States at the present time before the transfers of wealth effected through its interest payments would amount to as much as $2 billions annually.

If the war continues for a lengthy period it is very likely that our national debt will reach some such level. Since such a debt is unprecedented in American experience the consequence

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of transfer payments on so large a scale can best be estimated by reference to British experience. Twice in recent British history have there been comparable national debts exerting their effects upon the distribution of wealth and income in that nation.

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain's national debt amounted to £850 million; the interest charges on this debt were £32 million; the national income was £400 million. These conditions very closely approximate the conditions we have assumed for the United States at the close of the present war. The national debt was almost exactly twice the size of the national income. The burden of interest charges on the national income of Britain in 1817 amounted to 8 per cent of the national income of that year.

The income tax, adopted by Britain as a source of revenue during the war period itself, was dropped immediately after the close of the wars, and the government returned to reliance upon customs taxes and excise taxes on articles of general consumption as its principal sources of revenue. The impact of such taxes was primarily upon the great mass of working-class and middle-class people, whose consumption expenditures make up the great bulk of the total of such outlays. Through reliance on such taxes the interest payments made on the national debt were composed largely of funds transferred, year after year, from the great mass of working-class and middle-class people to the small group of wealthy landowners and industrialists who were the principal holders of the national debt. The debt acted in such fashion as to stimulate the concentration of wealth and income in the hands of a small group of wealthy individuals.

Such a concentration of wealth bore no relation to the incidence of sacrifice during the war period itself. Those sacrifices had been borne by the nation as a whole. The transfer mechanism of the national debt had no foundation in equity. Yet these transfers of wealth, inequitable as they were, in all likelihood corresponded to the economic needs of the Great Britain of that day.

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The industrial revolution was in the first period of its wildfire growth. Tremendous sums of capital investment were required to make possible the full exploitation of the new discoveries and inventions which, through their impact upon the economic structure of society, were to revolutionize life and make possible new and higher standards of living. In order that such great amounts of capital investment might be forthcoming there was need for large savings on the part of the nation as a whole. Without such savings, and with a banking system that offered only limited possibilities of economic development through credit expansion, full exploitation of the potentialities of the new economic order would have been prevented.

Such saving was dependent upon a high concentration of wealth in the hands of a small investing class. No considerable savings on the part of the great mass of working-class and middle-class families could be expected. Whatever increases in their incomes these might achieve would automatically flow back into increased consumption expenditures. The desire for a higher standard of living would effectively serve to prevent any significant accumulation of investment funds in their hands, no matter to what extent their incomes were increased.

By transferring a considerable portion of the annual income of the working-class and middle-class earners into the hands of the investing classes the interest payments on the national debt served effectively to increase the savings of the nation as a whole. Sums were rendered available for investment which would, had there been no such transfer of income, have been spent upon current consumption. The development of the thousand and one new enterprises that went to make up the new industrial framework of the nation was made possible primarily because the people of Britain as a whole were compelled to turn over to the entrepreneur class a sizable share of their annual money incomes. Out of these transferred funds were built up the new industries that gave Britain world economic leadership throughout the major portion of the 19th century.

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In this fashion the transfer mechanisms of the national debt —although they seemed, on the surface, to reduce the income of the working and middle classes—served actually to bring about a higher total national income and thereby brought benefits to the working and middle classes as well as to the rich. Although these classes received a smaller share of the national income their actual income was much greater than it would otherwise have been. The total per capita income of the nation was magnified many times over. The standard of living for all classes rose at a rate never before known in history. The savings enforced by the incidence of the national debt operated to increase the productivity of the entire nation to an unprecedented level. In the long run all of Britain benefited from the economic consequences of the redistribution of wealth brought about through the interest payments on the national debt.

It may be said that the national debt operated in such fashion as to place in the hands of the entrepreneur class those funds that were required for the economic development of the country—just as in the collective state, where the government controls the use of the investment funds of the community, these funds are directly obtained through taxation and directly invested by the state itself.

The first World War was financed in much the same fashion as were the Napoleonic Wars. The middle and working classes were heavily taxed, both through direct taxes and through the mechanism of inflation. The wealthy made great windfall profits out of the inflationary cycle. A portion of these extraordinary profits were taken from them through taxation. A portion they were permitted to turn over to the state in the form of loans.

The great national debts that accumulated during World War I were therefore, like the debts accumulated during the Napoleonic period, concentrated primarily in the hands of the wealthy. In Britain this debt amounted at its peak, on December 31, 1919, to £8 thousand million. The interest charges

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stood at £360 million—approximately 10 per cent of the total national income.

As was the case one hundred years earlier these great interest charges on the national debt were in large measure paid by funds obtained through taxation of middle- and working-class incomes. The effect was further to intensify the accumulation of wealth and income in the hands of a small group of wealthy individuals. In contrast to the earlier period, however, the social inequity of this procedure was not offset by economic benefits enjoyed by the nation as a whole. The increased transfers of wealth and income from the poorer to the wealthier classes of the nation resulted this time in disastrous economic consequences. The economic environment had undergone a great transformation in the hundred years between the downfall of Napolean and the end of the first World War. No great industrial transformation of society with its attendant demand for enormous capital outlay was under way in 1919. The nation was not confronted with an inadequacy of investment funds to meet the investment needs of the period. Rather was the reverse the case.

A century of profit making under the industrial revolution had by 1919 led to the accumulation of such enormous funds in the hands of the small group of the wealthy that there was an actual oversupply of investment funds seeking use. The annual savings of the investing class far exceeded the annual increment of new investment opportunities into which such funds could profitably be directed. Instead of a need for reduced consumption to make the accumulation of adequate investment funds possible there was need for increased consumption to make possible full utilization of the already existing productive facilities. The economic need of the period was for a transfer of expendible funds from the incomes of the wealthy, where such funds would be saved, into the incomes of middle-class and working-class families, where they would seek consumption outlets.

The impact of the greatly increased national debt was thus directly contrary to the economic need of the nation. Interest

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payments on the national debt, amounting to 10 per cent of the national income, involved the removal of great sums annually from the incomes of the middle and working classes through excise taxes, customs duties and other forms of taxation whose major impact was upon the average person, and the transfer of these sums to the small group of already wealthy individuals whose consumption expenditures were increased by only a small fraction of their enlarged incomes. A significant portion of the national income was effectively sterilized by this procedure. The reduced demand for consumption goods rendered it difficult to find suitable opportunities for the useful investment of the annual savings of the nation. The total size of the national income was reduced far below the possible level. Large-scale unemployment and the stagnation of economic enterprise were the inevitable consequences.

It would be difficult to overemphasize the effect of this unsound transfer of wealth in accentuating the economic difficulties experienced in Britain throughout the entire interwar period. The economic system was out of balance. The character of the interest payments on the national debt contributed materially to the economic unbalance.

The expenditures of the United States during the first World War were financed by fiscal measures of much the same type as those employed by the government of Britain. During 1917 and 1918 only about one quarter of the government's expenditures were met from tax revenues. The balance was financed through borrowings. Fortunately for our economy, however, the total outlays of the nation during the war period were so much less than those of Britain—especially when reduced to a per capita basis—that they were inadequate to result in the creation of a national debt large enough to have a similar impact upon the framework of our economic life in the postwar period.

Our national debt at its World War peak amounted to considerably less than half of our annual national income. That of Britain amounted to a good deal more than double her

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national income. The interest charges on the British national debt approximated 10 per cent of her national income whereas in the United States the interest charges on the national debt amounted in their entirety to less than 2 per cent of our annual income. The effect of interest payments of this size on the distribution of wealth and income in the United States during the interwar period was therefore inconsiderable.

But it is altogether likely that the situation in the United States at the close of World War II will be altogether different from that prevailing in 1919. It is very probable that the per capita national debt of this country at the end of the present war will be even larger than that of Britain at the end of World War I, and that the interest charges on this debt will amount to an annual sum equal to 8 per cent or 10 per cent of our national income.

Our situation today bears further similarities to the situation in Britain in the period following the first World War. For several years consumption expenditures have been inadequate to sustain a level of economic activity such as is needed if our available labor supply is to be fully employed. The annual increment of private and corporation savings that seek investment utilization has found an insufficient supply of profitable outlets. It grows more and more clear that the distribution of wealth and income in the United States today is such as to create too small a volume of consumption funds and too large a volume of investment funds for a balanced economy. The full utilization of our productive facilities and the further development of our productive possibilities have been for several years gravely impeded by this condition.

Careful study of the relation between the accumulation of savings and the supply of investment opportunities in the United States indicates that, with the existing distribution of wealth and income, there is an average annual excess of between $2 billion and $5 billion of savings in relation to new capital requirements. Only in years of exceptional activity has the demand for new capital equalled the supply of funds seeking investment.

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This yearly increment of unusable savings lies at the root of our persisting economic difficulties. Should we emerge from the present war with an enlarged national debt so owned as to bring about an even more accentuated excess of savings, it is altogether probable that the economic difficulties we should face in the period following the war would be greater by far than any experienced in the 1930's.

Under these circumstances it must be the aim of our government to develop a fiscal policy for the war period that will alter the postwar distribution of wealth and income in the United States in the opposite direction—alter it in such fashion as to place greater funds in the hands of those who seek consumption expenditure, rather than investment, with their incomes. It should be our aim so to finance the war as permanently to reduce the annual increment of funds seeking such investment outlets. Such a program will result in a more balanced economy; will bring savings in line with investment opportunities; and will have the ultimate consequence of creating a level of consumption high enough to enable more complete utilization of our available resources, both of capital and of labor, than has been the case in recent prewar years. We shall then be faced neither with a permanent unemployment of labor aggregating millions of would-be workers nor with a permanent unemployment of capital aggregating billions of dollars.

Such a fiscal policy must operate to remove investment funds, during the war period, from the hands of their owners. Heavy taxes should be imposed upon corporation profits and upon the personal incomes of the wealthy. The wartime removal of excess money incomes from the middle-class and working-class groups, however, whose funds are used primarily for consumption expenditures, must take place largely through borrowing rather than taxation, in order that these funds may be returned to their original recipients for consumption expenditure at the close of the war period.

The intensive campaign now being carried on to increase the purchase of War Bonds and War Savings Stamps represents the

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first faltering steps in the direction of such a program of borrowing. To the extent that these bonds and stamps are purchased with funds withdrawn from the consumption expenditures of the small-income and medium-income groups this program will result in buoying up the level of consumption in the postwar period. Such voluntary lending, however, will be utterly inadequate to bring about the needed redistribution of funds in the postwar period. During the fiscal year 1942-1943 the Federal deficit, after all new taxes have been accounted for, will amount to almost $50 billion. Possibly $10 billion to $12 billion of this deficit will be made good through institutional savings lent to the government by life insurance companies, mutual savings banks, building and loan associations, business corporations and other institutional channels. The social security program may supply a further $3 billion, while the savings of the wealthy may account for another $5 billion. There remains—if inflation is to be avoided and if those in the middle-income and lower-income groups are to retain title to the funds which they cannot make use of during the war period because of the necessarily restricted supply of goods available for consumption—some $30 billion which must annually be removed primarily from the consumption incomes of the middle-class and working-class income receivers of the nation. No such sum can possibly be obtained by a program of voluntary lending. Of the $5 billion in War Bonds sold in the United States between May 1, 1941 and April 1, 1942, only $1.2 billion, or one fourth of the total, was made up of bonds in the $25, $50 and $100 denominations. The remaining $3.8 billion was made up of bonds sold in denominations of $500 and up. It is clear that the savings of the middle-class and working-class groups accounted for only an unimportant fraction of the funds offered to the government during this period.

Voluntary lending can be relied upon to produce adequate results only in the case of a program with far less ambitious objectives. It is an effective method of removing, from private hands, funds which would under any circumstances have sought

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investment—primarily because, under war conditions, alternative outlets for investment funds are greatly limited. But voluntary lending is not an effective method of reducing consumption expenditure except in the case of marginal expenditures which may willingly be foregone under the impact of a wave of war patriotism. If the funds to be abstracted from consumption incomes are so great that their loss affects the ability to purchase those commodities considered vital—food, clothing, shelter and those amenities which have become part of the accustomed standard of living—they will not be voluntarily surrendered.

Voluntary lending can of course be stimulated by any program that increases savings by limiting the ability of the individual to spend his income freely for consumption goods. The government has already frozen prices on the supply of consumption goods available to the public. If, in addition, consumer rationing is applied to a wide group of commodities it is likely that each individual above the very lowest income groups will find himself with a certain quantity of unspendable funds in his possession, even after the payment of taxes. Under such circumstances the amount of money voluntarily lent to the government will substantially increase. It would be unwise, however, to place too great reliance upon these mechanisms as a means of insuring a volume of voluntary saving adequate to close the enormous gap between government tax revenues and total government expenditures. Voluntary lending must be supplemented and in large measure supplanted by a program of forced lending to the government if the gap is to be closed without a further enormous increase in the taxation of the middle-class and working-class groups, over and above all taxes now imposed or now contemplated. Such a program of forced lending must be conceived on a vast scale—especially since its inception will lead immediately to a reduction in the quantity of funds voluntarily offered to the government by those whose spendable incomes are reduced by the forced lending program.

This program of forced lending would take the form of deductions from all income received—deductions made at the

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time the income payments are originally made, in much the same fashion as the social security deductions are made at the present time. Workers and salary recipients would receive their weekly pay partly in cash, partly in the shape of government savings stamps convertible into bonds after the accumulation of a sufficient amount.

These bonds might be interest-bearing from the start or, preferably, they might be devised to appreciate annually in value until after the close of the war, at which time they would begin to bear interest. They might well bear no specified date of maturity. The government would then be privileged to release funds, at its own discretion, in the postwar period at such times and in such amounts as might seem desirable to prevent or cushion a downward spiral of business activity. They might even provide for release during the war period itself in cases where the individual holder could show the existence of a pressing need for his funds.

These payroll deductions, imposed on a graduated scale beginning at a very low level of earnings, might well be administered in connection with the income tax program. These forced loans might be treated as deductions from the income tax due the government. Opportunity would thus be given to take into account the various family circumstances. Families in which there were two or more wage earners would pay a sizable income tax in addition to their forced savings. Families in which the number of dependents is large would pay no income tax in addition to their savings—in extreme cases there might even at the end of the year be a refund of a portion of the forced loan.

These are details, however, further discussion of which would not be appropriate in this place. The principles involved should be abundantly clear from the foregoing brief description of the forced loan method. If direct taxes upon the incomes of the wealthy and upon corporation profits are imposed on a sufficiently drastic scale during the war years, and if taxes, both direct and indirect, upon those in the middle-income and lower-income brackets are held at a relatively low level, the forced

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loan mechanism will insure that the latter groups will, at the conclusion of the war period, be the owners of the major share of the new indebtedness contracted by the Federal government through its wartime borrowings.

I have estimated that institutional lending to the government by corporations, life insurance companies, mutual savings banks, building and loan associations and the like will not exceed $10 billion to $12 billion annually. The larger portion of this, in addition to possibly $5 billion lent directly to the government each year by wealthy private individuals, will represent the share of the upper-income groups in the annual increase in the national debt during the war period. The remaining $30 billion, needed annually by the government to make good its deficit and obtained primarily from the middle-income and lower-income groups through the forced loan mechanism, will represent the share of these latter groups in the annual increase in the national debt. In addition to this they will own a portion of the increase arising from loans made through institutions.

On the assumption that the total government deficits incurred during the war period aggregate $150 billion (and in the light of war appropriations already totalling considerably more than this amount such an estimate appears reasonable), the share of the middle-income and lower-income groups in the national debt created during the period of wartime spending would amount to approximately $90 billion. The annual interest charge on this portion of the national debt would, assuming a 3 per cent interest rate, amount to $2.7 billion.

Provided that in the postwar period the Federal government obtains its revenues primarily through a sharply progressive schedule of taxes on upper-class personal incomes and on corporation profits, these interest payments received by the middle-income and lower-income groups will constitute in large measure a net addition to their share of the total national income. The portion of the national income accruing to these groups will be permanently increased to the extent that the interest payments on the national debt in the postwar period are

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met through reliance upon a progressive schedule of taxation. Sound Federal tax policy, in the postwar years, would require a considerable lowering of wartime excise taxes and taxes levied upon the incomes of those in the middle-class and working-class groups, together with the continuance of taxes on corporation profits and of a very high schedule of personal income taxes on incomes in the upper brackets.

The government budget in the postwar period will be much larger than during the 1930's. The service on the national debt, figured at 3 per cent on a total national debt of $200 billion (made up of $50 billion of prewar debt and of $150 billion of new wartime debt), would require $6 billion in annual tax revenue. The maintenance of the military establishment on the scale that is probable after the war may require an additional $5 billion in taxation. Government expenditures, other than service on the debt and maintenance of adequate military defenses, might well amount to a further $5 billion. We may reasonably estimate a government budget aggregating in excess of $15 billion throughout the postwar period.

To make sure that the middle-income and lower-income groups may truly be the net beneficiaries from the interest payments made by the government on that portion of the national debt owned by these groups, the essential postwar Federal revenues must be secured through a highly progressive tax structure such as outlined above. If a regressive tax structure should be adopted after the war is over—or if taxes of the same type as those current during the 1930's should be imposed—the interest payments received by the middle-income and lower-income groups would be largely offset by the taxes paid by these same groups. The sharply progressive character of the postwar tax structure is an essential aspect of the wartime program of forced loans.

The discontinuance of the program of forced savings at the conclusion of the war, combined with a highly progressive schedule of postwar income and profits taxes, would serve utterly to reverse the ultimate economic and social impact of the war

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upon the nation from the impact we must expect if the fiscal policies of the last war are applied at this time. The incomes of those groups within the nation whose expenditures flow normally into consumption expenditures would be increased by a substantial sum. The continued high level of taxation to which corporations and wealthy individuals would be subjected would serve to reduce both private and corporation savings to a point where they would no longer exceed the supply of profitable opportunities for the utilization of investment funds. A principal cause of the economic disequilibrium from which we have suffered for a full generation would be eradicated.

It is altogether probable that such a program of wartime and postwar finance would serve to maintain consumption expenditures in the postwar period at a level adequate to insure a high permanent level of employment and a high permanent level of national income. Under such conditions the burden of a $15 billion postwar Federal budget would be far more easily borne than was the much smaller Federal budget of the prewar period when the national income moved between the $50 billion and $70 billion level. With an annual national income well in excess of $100 billion—such as we now know is well within the range of attainable possibility—the greatly expanded government budget would constitute no difficult problem.

The test of the adequacy of a wartime fiscal program is its appropriateness to both the immediate and the persisting economic needs of the nation. A program such as that advocated in these pages would, there is strong reason to believe, do much to improve the social and economic health of our country in the years to come.

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The Trouble with Aldous Huxley

W. Y. TINDALL

TRACES remain of Huxley's talent for the disgusting and the bizarre. In *After Many a Summer Dies The Swan* there are still baboons and antiquaries and the Marquis de Sade. The diary of the Fifth Earl is as good as the digression in Elizabethan plumbing in *Crome Yellow;* the fate of the Fifth Earl is as exquisite as Gumbril's pneumatic trousers or his visit to the night club in *Antic Hay*. But in the later novels baboons and antiquaries are lost among the sermons of Mr. Propter or the solemn monologues of Anthony Beavis. Readers to whom I have spoken either skipped the sermons of Mr. Propter or read them with pain, lamenting the decline of the novelist or, better, his ascent from novelist to mystic. Rochester's couplet, suitably corrupted, seems to fit the case:

> From deep to deep the reasoning engine flies,
> Who was so proud, so witty, and so wise.

These flights, which injure literature more than they advance piety, invite our concern. In general they may be attributed to evil times and to the religious temper. Specifically, however, the trouble with Aldous Huxley is Gerald Heard.

Huxley would not have succumbed to Heard without his earlier acquaintance with D. H. Lawrence, who prepared the way. When he first met Lawrence in 1915 Huxley was a civilized and fashionably cynical undergraduate, writing desperate verses and equally desperate stories. Lawrence was an earnest man, enlightened by the wisdom of Mme. Blavatsky, Mrs. Besant and James M. Pryse, the celebrated yogi of Los Angeles. The two men seemed to have nothing in common but Lawrence was taken with Huxley, Huxley with Lawrence. Lawrence invited Huxley to join him in his utopian community where,

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having escaped from cynicism and civilization, naked transcendentalists could dance beneath the Florida moon. Though Huxley was a prudent young man, disinclined to enthusiasm, he accepted the invitation. He knew that the community was impossible but, he says, "there was something about Lawrence which made such knowledge, when one was in his presence, curiously irrelevant." What made knowledge irrelevant appears to have been Lawrence's internal radiance.

For all his intelligence, Huxley cannot resist a dominant personality; but this time the fascination was momentary. The two men did not meet again for several years and during the postwar period Huxley continued in his cynical ways. Incessantly disillusioned by war, love and science he made fun of all moral and transcendental values. In *Crome Yellow* he laughed at Annie Besant, for example, and at Barbecue-Smith, the minor prophet, whose *Pipe-Lines to the Infinite* sounds like one of the juicier tracts of D. H. Lawrence. Planning an advertising campaign, Gumbril, in *Antic Hay* (1923), proposes to sell his pneumatic trousers by means of a spiritual message. Such pants, he observes, protect the great nerve centers of the spine, the lumbar and thoracic ganglia, the seat of dark, powerful sense life and sex life. Gumbril's campaign is a wicked application of Lawrence's *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious.*

Like Chelifer, one of the principal characters of *Those Barren Leaves*, Huxley had taken his stand in the heart of a waste land in which he forced himself to contemplate the disgusting and the meaningless. But self-torture and disillusionment were not his only pleasures. He could still delight in the relics of culture—in music, for example, and architecture. He could still admire Christopher Wren and Mozart, and he could write elegant verses about Minoan deities and the twelve Caesars. Charming, decadent novels, filled with arabesques from Ariosto or Crébillon, and strange stories like *Eupompus Gave Splendour to Art by Numbers*, which proved that the Beardsley period was not entirely dead, preserved the art and learning of the past.

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Culture and cynicism were of some comfort to him as they were to T. S. Eliot. To be cynical in a cynical period is pleasing. By 1925, however, times were beginning to change. The war was almost forgotten, Lytton Strachey was less esteemed, Wagner and D. H. Lawrence came into their own, Dorothy Parker wondered if she shouldn't become serious, Eliot joined the church. As the churchman had been concealed beneath Sweeney, so beneath the desperate frivolities of Huxley had lurked the moralist and the disappointed idealist whose complaint against the world was that it had failed to conform to his standards of truth and beauty. Perhaps this hidden and all but spiritual aspiration as much as Lawrence's personal charm had once made Lawrence attractive to Huxley. Now with increasingly serious times, fashion allowed the moral idealist a less devious outlet for his ideals and Huxley wrote *Those Barren Leaves* (1925). This novel begins as usual with fools, cynics and knaves but it ends with a mystic by the name of Calamy. After discovering the hollowness of cynicism and sensuality he retires to a mountain where in spite of the sneers of visiting skeptics he mystically broods. Not for him the barren leaves of science and art which, wanting spiritual point, seem incomplete. Calamy's tentative contemplations mark Huxley's first acknowledgment of a spiritual need.

Huxley was ready for D. H. Lawrence when they met again in Italy in 1926. This time Lawrence's conquest was more effectual. The two men remained intimate until Lawrence's death, whereupon Huxley composed the remains and edited the letters of the master. These duties were accompanied by an elegy on Lawrence in which he is seen not only as a genius but as an artist. Love blinded Huxley's eye; and his funeral essay reveals love's progress. At first Huxley was inclined to dispute Lawrence's "absurd" attacks upon science. Finally he listened as Lawrence spoke of Susan, his cow. Of Susan, Lawrence never tired nor, says Huxley, "was I ever tired of listening to his account of her character and her bovine philosophy."

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Her master's voice also let Huxley know what was wrong with him. Spandrell in *Point Counter Point* (1928) is Huxley's consequent farewell to cynicism and diabolism as a way to truth, beauty and deportment; and Philip Quarles is Huxley's acceptance of Lawrence's criticism of Huxley. This intellectual monster, who has acquired Culture I and II from Eton, Balliol and *The Encyclopedia Britannica*, cannot keep his eye on life for thinking about it. He cannot feel, and he is painfully aware of his incapacity. As for animal spirits or intuition, he is hopeless. His discouraged wife is on the point of eloping with a fascist. As antidote to this partial man, Huxley provided the figure of Rampion, the complete man, or Huxley's idea of Lawrence himself. An earnest, vital, impatient creature, Rampion feels, enjoys intuitions, accepts each impulse from the vernal wood and ceaselessly condemns intellect, science and civilization. To Philip, Rampion's phallic mysticism seems original and authentic. Contrasted with Rampion are two false mystics: Burlap whose devotion to the solemn and the profound is but a prelude to amorous rompings in his tub, and Marjorie who follows a somewhat inadequate course of contemplation.

In essays written during the later 1920's and collected in *Music at Night* (1931) Huxley hails Lawrence as a moralist and a champion of human wholeness. *Brave New World* (1932) is not only an unsympathetic picture of a Wellsian future but a sympathetic account of Lawrence's battle with present civilization. The savage from New Mexico who upholds truth and beauty in a mechanical world is intended in part at least to represent Lawrence. As the savage dies a martyr in his battle with materialism and mind so, in Huxley's opinion, had Lawrence. By 1932 the former cynic who had scoffed at spiritual and moral values had become a convert to values both spiritual and moral. Huxley retained enough of his skepticism, however, to visit Mexico with the intention, apparently, of checking up on the master. Huxley's visit to Mexico, as described in *Beyond the Mexique Bay* (1934), was disenchanting. He found the noble savage ignoble, the Indian drums and

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dances childish and Lawrence's *Plumed Serpent* false. Lawrence's primitivism had been extreme, his faith in blood injurious to spirit and intellect. In *The Olive Tree* (1936) the backsliding disciple reprinted his essay on Lawrence next to an ironic study of religious enthusiasts.

But Lawrence had had his effect. He had freed Huxley from negative cynicism; he had given him suspicions of science and pure reason; and he had shown him the value, if society was to be saved, of an oasis from which the profane could be excluded. Without Lawrence, Huxley might have followed a similar course (as the conclusion of *Those Barren Leaves* suggests), for Huxley had always possessed a moral and religious inclination. But Lawrence served to release and encourage tendencies in Huxley which youth, intelligence and fashion had frustrated. Whether or not Huxley fully realized Lawence's occult quality, and it is not apparent that he did, it was Lawrence who convinced Huxley that religion is the cure for what we have. Lawrence had softened Huxley for Gerald Heard.

Gerald Heard, a man of respectable family, is some four or five years older than Aldous Huxley. After attending public school and university Heard began, with the social responsibility of his social class, to use his learning for the profit of other men. His knowledge of bogies led him to a position of importance in the British Society for Psychical Research. His mastery of psychoanalysis, palaeontology, anthropology and the rudiments of physical science led him to compose a philosophical tract on the evolution of clothing and, from 1930 to 1934, to deliver a series of lectures over the wireless. Having command of all things he spoke of all things.

Unabashed by the remarks of Father Ronald Knox who considered him pretentious, incoherent and misinformed Heard proceeded to publish book after book in order to inform the public. Of his earlier books *The Social Substance of Religion* (1931), which concerns the nature of things, is perhaps the most complete. Anthropology, psychoanalysis and intuition show, says Heard, that even before the emergence of the

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Oedipus complex man's psychic unity was destroyed by the emergence of individuality and personality, and these caused conflict within man and within society. The curse of individuality was made less supportable by the emergence of reason and by the abandonment of all that is animal and intuitive. Loneliness, constipation and all our sorrows are the result of this primitive psychic fissure. The remedy for our troubles both individual and social is not economic but religious since health and economy flow from Right Doctrine. Spiritual group-movements, inspired by Quakerism or primitive Christianity and directed by Gerald Heard, will restore psychological harmony, identity with the whole and sound economy.

Such sentiments, which inspired the smile of the cynic in the Huxley of *Crome Yellow*, struck the Huxley of 1935 as sound and reasonable. Though he had rejected Lawrence, and Heard's proposals closely resemble those of Lawrence, Lawrence had prepared Huxley for transcendentalism and after such preparation Heard could appeal where Lawrence had partly failed. Heard's personality was not quite so magnetic as Lawrence's perhaps but Heard wore an old school tie. Moreover he was all but omniscient. Such attractions could not be resisted and Huxley eagerly re-adopted a system which when proposed by Lawrence had wanted only outward grace.

Huxley seems to have fallen under the influence of the new master in 1934 or 1935. The two were associated with Canon Dick Sheppard, Bertrand Russell and other distinguished people in the Peace Pledge Union, which promoted contempt of war and violence, sent missionaries to convert the belligerent and issued propaganda against air-raid precautions. Huxley urged the public (in his *Encyclopedia of Pacifism*, an official publication of the Peace Pledge Union) to meet tanks and bombs with the "redeeming power of Love." For this cause Huxley wrote one pamphlet, Heard another.

After editing the *Encyclopedia of Pacifism* in 1937 Huxley joined Heard in a voyage to America. They hopefully investigated the Quaker communities of Pennsylvania. They visited

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Black Mountain College in North Carolina in search of a model for a spiritual yet learned community. Somewhat disappointed they paid their respects to Dr. Rhine whose investigations of telepathy seemed to advance the cause of the spirit. As they travelled together they composed two tracts to express the philosophy of Gerald Heard. Heard called his tract *The Third Morality* (1937). Huxley called his *Ends and Means* (1937). It is not easy to see why they chose different titles for works so nearly identical.

In his tract Heard observes that materialism, which is based upon the mechanical philosophies of Newton, Darwin and Freud, is mistaken because it ignores the spirit, leaves morality without foundation and makes life meaningless. Materialism has caused disorder, greed and war. The social ship is sinking, he continues, and we need a raft, a new religion which, unlike Christianity or materialism, will embrace all the facts. The facts are these: Lamarck and Samuel Butler have shown that evolution is not blind and mechanical but the progress of the Life Force toward spiritual improvement. Dr. Katz has shown that vegetables rather than meats encourage the spirit. The Quakers have shown that religion flourishes in small groups; the failure of utopian groups in the past is ascribable to want of Right Knowledge. Wise men of the East, who advocate the power and beauty of non-violence, have shown how necessary it is to be kind to all creatures, even to bacteria, insects and tigers, which should be met not with iodine, Flit and elephant guns but with good will. The yogis and the Buddhists have shown the need of training the mind-body unit by means of suitable exercises and systematic contemplation. In short, spiritual leaders are in substantial agreement on contemplation, evolution, tigers and vegetables.

Out of such considerations there emerges a "third morality" to replace with completeness and truth the partiality and error of the anthropomorphists and mechanists, whether Catholics, fascists, communists or democrats. Following a course of spiritual and physical exercises, small groups of enlightened men

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will regulate their breathing, diet and posture after the manner of yogis; and by systematic meditation, after the manner of Buddhists, will expand their awareness as they commune with God. Sublimated, their sexual energies will help the Life Force to evolve the superman. Social and economic adjustment will follow. The alternative, says Heard, with his eye on Hitler and Ford, is annihilation.

Before he came upon these neo-Buddhistic and neo-Lamarckian truths, says Huxley in his tract, the evils of war, nationalism and materialistic science had made life meaningless and unprofitable. Hence his cynicism. Now, enlightened by Burtt's *Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, by Irving Babbitt's *Dhammapada* and by various works on spiritual exercise, contemplation, mysticism and breath control, his way seems clear. Huxley does not mention Heard nor does Heard mention Huxley. But after composing their manifestoes, master and disciple retired to California where, when they are not walking with Greta Garbo or writing for the cinema, they eat nuts and lettuce perhaps and inoffensively meditate, Huxley in Hollywood and Heard on a convenient mountainside.

But Huxley is more than a vegetarian, a mystic and a tractarian. He is a novelist and he was compelled to find expression for his convictions in his favorite medium. As he had told of his conversion to Lawrence in *Point Counter Point*, so he told of his conversion to Heard in *Eyeless in Gaza* (1936). Anthony Beavis, the hero of the latter novel, is Huxley, decently disguised, and Mr. Miller is Gerald Heard. At first Beavis, who had read everything from St. Teresa to Pavlov, is convinced of the futility of everything and, to express his disillusionment, plans a novel about baboons and half-wits. Experience, however, sobers him. After discovering the emptiness of skepticism, indifference, sensuality and culture he asks what he must do to be saved. Catholicism is external and escapist. Fascism is stupid. Communism is violent. D. H. Lawrence who once attracted Beavis is partial, ignorant and a little bestial. In this quandary Beavis meets Mr. Miller, a physician, anthropologist

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and prophet, who preaches a synthetic oriental mysticism combining the best features of yoga and Buddhism. Mr. Miller considers the Beavis case and prescribes exercises for the spine, mystical meditation, colonic irrigation and a diet of vegetables. Beavis is enchanted. He immediately cultivates chastity, devours vegetables, meditates and takes enemas. By these means he attains spiritual enlargement, catharsis and peace and, as a member of Mr. Miller's Peace Pledge Union, preaches nonviolence to the skeptical. He does not lift a hand when he is beaten by mobs of angry skeptics. That he should follow his martyrdom by going home to swoon in mystical ecstasy is not surprising; for he has sucked Right Knowledge from the horse's mouth.

Eyeless in Gaza recounts the progress of disciple and master up to their flight from Europe. Upon their arrival in California, whither they had been preceded by Rosicrucians, Theosophists and Okies, Heard published a tract called *Pain, Sex and Time* (1939), Huxley a novel called *After Many a Summer Dies the Swan* (1939). Both works are propaganda for Heard's religion.

Heard's tract, the jacket of which bears an enthusiastic recommendation by Aldous Huxley, describes Heard's monastic colony as a place where yoga and Quakerism are combined "in an original synthesis." A small group of happy vegetarians is to meet regularly for mystical meditation under a neo-Bo Tree with a "Neo-Brahmin" who expands their minds, makes them aware of the "above and beyond" and directs them to supra-individuality. According to the Vedantists, observes the Neo-Brahmin, "when a man knows who he really is, he ceases to need any longer a body." Meanwhile, however, the community is to maintain a private truck garden, power plant, machine shop and laundry in order to be economically independent of the frightening world without the gates. Such is "the neo-monastic answer to our own Dark Age."

Huxley's novel disguises Neo-Brahmin Heard under the name of Mr. Propter. In his incessant monologues Mr. Propter conveys to the readers of novels, who might be repelled by a tract, the substance of Heard's religion. The meditations of

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Mr. Propter, which begin with "busy nothingness" and end in freedom from personality and timeless experience of eternity, are patterns for imitation. Around him as he meditates are a power plant, a carpenter shop, a weaving machine, a flour mill and a greenhouse for the vegetables. Such spiritual and economic self-sufficiency is not enough, however. He longs for and secures a few disciples. Unhappily most of the characters in this novel are immune from his propaganda—as one would expect of representative materialists, scientists, capitalists, Catholics and cultural dilettantes. Jeremy Pordage, who represents Huxley before enlightenment, obstinately clings to profane culture and Mr. Stoyte continues to desire longevity although Mr. Propter repeatedly says that good is not to be found in personality or time but beyond these in eternity. Mr. Propter's contemplations of eternity, not to mention the economic independence of his cult, are assisted by his enjoyment of a private income—a prerequisite for spiritual enlargement.

Of Huxley's economic innocence much might be said. Of his power of characterization—and this is more essential for a novelist—it may be said that Sinclair Lewis might have done a better job with Mr. Stoyte, that Steinbeck might have done a better job with the Okies who starve beneath Mr. Stoyte's castle, but that no one could have done a better job with Gerald Heard. As Mr. Propter, Gerald Heard becomes coherent, lucid and not too redundant.

Heard and Lawrence may be the immediate causes of Huxley's decline but the religious temper and our times are mainly responsible. As a response to the disorder of our times Huxley's California mysticism may seem ineffectual but it is the kind of response which seems to be normal and inevitable for many of our contemporaries. Since the development of materialistic science the traditional religions of Europe have ceased to satisfy many sensitive, religious men. Science, which pleases their minds alone, has denied them the traditional outlet for their emotions and they have found themselves unhappy in a world from which meaning and purpose have disappeared.

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In place of the faiths which comforted their fathers they have been compelled to invent religions of their own. From Carlyle and Emerson down to Samuel Butler, Shaw, Yeats and Lawrence literary men have followed this course. In Protestant places few have been moved to accompany Newman, Chesterton and Eliot in their flight from confusion and materialism to an orthodox refuge. Recently some have found in communism, fascism or even democratic nationalism the religious satisfaction they desire. The private religions to which more have been inclined are sometimes reasonable like that of H. G. Wells, often eccentric like that of D. H. Lawrence. Sometimes these private religions, like those of Shaw or Butler, involve the Life Force. More often, because the East is still sufficiently remote and mysterious to appeal to the emotions, they have an oriental character. The world is not saved by these private religions but for the believer the world acquires meaning.

Huxley has some understanding of these matters. In *The Olive Tree* he describes the 19th century as a period of science and rationalism that made life meaningless and denied faith a transcendental character. Faced with the obstacle of science, faith expressed itself in pseudo-religious forms. But the only form of pseudo-religion recognized by Huxley is political. Fetishism, he says, has now abandoned the churches and has established itself in politics. Rudyard Kipling is the 20th-century equivalent of Wesley and *Mein Kampf* and *Das Kapital* have taken the place of the Bible. Huxley fails to see that, far from preventing, science has increased the transcendental response, that pseudo-religion has taken private forms and that Lawrence and Heard are little different from Kipling. It is only natural perhaps that he should also fail to see the significance of his own position.

The position of the literary man in our times is responsible for what is known as romanticism—which is essentially the effort to restore spiritual meaning to a world without it and to transcend the limitations that materialistic science seems to have imposed upon man. Romanticism has many aspects but

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this transcendental effort is behind most of them. If this definition is accepted as a useful critical device then Carlyle, Samuel Butler and Shaw are representative romantics and Lawrence, Heard and Huxley take their place in the tradition.

Although the writing of Lawrence and Huxley depends upon private or romantic religion, this religion has been inimical to excellence. The beautiful has been sacrificed to the good and the true. Religious writers like Eliot can create art, inspired by a belief which they are under no compulsion to explain. But a private religion demands that the artist be prophet and missionary as well as artist. The necessity of establishing and explaining the belief requires preaching and impedes the reduction of experience to symbol or drama. When tried by the rules of Aristotle, Aquinas or Mortimer Adler, or even by the judgment, taste or intuition of men this side of Chicago, little of the romantic writing of Shaw, Wells, Lawrence or Huxley can be considered art. What is of more concern to the reader, the explanatory monologues of Wells's William Clissold, of Shaw's Don Juan, of Lawrence's gamekeepers or of Huxley's Anthony Beavis and Mr. Propter are all but unreadable. The novel and, in our day, the play may be loose forms permitting all manner of treatment but they falter and expire beneath the weight of the religious monologue. Readers wisely skip the sermons of Mr. Propter and read the novel for the baboons which have survived from a happier period.

Even before Lawrence and Heard released his religious impulses Huxley, like Peacock whom he used to resemble, had favored the monologue. But however undramatic such monologues may be they are not oppressive when the intention behind them is to amuse rather than to convert. The secular Mr. Scogan can be as loquacious as the religious Mr. Propter without being a bore.

In *Point Counter Point* Huxley declared that he is not a born novelist but an intellectual, wanting in drama and sympathy. The fugal structure of *Point Counter Point* and the scrambling of sequence which makes *Eyeless in Gaza* more

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tiresome are to be understood as efforts to compensate by artifice for what he considers native incapacity. Critics, who have noticed Huxley's monologues and the intellectual character of his novels, have gone so far as to call Huxley an essayist who has mistaken his medium. But they, and Huxley too, are deceived. As his essays prove, Huxley is better as a novelist than as an essayist. Moreover as a novelist he is typical of our times. The intellectual monologue—a kind of novel as valid as the older dramatic variety and equally entitled to the name of novel—is one of the forms which romanticism has produced. It resembles Plato's dialogues or the Book of Job more than it does *Pride and Prejudice* or *Tom Jones*. H. G. Wells writes this kind of novel and in his autobiography he has justified it as the inevitable form for our times. Shaw has written and endlessly justified a kind of play which differs from the older drama in the same way that *After Many a Summer* differs from *Pride and Prejudice*. This recent variety of romantic play or novel may not be good—since few have Plato's genius or the patience of Job—but it is not to be confused with the essay or the oration.

To the least exacting reader it is clear that Huxley's novels become less readable as his piety grows. Apparently, however, his novels are still read. *After Many a Summer* was listed among the best sellers for several weeks. It is certain that Huxley is not read for his private religion since in a day of private religions the normal reader prefers his own version of the unknowable. Huxley may be read for those relics of the witty and the grotesque which readers still expect and in large measure find. He may be read for the miscellaneous learning which still decorates his books since "information please" is a current demand. But there is a likelier explanation. The romantic movement, which affects readers as much as writers, has encouraged an interest in personality as well as in its expansion. Despite the desire of Propter, Heard and Huxley to transcend their personalities, readers are interested in the personality of Huxley, and so is Huxley.

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War on the Visual Front

HEINZ SOFFNER

THE further this global war progresses the harder it is for even the generally well informed and earnestly interested citizen to keep track of all its rapidly changing aspects and the more difficult grows the task incumbent upon the various media of information. This is true of military operations, scattered over several continents, in the air, and above, on and below the seas. Even experts are confused by a multitude of new weapons, revolutionary strategies and surprising tactics. The political, economic, social and psychological implications of this war are even more bewildering.

To the totalitarian powers, who want to direct a maximum response from their peoples to the momentary center of the war effort, this puzzling complexity of events and issues has posed merely the problem of concentrating propaganda on one specific issue at a time. And since the totalitarian nations have trained their populations to use words as weapons rather than as "food for thought" they have been successful even in such sudden shifts in the propaganda barrage as that compelled by Hitler's invasion of Russia. The fighting democracies, however, while they are under equal compulsion to use all the techniques of propaganda, of political and psychological warfare at their disposal, are at the same time faced with the no less important task of giving adequate information both to their own citizens and to the people of neutral or enemy-held territories as an indispensable incentive to gearing the forces of democracy for total victory and total peace.

The use of maps, charts and diagrams for purposes of propaganda is not unique to the 20th century. There was, for instance, the "Beatus" map, drawn in 776, which divided the world among the Twelve Apostles. Similarly, as Edna Kenton

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

"This device proves the Earth to be a Globe"

(From *Cosmographia;* Petrus Apianus, 1640.)

Reprinted from *The Book of Earths,* by Edna Kenton, Copyright 1928 by Edna Kenton, by permission of William Morrow & Company.

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points out in *The Book of Earths*, "This device proves the Earth to be a Globe" "is an attempt to popularize a difficult theory."

For the purposes of both information and propaganda the illustration of news, of facts and of figures by pictures, maps, graphs and pictorial statistics is imperative. Pictures of this kind reduce the mental process of reading words one after another and of transforming their content into images and ideas, to a simple matter of perceiving, directly and as a whole, one more or less complex message. Even a reader well acquainted with a given terrain welcomes a good map to supplement the war communiqués; even a reader accustomed to peruse statistics will be more strongly impressed by a pictorial graph than by mere rows of figures. In both cases the picture allows a person to perceive at a glance what words and figures communicate only through a series of mental operations.

Consequently maps and pictures play an increasing role in our newspapers and periodicals, on posters and in other media. Prior to one of his fireside talks President Roosevelt expressly recommended the use of a map of the world to his listeners—a remark that provoked a veritable run on map dealers and bookstores despite the fact that most newspapers carried maps on the day of the President's address.

Out of the employment of maps, graphs and pictorial statistics, however, has arisen dangerous misinformation or misinterpretation likely to impair the democratic war effort. I shall not deal here with misinformation originating in the willful distortion of maps and graphs that is created by basing them on falsified data or by using such tricks as contrasting "agreeable" colors (red or blue) against "disagreeable" colors (like a sulphurous yellow), over-enlarging alleged "danger spots" by exaggerated shading, and the like. The Nazis, inspired by Haushofer's geopolitics (see, for instance, Karl Haushofer, *Rückblick und Vorschau auf das geopolitische Kartenwesen*, Berlin, 1932), are past masters in such tricks. Their "victory atlas," *The War in Maps*, published by the German Library of Information in New York, is an outstanding example of the

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misuse of the average reader's naive confidence in maps—far more uncritical than his trust in printed matter in general. Two recent articles—H. W. Weigert's "Maps are Weapons" (*Survey Graphic*, October, 1941) and Hans Speier's "Magic Geography" (*Social Research*, September, 1941)—describe and analyze the Nazi methods.



"A Study in Empires"

This diagram, which first appeared in *Facts in Review*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (Feb. 5, 1940), published by the German Library of Information, New York, was reproduced in Sept., 1941 by *Social Research* (Vol. 8, No. 3) in conjunction with Hans Speier's "Magic Geography."

This Nazi "victory atlas," incidentally, furnishes an object lesson in how unscrupulous propaganda may backfire: two of its impressive, colored maps compare Germany's encirclement in 1914-18 with Germany's incomparably superior position during the current war, her back protected by her treaty with

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Russia. These maps were of course drawn before June 1941—today one can use them to prove an opposite contention.

But how about the unintentional misinformation or misinterpretation that sneaks into our own publications? During the first months of the war the high point of French propaganda was a huge, very effective world map, posted everywhere, portraying the Allied countries with their colonies in glowing red, spread all over five continents, whereas Germany was drawn as a forlorn, tiny black spot in the center of Europe. The caption read "*Nous vaincrons parce que nous sommes les plus forts*" (We shall win because we are the stronger). After the defeat of France the Nazis in their film *Victory in the West* skilfully exploited this unfortunate document of the "Maginot Line of the Mind" to ridicule the self-conceit and the delusions of the democratic nations.

Although the general misconceptions about defensive warfare and the value of static defense positions have been exposed time and again since the fall of France we still find some maps and graphs designed—perhaps unconsciously?—very much along the lines of that ill-fated French poster. Objective factors tend to aggravate the situation. There is, for instance, the distortion caused by map projection when a large sector of the earth's surface is depicted. In such maps the empty wildernesses of northern Canada or of arctic Siberia seem overwhelmingly bigger than the strategically and industrially all-important areas of the United States, England, European Russia or Germany.

"An Atlas for the U. S. Citizen, U. S.-centric Maps" (*Fortune*, September 1940) provides an instructive example of how thoroughly the outlook is changed if one shifts merely the angle and the mode of presentation. Or remember the many maps on the blockade question which appeared with great frequency during the first phases of the war both from British and from German sources. If, say, 75 per cent of the places of entry into a country appear to be blockaded the spectator naturally concludes that 75 per cent of its imports are shut out,

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whereas through the remaining 25 per cent all the materials vital to that country may be brought in. On the other hand a blockade of merely 25 per cent of a boundary line may prove highly effective if certain irreplaceable materials can be procured only through this portion of the line. The closing of small outlets, inconspicuous on an ordinary map, may become a matter of life and death (Germany's only maritime exit along the Norwegian coast, Britain's lifeline across the Northern Atlantic, the Murmansk supply route, the Burma Road.

Similar "static" misconceptions can be found in graphs and pictorial statistics (for basic information on this type of statistics see Rudolf Modley's *How to Use Pictorial Statistics*, New York, 1937). One still sees, for instance, comparisons between the industrial resources of the Axis and the United Nations which depict the steel-production capacity of the United Nations as three times larger than that of the Axis (this and all subsequent figures are arbitrary examples and wholly fictitious). The average person translates this picture into "we are three times stronger than the Axis." He should instead remember that the course of military operations is determined not by productive capacity but by actual production; and not by the sum total of production but only by war production; and not even by the total war production (for some of it rusts in warehouses or is sunk in transit) but only by that portion that actually reaches the fighting lines. We may well find in the misleading kind of comparison one of the major sources for our much-blamed "complacency" and "over-confidence."

The all-important question of manpower forms another favorite topic for errors. Usually the grand totals of mobilizable men—or even of entire populations—are presented, whereas probably only those who are now with the armed forces or are due to be called to the colors this or next year should actually be figured in. Since the Battle of Britain, moreover, we ought to know that one thousand men, if they are properly trained and equipped pilots, count for more than a hundred thousand infantry.

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War on the Visual Front

Statisticians and writers like to contrast Germany's labor shortages, its importation of foreign labor etc. with the vast human reserves available to the United Nations. Again, the average spectator is likely to translate the unquestionable fact that the United Nations are potentially many times stronger in man power into the simple but misleading "we actually have many times more soldiers and war-production workers."

These and similar statements, to be found regularly in newspapers, newsreels, posters etc., prove conclusively that while we all theoretically agree that "defense will not win this war" there is still much to be done to transform this commonly held but somewhat platonic opinion into actual work—and, vis-a-vis the topic of this discussion, into the right kind of day-to-day information, interpretation and propaganda.

What can be done about it? The matter of visual information is closely related to the broader problem of further development and perfecting the political conduct of the war, a subject that obviously goes far beyond the scope of this article. Assuming, however, adequate political planning we might well consider some practical suggestions.

In keeping with the dynamic, swiftly moving and changing character of this war, pictures of all kinds ought to be dynamic rather than static. They ought, that is, to show trends, actions, movements rather than possessions or stocks or stationary positions (whether military, political or economic). Most newspaper cartographers understand this already insofar as they indicate with arrows and other signs the shift in the disposition of troops and the actual or potential moves of the belligerents. Maps of the "arrow" type could perhaps be improved by distinguishing with arrows of different sizes or shapes the comparative strength of present dispositions and the comparative importance (or probability) of possible future moves.

A clear distinction should be made between maps illustrating the news from the war theaters and other maps communicating more general information. The former, particularly if they are used in daily newspapers, should be restricted to specific

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areas in order to avoid the misleading distortion inherent in map projection and to allow quick and accurate orientation. The latter kind of maps, which must cover large sectors of the earth if not the entire globe, ought to select the type of presentation most appropriate to one definite purpose and subordinate or omit all irrelevant geographic detail. We could well abandon



Axis-dominated areas (not including Russian campaign) and Finland
United Nations and protected areas

Reproduced from Headline Books, *War Atlas*, 1942, with the permission of the publisher, the Foreign Policy Association.

The world on Mercator's projection, which unduly aggrandizes the territory of the United Nations while it minimizes that of the Axis powers.

Mercator's projection (based on projecting the surface of the globe on a cylinder which touches the earth along a circle of latitude, thereby stretching the meridians to parallel lines), which confusingly exaggerates arctic and antarctic distances, in favor of any other, less misleading, system.

The most difficult problem in drawing truthful maps today arises from the new values attaching in this war to space and

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distance. In earlier wars, including World War I, large territories, difficult to traverse—such as deserts, mountains, broad expanses of water—uniformly favored the defender and impeded the attacker. This is only partially true in the current war, for such terrain may also compel the defender to split his forces while it conceals surprise moves on the part of the attacking units (as in Libya and Ethiopia). On the other hand the more valuable a given area to the industrial war effort the more vulnerable it is in case of an attack (i.e. the Ruhr valley and the Ukraine). One ought to try, therefore, to symbolize the importance of a given area (in each case with exclusive relation to a specific situation or problem) by showing its industrial capacity, the density of its population, its strategic value as giving access to other, more important, regions and the like. In this effort, map designers should emphasize the relative importance of each place by proper shading, coloring or other easily explainable symbols.

A general world-war map, for instance, could indicate the main strategic and industrial areas or "active" countries—Germany, England, the United States, European Russia, China, Japan—in strong, full colors; important but "passive" territories—the Nazi-occupied countries—in subdued shades; and in white the "empty" spaces which are of scarcely any military or industrial value except as they shut off or provide access to more significant areas—most of Australia, the deserts of Africa and of Asia etc. On another map the approximate potentials of each country might be indicated by symbols—in terms of population, machine output, shipbuilding, production of steel, coal and oil. This type of thing is being done but maps of this sort frequently confuse the reader by employing too many different symbols simultaneously, by overcrowding the picture or by choosing statistical signs that are difficult to compare.

In this connection another matter deserves comment. Many war maps concentrate on problems of transportation and supply, showing railroads, highways, harbors and the like. And this is valuable. But quite a few of them use identical symbols to depict

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the least useful, small-gauge track and the four to six track trunkline capable of carrying a hundred or more times more freight. Harbors of the most divergent sizes and installations —say New York and Tutuila, Samoa—are usually marked by the same anchor or star or whatever it may be. It would seem worth while to distinguish—certainly on maps devoted to transportation—between several sizes of railroad or port capacities.

Pictorial statistics pose two groups of problems: these statistics are either "static" ("in 1938 the United Nations produced 90 per cent of the world output of oil") or their "dynamism" lends itself to misinterpretations. Their use is further complicated inasmuch as many figures are necessarily military secrets.

Graphs that merely show that "we now produce six times more than two years ago," tend to provoke smugness. If their message implies—without a lengthy comment—"two years ago we produced, say, 10 per cent of the Axis output; we now produce as much as the Axis but we must double the Axis output to win" they are obviously much better. The best imaginable graph, however, should lead to some such conclusion as that "two years ago we produced 10 per cent of the Axis output, 20 per cent of our production was war production—and France, Belgium etc. were lost; last year we produced 80 per cent of the Axis output, 50 per cent of our production went into the war—and Mussolini's African empire was destroyed, Hitler was temporarily halted, but Japan won important victories; this year we must double the Axis output, divert 75 per cent of our production to the war—and win an all-out victory."

In the motion picture lies a highly essential but much neglected field for pictorial statistics. Newsreels, war films and such features as "The March of Time," McCrary's "Ringside Seat" or "Kaltenborn Edits the News" occasionally incorporate maps, but usually they are either globes or maps clipped from newspapers and similar sources. But the screen offers the best imaginable opportunities for "dynamic" visual information. On the screen arrows can really move as opposing armies advance or retreat, statistical columns can grow or shrink, frontiers

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can be violated and empires can literally "crumble." The effect created by such "living" maps and graphs can be further heightened by an effective accompaniment of words or music. One could both see and hear a "frontier" "break down," the tramping "men" in the statistical column "join the army," "the whistling ships" slide down the ways and the like.

Why not include such a map feature, dynamically illustrating current war events, in the newsreels? Why not visualize the growth of lend-lease aid, the progress of the war-bonds campaign, in pictorial statistics that move? Why not portray Germany's exploitation of the occupied countries by maps on which the confiscated goods actually march into the Reich? Or depict the effect of air raids, swarms of planes (in symbols) dropping bombs across a map of strategic and key industrial points? Why not dramatize the unrest in Nazi-occupied Europe by flashing on a map those places where hostages have been executed, troop trains have been derailed, underground papers have been secretly edited and printed?

These few suggestions indicate how great can be the improvement in the techniques and therefore in the effectiveness of visual means for conveying information about the war. But visual information can do even more. Beyond illustrating and clarifying current issues it can also help to explain the background of the war, the aims of the democracies and the potentialities of the coming peace. Good examples are to be found in J. F. Horrabin's *Geography of the War* (London, 1940) and in the *Headline Books* of the Foreign Policy Association, New York—e. g. Shepard Stone's *Shadow over Europe*, Henry C. Wolfe's *Human Dynamite* and others.

Why not translate the ideas of the Atlantic Charter into maps and pictorial statistics? If leaflets composed of maps and graphs setting forth the war and the peace aims of the United Nations were dropped from planes over enemy-held territories they might easily do a better job of propaganda than mere word appeals. They would reveal how enormous a fraction of mankind is still without democratic forms of government; how the

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living standard of the German people could have been improved had they used differently the billions that Hitler spent for armaments; how the riches of the world, if intelligently employed for peaceful purposes under the supervision of a world-wide organization, can easily offer fair opportunities for working and living to all peoples.

This total war makes imperative on the part of the democracies a maximum expenditure of will power and intellectual ability. Visual information can make a tangible contribution toward the achievement of that end.



An Azimuthal Equidistant Projection Centered on San Francisco

Reproduced from the *Michigan Alumnus Quarterly Review* for Summer, 1942 (Vol. 48, No. 24)

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There'll Always Be an England

GIOVANNI COSTIGAN

THE distinction between the perishability of a culture and the permanence of the land that supports it, between the brevity of the one and the undying nature of the other, is one that finds illustration from the history of any civilized people. National and social personalities, like our own selves, are continually dissolved and recreated, destroyed and reborn. The life history of a nation like that of an individual is actually composed of a succession of distinct beings, the separateness of whose identity is masked in the one case by the continuity of institutions as in the other by the phenomenon of memory. But this very continuity of organized life is to a certain extent formal and fictitious. Consider, for example, what totally different conceptions have at various times been embodied in the British Parliament or in official Christianity, and what totally different groups have at times engrossed power through the instrumentality of these agencies.

The England in dissolution today is only the latest in the series of Englands that have perished in the past. If in the 18th century Horace Walpole could write that one must consult the papers every day for fear of missing some new British victory, only yesterday we consulted them, as we may again tomorrow, to find out what fresh English city is laid waste. Beneath a rain that never fell from English skies before, the products of the love and labor of 30 generations are being annihilated, the symbols of their hope and longing equally with the monuments of their pride destroyed. Yet, in terms of purely human misery, the suffering caused by this destruction is no greater than that brought about when, in the bloody throes of the Industrial Revolution, the England of today emerged from the England of the 18th century. The woeful

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prophecies that now are sometimes heard were anticipated then. "The harlot's cry from street to street shall weave old England's sheet." England has always been dying yet England has never ceased to live; and it is true of nations as of men that "he who lives more lives than one, more deaths than one must die." The plangent voice of a certain Lord Chief Justice mourning the vanished glory of great names, an echo in an English law court of the harsh voice in the Syrian desert, might reverberate indefinitely through history. "Time hath his revolutions. There must be a period and an end to all things temporal. . . . Where is Bohun? Where is Mowbray? Where is Mortimer? nay, which is more and most of all, where is Plantagenet? They are entombed in the urns and sepulchres of mortality."

Let us take a look at some of these earlier Englands, so remote from that now perishing. And let us remember that each successive England, could it have known the England that was to be, would have regarded it with horror. English Catholics did not foresee that they were building as surely for destruction as the body is built for the worm; that the descendants sprung from their loins would come to hold the faith of their fathers in perfect abhorrence and that the Pope would come to be regarded by the average Englishman either as the Scarlet Woman, the Whore of Babylon, or as Bunyan's feeble giant, "grown so crazy and stiff in his joints that he can now do little more than sit in his cave's mouth, grinning at pilgrims as they go by, and biting his nails because he cannot come at them." The Puritans did not foresee that the product of their holy zeal would be a licentiousness of manners seldom surpassed, or the 18th century that its freedom of thought would father Nonconformist conscience, its elegance and wit play midwife to Victorian middle-class morality; or this in turn that it would give place to the gross and florid morals and the questionable taste of the cosmopolitan money lords, the Rothschilds and Sassoons, the Joels and Beits and Barnatos, whom Edward VII gathered expansively around him.

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There'll Always Be an England

The England of a thousand years which boasted of its purity of faith and of its unalterable attachment to the Holy See died in the 16th century a violent death. Its monasteries were destroyed and its sanctuaries profaned, its precious vessels melted into gold, its stained glass shattered into fragments and its images—the symbols of its faith and hope—trampled underfoot. Its books—the repositories of its learning—perished by hundreds. And when Sir Thomas More kissed his executioner and laid his head upon the block, when the last Carthusians submitted to be hanged and disembowelled for the faith that was in them, there disappeared from England an ideal, a way of life which, however violated in practice, had for ten centuries been held in men's esteem. The ideal of renunciation and the quest for solitude that drove men out, like the swallow in Yeat's play, to "wander the loud waters," to root on lonely rocks and live with screaming gulls amid the spray of Northumbrian tempests was now itself held up to derision.

Almost the last episode of Catholic England opened at daybreak on a late June morning in the year 1580. On the beach below the cliffs of Dover a young man landed from a fishing smack. His name was Edmund Campion and he knew that in returning to his native land he was courting almost certain death. For he was the spearhead of the Jesuit invasion, the leader of the last attempt to arrest the ruinous course of the present and to attach England once more to ancient ways. He told the English people that he came "either to win you heaven, or to die upon your pikes." By December he was hunted down, racked and tortured till his body was a pulp, then drawn on a hurdle through the streets of London where at Tyburn he was hanged and drawn and quartered. With him disappeared the lost hope of Catholic England. "Musical and low," says Newman, "across the broad sea comes the report of their deeds and their sufferings." So low indeed that it has needed ever since an attentive ear to catch its harmonies.

The new land, Puritan England, belonged for a brief period to preachers and psalm singers who with the founder of the

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Quakers proclaimed, "All nations have drunk the whore's cup, and all the world hath worshipped the beast." Men walked with God without benefit of clergy. They bore alone the agony of apprehension and the weight of sin. Not seldom the afflicted spirit broke forth prodigiously in cries and groanings till the torment of the individual was slaked in the waters of conversion. For salvation was not sure; else why did Cromwell, after a life of godliness, cry out so loudly on his deathbed that it was a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God? Was Christ's blood not sufficient after all? The fires of Hell burned in the Puritan mind. From the printing presses came frequent ejaculations like those of Bunyan with his *Few Sighs From Hell* or *The Groans of a Damned Soul*. Through nervous tension and the repression of instincts a formidable and compelling personality was built up. George Fox, the man in leather breeches, for years wandered up and down the country launching against towns and villages the thunderbolts of his wrath. Consider his words to the city of Derby:

> O DERBY! as the waters run away when the floodgates are up, so doth the visitation of God's love pass away from thee, O Derby! Therefore look where thou art, and how thou art grounded; and consider, before thou art utterly forsaken. O Derby! thy profession and preaching stink before the Lord. Ye profess a Sabbath in words, and meet together dressing yourselves in fine apparel; you uphold pride. Thy women go with stretched-forth necks and wanton eyes, &c., which the true prophet of old cried against. Your assemblies are odious, and an abomination to the Lord: Pride is set up, and bowed down to; covetousness abounds; and he that doeth wickedly is honoured: so deceit bears with deceit; and yet they profess Christ in words. O the deceit is within thee! It doth even break my heart to see how God is dishonoured in thee, O Derby!

A new character, almost a national type, was evolved: gloomy and fanatical, loud and zealous, staunch and self-reliant. Steeple-crowned hats hid downcast looks. Nasal tones gave forth sanctimonious aspirations. The Puritan bristled with Scriptural saws and instances. Chapter and verse were ever at

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tongue's end. He modelled himself on the Hebrews in the Old Testament and regarded himself as of a Chosen People. He was willing to bathe his sword in the blood of the ungodly. He found beauty dangerous. He eschewed music and dancing. Cathedral organs were broken and the long line of English musical development stretching back to John of Dunstable was cut short. In Purcell it momentarily flickered and then died. The nobler side of Puritanism, as revealed in Baxter and Milton (consider Baxter's "God breaketh not all hearts alike," and his sermons with their "transcript of the heart which hath most force upon the hearts of others," or Margaret Baxter's precept to "learn by experience when any condition is inordinately or excessively sweet to thee, to say from hence must be my sorrow"), its seriousness of purpose and sweet gravity, its moral elevation, its scorn of compromise and rejection of things base—these things also came to an untimely end.

The downfall of Puritanism was swift as that of Catholicism. In the joyful Restoration its psalms were drowned in bawdy songs, its soul sluiced out in floods of wine. The merriment of Oak Apple Day was its death knell. When the bodies of Cromwell and Ireton were dug up and hung on gibbets the corpse of Puritanism was exposed and derided with them. Wycherley and Congreve danced an obscene dance upon its grave. Charles II, the dark young man two yards high, symbolized the new age by stamping his royal image upon a good deal of plastic material lying about the court. Profligate England continued substantially through the four Georges; the Regency ended what the Restoration had begun. Charles II and George IV mark the limits of an epoch: an epoch in which, as someone has said, the Foxes had their holes in the public Treasury and gout became an occupational disease of aristocracy; an epoch of correct manners and good breeding, of elegance and moral depravity, of political corruption and the cult of reason. This England of the orgulous Georgian houses was the watershed dividing the Puritans from the Victorians. A few great families formed the State. A few great houses like Belvoir and

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Bowood, Chatsworth and Stowe, contained the sum of culture. Sir William Blackstone praised the constitution, seamed and streaked and spotty with abuses as it was. From his professor's chair he solemnly declared that it was "so wisely contrived, so strongly finished and so highly raised, that it is hard to speak of it with that praise which is justly and severely its due."

At its best, patrician England exhibited restraint and dignity, tolerance and courtesy, and a balance of temper not disturbed by the success or failure of the moment—qualities conspicuously evident in such a life as that of David Hume, whose death-scene is one of the shining hours of the century. It produced elegant little gentlemen like Horace Walpole. It elevated good manners to an ideal of conduct. Lives of studied moderation such as those of Gibbon, Hume and Adam Smith if unexciting are not without charm. Such men practised Crébillon's precept of control over the emotions. They loved without passion and parted without hate. Lord Chesterfield realized that, in so far as they imply just recognition of and respect for the personalities of others, manners have in fact a moral value.

But the aristocracy was also pompous and empty, selfish and debauched. It was prone to echo the earlier braggadocio of Lord Herbert of Cherbury who had fought over twenty duels in all of which he said he had been the aggressor. Its godlike pride was prone to degenerate into the most odious insolence, illustrated by the well-known letter of the Duchess of Buckingham to Selina, Countess of Huntingdon, who had taken up with the Methodists. "It is monstrous," she wrote, "to be told you have a heart as sinful as the common wretches who crawl upon the earth. This is highly offensive and insulting, and I cannot but wonder that your Ladyship should relish any sentiments so much at variance with high rank and good-breeding."

The French Revolution exploded this world's counterpart upon the Continent. In England its power was undermined in equally sure but less spectacular fashion by railroads and cotton mills, by the Industrial Revolution and the Great Reform Bill.

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There'll Always Be an England

The valediction of the Augustan Age was the Duke of Wellington's languid comment on the middle-class House of Commons in 1833. He said he had never seen so many shocking bad hats in his life.

Another England underlay that of ducal palaces and salons —the England of Sir Robert Walpole, and of Fielding and Smollett, the England of the squire and the hunting field, of John Bull at length emergent: a world of inns and grooms and ostlers, of ale and oaths and dung; a compost of heaving equine flanks and steaming nostrils, of pounding hearts of beast and rider, of flushed cheeks and hard breathing, of the sheer exhilaration of the lengthening stride of a powerful creature beneath one, of the terror of hunted animals and the madness of hounds. John Bull's world was scented not with the perfume of the drawingroom but with the acrid tang of horseflesh and leather mingled with that of urine, sweat and lovely muck—that complex of odors so long in the nostrils of man before the coming of machines and which, with a sensation of indescribable bittersweet, still impregnates the air of small Irish country towns. On raw November mornings the streaming hounds and scarlet coats flew along the hillside like wine along the blood. Instead of violin and harpsichord its music was the huntsman's horn and the pack giving tongue, that "chiming and jangling sweet madness" as Kingsley called it and loved it. Anthony Trollope, another mighty hunter though in a falling time, here and there catches a lingering echo of Squire Western's world: "an old hound opened true and sharp—an old hound whom all the pack believed." In a phrase of superb simplicity he pronounced the final eulogy of that world: "To ride to hounds is very glorious"—by which he refers, no doubt, to that exhilaration of spirit which is the absolute pitch of physical well-being, the sense of perfect form, which comes at the moment when consciousness is sunk in sensation and this at the point of danger. What a curious overlapping of worlds, incidentally, takes place when Friedrich Engels extols hunting to Marx as "the greatest physical pleasure I know."

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That life, too, made real as could no other the sense of the countryside, gained from the saddle and between the ears of a mare—the shape of its bare hills, the feel and contour of its fields, the lie of its woods and hedges and the wandering courses of its streams among the pollards. Of these things momentarily the huntsman became an actual part. Dividing their days between the fox and the bottle, the squires of England were as ignorant of books as George II whom the sight of one was said to transport with rage. But if they did not read poetry they partly lived it. Their values were those of blood and soil and they included the vices bred of these: mountains of irremovable prejudice, an unbounded contempt for strangers and especially for foreigners, a surly truculence of manner and a loud offensive patriotism.

These two worlds of the 18th century achieved their highest distinctiveness when each was on the point of being submerged by the Industrial Age. The social graces and rational attitudes of aristocracy received consummate form in the circle of Holland House, which did not meet till 1800 and did not break up until the death of Lord Holland in 1841. But already Victorian influences both physical and spiritual had begun to invade the citadel of that older and now vanishing world. The tentacles of London's monstrous growth were wrapping themselves about those groves where Fox used every April to listen for the earliest nightingale; while Lady Holland's table was being steadily inundated by the rising flood of unceasing and coruscating Macaulayese.

The old rural England of shires and squires and yeomen was also being obliterated. But by a providential dispensation it found at length a voice and champion. In the last hours of his world's existence John Bull appeared in person, the word made flesh, to protest against the impending destruction of that world. In his own person William Cobbett summed up centuries of rural life. What a mighty wind that was that blew through England, denouncing injustice and defying the future: the last authentic voice of Merry England. The land was filled

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with the noise of Cobbett's hammering hoofs. He could tell her varying soils at a gallop with his eyes shut—the clear iron ring of the chalky downs, the stiff clays of the Weald, the heavy grasses of the Midland pastures. He loved the earth of England for its richness and fecundity. Like Richard Jefferies after him he sought to feel it with his hands and strain it through his fingers. Barren and impoverished soil, moors and heaths, he hated; the sheaves of corn, the hayricks, the beef and beer and ale he loved.

His hates were violent as his loves. They were of an extraordinary variety and abundance, equally appalling and indiscriminate. He particularly detested foreigners, the Lake poets, intellectual women, Scotsmen, potatoes, philosophers, bankers, George IV, Jeremy Bentham and tea drinkers. Tea had done more to ruin England than Napoleon. He turned on it the same personal fury that he turned on Lord Castlereagh. "I view the tea-drinking," he declared, "as a destroyer of health, an enfeebler of the frame, an engenderer of effeminacy and laziness, a debaucher of youth, and a maker of misery for old age."

Mr. Churchill has remarked in one of his essays upon the contrast between the typical Englishman of a century ago—the gross and fleshy John Bull of Gillray, for example, loudly bawling for more as he devours the French ships which the English admirals, Nelson and the rest, serve up to him upon huge platters; and the typical Englishman as conceived by Struve or David Low today—a timid, inoffensive little wisp of a man, staggering under a huge burden of taxation, harassed by the government without and by his wife within. Cobbett would have seen in this the fulfilment of his gloomiest forebodings. Peace to his spirit, which knew no peace in life. His world is dead. Today Will Cobbett would be almost as great an anachronism as the Venerable Bede.

With the 19th century a new England was born. In smoke and flame it was launched into the world, as in smoke and flame it is perishing today. "Nothing begins," says Francis Thompson, "and nothing ends that is not paid with moan, for we are

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born in others' pain and perish in our own." Aristocrat and yeoman went down to a common destruction. The new England was powerful and wealthy, the pivot of Empire and the workshop of the world. It defeated Napoleon and crushed the Revolution. But its victory was bought at a price. "The play is over," said the government paper, *The Courier*, on the news of Waterloo. "We can now go to supper." "Not," replied Cobbett, "till you have first paid the bill."

The insistent rhythm of British greatness was punctuated by the sobbing of children in the bowels of the earth. The French historian Michelet later accused England of having won through the sweated labor of her children in mines and factories. Certainly to listen to the dire prognostications which sounded through the House of Lords whenever it was proposed to abolish, or even curtail, the use of such labor one might have thought that the British Empire was really propped up by the feeble strength of women and children. Listen to the Parliamentary report of 1842 upon the labor of girls in coalmines:

> Chained, belted, harnessed like dogs in a go-cart, black, saturated with wet, and more than half-naked—crawling upon their hands and feet, and dragging heavy loads behind them—they present an indescribably disgusting and unnatural appearance.

Hear Engels' description of Little Ireland in the city of Manchester:

> . . . . masses of refuse, offal, and sickening filth lie among the standing pools in all directions; the atmosphere is poisoned by the effluvia from these, and laden and darkened by the smoke of a dozen tall factory chimneys. A horde of ragged women and children swarm about here, as filthy as the swine that thrive upon the garbage heaps and in the puddles. In short, the whole rookery furnishes such a hateful and repulsive spectacle as can hardly be equalled in the worst court on the Irk. The race that lives in these ruinous cottages, behind broken windows, mended with oilskin, sprung doors, and rotten doorposts, or in dark, wet cellars, in measureless filth and stench, in this atmosphere penned in as if with a purpose, this race must really have reached the lowest stage of humanity.

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The rural laborer was broken too. The yeoman, whom Cromwell declared the backbone of the country, lost his land. In Sussex Cobbett actually saw men yoked like beasts to the plow. Starving peasants like the "Tolpuddle martyrs" whose sin was to be hungry were sent with the scum of the gaols to Botany Bay. The earliest memories of Thomas Hardy, growing up close by Tolpuddle, were of the misery of Dorset in the "hungry forties"—a misery that stamped itself so deeply on his mind as to determine effectually, and not without results for English literature, his outlook on the universe and on man's place in it. Jude the Obscure, a symbol of all the forlorn, nameless, wronged ones of the countryside, is introduced to us as one "who was born to ache a good deal before the fall of the curtain on his unnecessary life should signify that all was well with him at last." "Honest pride and happy days!" cried Cobbett looking back upon his childhood—a cry that Jude the Obscure is hardly likely to have echoed.

Together with the lives of its people the very face of England was altered. Whole cities lay under a perpetual pall of smoke and saw the sun on Sundays or not at all. Asked Blake, remembering Milton:

> And did God's feet in ancient time,
> Walk upon England's mountains green?
> And was the holy lamb of God
> In England's pleasant pasture seen?
>
> And did the Countenance Divine
> Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
> And was Jerusalem builded here
> Amid these dark Satanic mills?

London began to exhibit its deformity through the fields of Middlesex and Surrey. Like a remorseless scoriac flow it engulfed the idyllic hamlets that for centuries had clung about its skirts. Wider and wider spread the stagnant waters of human misery, in London and Birmingham and Manchester. Typhus

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and cholera invaded tenements and Englishmen died like rats in sewers. Hundreds of thousands of houses were built in this new England, back to back, without ventilation or drainage, fronting the midden running down the street.

Two or three generations of English men and women passed through the fiery furnace. Upon their sufferings was built the greatness of Victorian England. And still a new national type was evolved. We meet it first in Sir Robert Peel, the wintry bleakness of whose countenance was occasionally relieved by what in another might have been called a smile. Daniel O'Connell said it was like the silver plate on the lid of a coffin. Reserved like the Puritan, but frigid and not fervent, correct and in taste like the Augustan, but religious and not cynical, the new type was matured by Dr. Arnold at Rugby and later in the schools patterned after it, to become the matrix of Empire builders and administrators.

It was in the Public Schools that the word "gentleman" now underwent a change of meaning and began to cast, in the shape of the word "cad," an unfamiliar shadow. This term was a coinage of the 19th century made current through the Public Schools and Universities. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as a "fellow of low, vulgar manners and behavior (an offensive and insulting appellation)." Tom Brown quickly learned at Rugby that the world was divided into two classes—gentlemen and cads. This dichotomy was a sort of Victorian transposition of the old Puritan dualism of saints and sinners, a secular cheapening of a religious theme. The category of cads, like that of the sinners of old, included practically the whole population —who might be, and sometimes were, insulted with impunity. In case of need, injured feelings could be assuaged, as Tom found with the gamekeeper, by crossing the cad's palm with money. In real life the Duke of Hamilton once won a bet with Edward VII, then an undergraduate at Christ Church, by filling a hat with treacle and clapping it on the head of a shop assistant. The latter was in all likelihood flattered at this mark of ducal attention, grateful for a pecuniary salve to feelings

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that had probably not been hurt and pleased to see young gentlemen enjoying themselves. Not the least deplorable aspect of such hooliganism was the spirit either of obsequiousness or else of savage resentment it was likely to foster in its victims. In his poems Kipling extolled the valor of Tommy Atkins and the thin red line of heroes but in his private letters he would ask what notion of duty could possibly be expected of a cockney cad, thus annihilating with a single brutal epithet three or four millions of people whose misfortune it was to live in the East End of London.

That this particular England is crumbling today will not cause any special regret. In the face of common danger and moved by the same common courage such distinctions have lost their meaning—one hopes forever. Even the fair virtues of this England, symbolized for the "Last Puritan" by the lilies of Eton and actually incarnate in such as Lionel Johnson (that scholar gentle, gracile, frail, and prince of Wykehamists)—even its blitheness of spirit, its unassuming bravery, its debonair acceptance of life, hardly make one regret its passing.

Parallel in time with Imperialism, but hostile in intention to it, quite a different England projected itself down through the 19th century—the liberal England of Bentham and Mill, of Darwin and Huxley, of Gladstone and Morley, of the Hammonds and the Webbs, of Shaw and Wells and Bertrand Russell: an England which, for all the abuse heaped upon it by Marx, was progressive, humane, intelligent and courageous. From those gatherings at Grote's House in the 1820's, where at eight in the morning the Utilitarians discussed metaphysics before beginning the day's work, down to the Fabian meetings where, as Shaw tells us, for fear of ridicule no speaker dared indulge in rhetoric or in appeals to sentiment, the liberal tradition maintained a consistently high standard of intellectual and ethical integrity. Severe and dry, precise and disinterested, it assumed the natural goodness of men and the omnipotence of reason. "I supposed," Bentham said plaintively in old age, "that men only wanted to know what was good in order to

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embrace it." Around the formula of the greatest happiness of the greatest number clings the aureole of a new day. "Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive."

In John Stuart Mill the Utilitarian severity was filtered through a warm emotional nature which the most grinding tyranny of education ever inflicted on a child failed quite to subdue. His personality though crippled survived. The cost is written in the furrows of that frightfully ravaged face, with its suggestion of an inexpressible grief from moment to moment held sternly in check, which haunts one from his later photographs. Mill's subtle intellect was at the service of every humane cause. Unselfish, kindly, generous, he is one of the noblest figures of English life. The essay *On Liberty* is the most perfect statement of Victorian idealism. When Mill lay finally in Avignon, beside the wife with whom his heart had long been buried, Gladstone was beginning to carry out many of the reforms that Mill had urged. In Gladstone, who brought to public life a unique force of oratory, a moral elevation and the power of communicating it to his hearers, an impetuous, unresting energy, a broad strong intellect, and an indomitable will—in Gladstone, liberal England achieved its apotheosis.

The Grand Old Man was likewise the incarnation of the Nonconformist conscience. Notwithstanding its humorlessness, its aversion to beauty and its narrow sexual morality, traits derived equally from Utilitarianism and from Puritanism, Nonconformity was in many ways a strong and vital element in the national life, as valuable in Victorian England as the Huguenots were in the France of Louis XIV. The Dissenters were the core of the Victorian Age, its soundly beating heart. It was easy to jeer at them, as Wilde found to his cost, and disregard their unpretentious honesty, their uprightness of conduct and seriousness of mind. But even the vindictiveness with which they persecuted men like Dilke, Parnell and Wilde does not entirely forfeit their claim to our respect, a claim which has been sympathetically stated from a seemingly unlikely quarter. Henry James in his charming *English Hours* writes:

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There'll Always Be an England

Conservatism has the cathedrals, the colleges, the castles, the gardens, the traditions, the associations, the fine names, the better manners, the poetry; Dissent has the dusky brick-chapels in provincial by-streets, the names out of Dickens, the uncertain tenure of the "h," and the poor *"mens sibi conscia recti."*

Unhappily other Englands are crumbling too, among them that embodying some of the finest traits in the assemblage constituting the most recent national character—an England whose life is mirrored in the most intimate and lovely aspects of the land, the England of pastures and hanging woods, of deep-embowered villages whose names are a litany, the England of Emerald Uthwart, of "little velvety fields," says Pater, "little with the true sweet English littleness of our little island, our land of vignettes," the England that Ruskin commemorates in the first chapter of *Praeterita:*

While I never pass a lattice-windowed cottage without wishing to be its cottager, yet I never saw the castle I envied to its lord . . . the personal feeling and native instinct of me had been fastened, irrevocably, long before, to things modest, humble, and pure in peace under the low, red roofs of Croydon, and by the cress-set rivulets in which the sand danced and minnows darted above the Springs of Wandel.

The thought of war in England is made particularly cruel by the sense of ravishment of so profound a peace, the violation of so tranquil a slumber as that in which the land was plunged. Of all nations in the world, in England was war most unthinkable. Seldom in history has any land enjoyed so long a respite from violence or twined around itself more slowly and securely the blandishments of peace. How distant seem those years spent in the garden at Rye, when, as James says, "the summer days are long, and the sweet old soul of all the land seems most to hang in the air"; or when, to the Child in the House, "the perfume of the little flowers of the lime-tree fell through the air upon them like rain; while time seemed to move ever more slowly to the murmur of the bees in it, till it almost stood still on June afternoons."

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Of this England the prime symbol was that slow unique accretion of the ages, the parish church. Entering the cool darkness time indeed stood still as if it had been noiselessly subtracted from the passing years and actually stored here in palpable form. To descend into the crypt was to be encompassed by a Norman gloom, to feel the very weight of history. The silence of the nave was thick and sensible. Along the walls—in the shape of epitaphs, brasses, hatchments, tattered flags—flowed the spilth of centuries. A dim memorial might aim its random shaft—sped twenty, or a hundred, years ago—from Waterloo or the beaches of Gallipoli: *Qui procul hinc . . . Mediterraneis sepultus sub undis. Qui ante diem periit, sed miles, sed pro patria.* Along the aisles the stiff recumbent effigies maintained their timeless identical posture. Outside, the Crusader or the Jacobean squire whom they commemorated had long turned gently into mold. If anything built of human hands seemed stable and destined to survive, such buildings did. Out of thousands of such cells the body of England was composed. The chords of her history vibrated through them. Now they are torn apart in the common fate of town and country. On Bredon now the noisy bells *are* dumb. The wind no longer knows the silver chiming flung gustily through Sabbath fields.

A certain type of character was sometimes bred from the crossing of such influences—the subdued Puritanism of Charles Kingsley or Matthew Arnold, for example, with its blending of modesty and pride, of tenderness and strength, of vitality and sensibility. At his best the country clergyman in his unambitious round was one of the most distinctive products of English culture. His feet were not swift to shed blood. As with the father of Morris, his self-effacing devotion often served but to hand on loyally a certain tradition and a way of life. He was the center and the moving spirit of "the dear sweet Protestant England" of George Moore's *Confessions* which had such power to beguile the callow youth from his python and his demi-tasse at Tortoni's. Beyond the country vicarage, the type was mirrored in certain quiet pools. The streams and gardens of an

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ancient university were apt to mask their retreat. The type was conventual, recluse and celibate, often odd and whimsical. We recognize it in Lewis Carroll and in Walter Pater, in A. E. Housman and in A. D. Godley. Occasionally it strayed beyond those walls, as with Fitzgerald sailing his boat on Suffolk waters or Charles Lamb shedding "tears in the motley Strand from fulness of joy at so much life." This England too is dead and its epitaph already written.

. . . . and England over
Advanced the lofty shade.

Ten years ago when he visited the home of his ancestors Robinson Jeffers, wiser than most statesmen, perceived that the present epoch of English history was drawing to a close. He sensed the uterine softness of the national life and saw "the great pillar of empire settling to a fall, the pride and the power slowly dissolving." The land was peopled with the ghosts of the populous dead, "skipping and fleering" behind the hedges, Arthur gaunt as a wolf, and Alfred of Wessex wandering witlessly, wringing his hands.

What will be the form of things to come we do not know. That a new England is now taking shape is clear. Hitler is perhaps accomplishing for England what no statesman or party of the 19th century was able to achieve—the disintegration of her class structure and the destruction of her slums. It seems likely that in the effort to tear the nation apart he may be fusing its elements more closely together. Can it be that under the impact of such external danger the dream of the classless society that Marx took with him into the grave at Highgate is about to be materialized?

Whatever the outcome, the English past has left a double legacy to "look time's leaguer down." Beneath the flux lies permanence, elements of continuity pillaring those of change. The language is indestructible. The English tongue has been carried to another world. And wherever it survives, the manifold aspects of English culture may be imaged as fairly, as tenderly, by those who have never set foot on English soil as by

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those who have never left it. Remoteness has its reward, absence sharpening the imagination. Transpontine longings and incredible nostalgias are bred of words on a printed page. No sense of English life could be more vivid than that of Hudson's boyish rapture in the bookstalls of Buenos Aires. From Fielding's faded pages rose like a mirage on the dry air of the pampas a vision of the moist green island he had never seen. For him, as for those other "passionate pilgrims, vague aliens and disinherited strangers," Henry James and Santayana, it became an ineluctable goal of desire.

One other imprint of old England will remain, the indelible imprint of its earliest people, enduring as the cloudy vesture of its skies; and while this abides, though all else fail, England will be recognizably herself. For the land is a living palimpsest upon which successive races and peoples have written their signatures. As one by one these glosses are erased in a fiery ordeal, the original script is more legible than ever. No people has left a more ineffaceable mark of its presence than the ancient megalith builders. In solitude and grandeur their spirit walks the high bare hills. Everywhere in southern England the ineffable line of brooding Downs is crested with the vigilant immobile forms of tumulus and barrow. "For time he taketh all away but these he cannot take." For forty centuries on Salisbury Plain that huge huddle of monolithic sheep has braved all weathers.

A thousand years hence, moved by no other memories than of these stones, the exiled native may still dream as James Elroy Flecker dreamed among the cedars of Lebanon:

> 'Tis ever sweet to lie
> On the dry carpet of the needles brown,
> And though the fanciful green lizard stir,
> And windy odours light as thistledown
> Breathe from the lavdanon and lavender,
> Half to forget the wandering and pain,
> Half to remember days long since gone by,
> And dream and dream that I am home again.

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In the Workshop

The Evolution of Farm Relief

ASHER HOBSON

OUR government has always been sympathetic toward its farmers. Such an attitude was to be expected in the days of more land than farmers, when the great bulk of the nation's population was directly dependent upon the soil for a living. But it is a little surprising to observe that as the agricultural population becomes relatively less numerous, the generosity of government increases.

To be sure, agricultural legislation has not always resulted in helping agriculture. Yet it is fairly certain that the intent to help is always present. The Homestead Act of 1862 is a case in point. It is rather generally agreed that part of our present difficulties have their root in this Act. It brought into cultivation millions of acres that should never have been exposed to the plow. The government meant well. Farmers wanted cheap land. The government gave them cheap land. The trouble arises from the fact that the land was not only cheap, but some of it extremely poor. The problem now is that of retiring this poor land from circulation as farms.

Early agricultural policy was devoted almost wholly to promoting land settlement. The price of government land was low—seldom exceeding $1.50 per acre—and sold upon liberal credit terms. But cheapness and easy payment terms were not the only devices used to encourage settlement. Private ownership of land was made still easier by a series of official programs designed to facilitate settlement. The more important of these are familiar. They are listed here merely to emphasize their place in the evolution of agricultural policy.

The Indians were concentrated in order to make way for the white settler. By the pre-emption law, "squatters" who outran the surveyors were permitted to retain possession of their holdings. The railway land grants played an important role. As someone has said, they promoted the building of railroads "from places where no one lived to places where no one wanted to go." It was assumed that settlement would follow the rails. It did. The master stroke of the 19th-century in matters of agricultural policy was the Homestead Act (1862) reducing the amount of money payment required of the settler. The government disposed of something

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over 100,000,000 acres of land under this Act and its subsequent extensions.

Government interest in the nation's farm population was not, however, limited to the transfer of land. With the passage of the Morrill Act (1862), the Federal Government initiated what later became an energetic and sizable effort to promote agricultural education, research, and extension activities. Through the donation of public lands, it provided for the establishment in each of the states of institutions of higher learning known as land grant colleges and universities, for the teaching of agricultural and engineering subjects.

By the Hatch Act (1887), Congress provided that Federal funds be made available annually to each of the states for agricultural experimental and research purposes.

The Smith-Lever Act of 1914 placed on a permanent basis the agricultural extension service with its corps of county agricultural and home demonstration agents.

These original acts have been augmented and supplemented. Funds, especially for research and extension purposes, have been substantially increased from time to time. Farmers stand out among the economic groups as one to which the government has been lavish in its effort to place them on a high plane of operating efficiency.

The Grange movement in the seventies crystallized farmer demands that the railroads and other "monopolies" be curbed in the interests of those who dealt with them. Partially, perhaps predominantly, as a result of these demands, Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and the Pure Food and Drug Act. While legislation of this sort does not deal directly with agriculture, it may be considered a part of agricultural policy.

Although one of the earliest of the official agricultural programs was the sale of publicly owned lands at low rates on easy terms, it was not until 1916, with the establishment of the Federal Land Bank system, that Uncle Sam entered the field of supplying credit to agriculture in a large way and for purposes other than the purchase of the public domain. This policy has been expanded to cover short term marketing and production credit and loans to agricultural cooperative associations for the conduct of their business. Feed and seed loans, and loans made by the Farm Security Administration are granted to many who have no credit standing under the ordinary interpretation of that term.

No longer can it be said that farmers as a group suffer from a lack of credit facilities designed to meet their needs. The question is sometimes raised as to whether farmers have not been the victims of too much and too easy credit.

The above sketch covers in brief the first one hundred or more years of official agricultural policy in this country. This is one instance in which the first one hundred years were not the hardest. It is believed by many that agricultural policy was born in the 1930's. Such is not the case. Our

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government throughout its existence has been mindful of agriculture. Measured by the standards of the time, it can be said with acceptable accuracy, that the government has done more to promote agriculture than any other profession, occupation or calling. Even the advance of medical science has received no such encouragement.

Truly, even before the days of the McNary-Haugen, the export debenture, and the domestic allotment discussions in the 1920's, and before the days of the more recent Federal Farm Board and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, agriculture occupied a favored position in the eyes of federal legislators.

Perhaps the reason why the earlier acts of government are not looked upon by many as matters of policy is their mildness as compared to more recent programs. They involved no direct monetary rewards. Compulsion in connection with farm operations was lacking. The aim of Congress seems to have been the promotion of the family-sized farm in an atmosphere of competitive private enterprise. The farmer was assisted in the acquisition of land. He was protected, in a measure, against detrimental activities of powerful economic groups with which he had to deal. He was furnished with much friendly advice on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Yet in the last analysis his decisions were his own.

World War I lifted agricultural prices to soaring heights. The latter part of 1920 saw them drop with a resounding crash. The severity of the economic shock is indicated by the following figures:

	1920	*1921*
Cash Farm Income	$12.6 billion	$8.1 billion
Farm Price Index	211%	125%
Farm Purchasing Power	111%	67%

Congress began to hear from the rural areas. The three general farm organizations of national scope had established permanent legislative offices in Washington in order to provide a better sounding board for the boys back home. The demands were many and insistent that something must be done. Congress and the Administration became deeply concerned. There is much evidence of this concern. In 1921 a Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry was set up by Congress with instructions to report within six months on "The Agricultural Crisis and its Causes." The report of the Commission covers some 1300 printed pages of ordinary book size. President Harding called a National Agricultural Conference, early in 1922, to which 439 delegates from all parts of the country were invited. A third manifestation was the organization of the "Farm Bloc" in the Senate—the first of its kind.

Some students of the subject are inclined to look upon this period as the real beginning of the government's participation in agricultural affairs. Without doubt, it is the period in which the government began to consider ways and means of participating more directly and more actively in

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agricultural matters. Discussions began as to the possibility of the government's taking a hand in the control of farm prices.

There is a real basis for the statement that Congress passed more legislation on behalf of agriculture during the period 1920 to 1932 than during its entire previous existence. Not only did the government expand the output of economic and scientific information, but this period saw a considerable increase in the "control of others" on behalf of agriculture. To mention a few examples:

Packers and Stockyards Act; Grain Futures Act; Filled Milk Act; Cotton Standards Act; The Produce Agency Act; The Perishable Agricultural Commodity Act.

It was during this period also that Congress departed from its usual practice by granting to agriculture what were looked upon at the time as special privileges. In 1922 the Capper-Volstead Act was passed granting to agricultural cooperative associations certain immunities under the Sherman Anti-Trust law, thus permitting farmer cooperatives to do certain things denied to their private competitors. During the same year agriculture was granted a representative on the Federal Reserve Board. Yet by far the greater bulk of the legislation was more of the usual: added provisions for research and extension; increased quantities of information; more credit on easier terms; more rigid controls over those handling farm products.

But legislation of this sort, no matter how profuse, was not enough. It did not answer farmer demands. Their trouble was low prices. The cure was higher prices for farm products. Hence, the beginning of the extended, not to say bitter, controversy in Congress over bills designed to raise the domestic prices of agricultural products above world prices.

In 1924 the first McNary-Haugen bill, embodying the equalization fee principle, was introduced. The domestic price was to be based upon a "fair exchange value." The fair exchange value was one that represented the relationship of the prices farmers received for their products to the prices paid by farmers for the things they bought, during a designated previous period. The designated base period was to be one which represented happier days for the farmer. The surpluses were to be exported at world prices. The "losses" on exports were to be made up by the collection of a small fee on each unit of produce grown. A small fee upon the whole production would provide a large fee for the exported portion.

Another two-price plan advanced during this period was the export debenture which proposed to pay subsidies to exporters of designated farm products. The subsidies were to be paid in certificates which would be valid for the payment of customs duties on imports. In short, it was to be an export subsidy with administrative trimmings.

The domestic allotment proposals attempted to accomplish the same results by a different approach. It was based upon rewards to those farmers

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who reduced their acreages of surplus crops in keeping with the demands of the domestic market. Instead of exporting the surpluses at a loss, the thought was to eliminate them. Individual farms were to have allotments. Rewards were to go to those who kept within the allotments. Funds with which to pay the rewards were to be raised by a fee which in later practice turned out to be a processing tax.

It will be observed that the basic principle involved in each of these proposals was the same—a separation of the domestic market from the world market price with a view to raising domestic prices artificially. The differences are in methods. None of these proposals found their way into law during the twenties. Yet few defeated proposals have had such tenacity for legislative life as that exhibited by the equalization fee principle. It was twice passed by both branches of Congress and twice vetoed by the President. Another matter worthy of note is that all these proposals were later put into practice, in one form or another, by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.

It became obvious that price boosting legislation could not be passed over the President's veto. The Agricultural Marketing Act establishing the Federal Farm Board (1929) was openly a compromise measure—a sleeping powder administered to proponents of direct price-boosting schemes. The Board was given a revolving fund of one-half billion dollars. The Board was instructed to drive the agricultural depression to cover. Its weapons were: aid to farmer cooperatives through loans at most favorable rates of interest, and, as a last resort, "stabilization operations" for the purpose of pegging prices. A Christian spirit demands that one not dwell at length upon the accomplishments of the Board. It failed to fulfill its official mission. The failure can hardly be laid at the door of the Board. Farmer cooperatives, no matter how numerous, robust and healthy, could not reasonably be expected to cope with a depression arising from causes quite beyond their sphere of influence. Stabilization operations without the power to influence production proved a hopeless undertaking.

The demise of the Farm Board in 1933 marked the end of an era in agricultural policy. March 4, 1933 brought with it new styles in government procedure. Agriculture received an entirely new outfit—something different than it had ever worn before. This was the beginning of a large body of legislation commonly referred to as the AAA. The outstanding characteristic of the first Agricultural Adjustment Act was the sweeping authority given the Secretary of Agriculture. He could, for instance:

1. Lease land.
2. Deal in cotton futures.
3. Restrict production.
4. Restrict amounts offered for sale.
5. License and supervise processors and handlers of farm products.
6. Purchase surpluses.
7. Levy processing taxes in amounts of his own setting.

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It is somewhat amusing to recall that only a few short years before the equalization fee, the export debenture and the domestic allotment were rejected on the grounds of their being too radical. Soon after 1933 the government put into practice the essential features of all these proposals. Together they formed but a part of the enlarged program. It is evident, however, that the discussions surrounding these measures in the twenties did much to pave the way for the agricultural relief legislation of the thirties.

The most significant development during the past ten years has been the government's direct participation in farm operations. This participation covers a wide range. In the interest of brevity, this discussion deals only with procedures designed directly to influence agricultural prices. Price increases were the prime motive. "Parity prices" were the goal. Parity was defined in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 as that level of agricultural prices

> that will give agricultural commodities a purchasing power with respect to articles that farmers buy, equivalent to the purchasing power of agricultural commodities in the base period (August, 1909 to July, 1914).

In the beginning, weighty emphasis was placed upon the curtailment of production. The desire was to reduce the production of surplus crops by some 40 to 50 million acres. These figures represent well over a tenth of the total area in cultivation. The first year's accomplishments were considerable. Wheat acreage was reduced by some seven million acres. Over ten million acres of growing cotton were plowed under, and six million little pigs and 200,000 prospective mother sows were slaughtered. The Adjustment Administration was in time successful in securing the shift of something over 35,000,000 acres from the growing of surplus crops to other uses.

During the first three years a total of $1,136,000,000 was paid to farmers directly in the form of rental and benefit payments. These payments were a reward for compliance with the provisions of the program. The tendency has been for the total rewards to increase and their distribution to be spread over larger numbers.

It is generally agreed that the restriction of production program did not come up to expectations as a booster of farm prices. This is one explanation for constant changes. Substantial amendments to the Act have been added during almost every year of its existence. Furthermore, the Act was declared unconstitutional in 1936, partially on the grounds that production control was not a function of the Federal Government.

Beginning with the Act of 1937, emphasis was shifted from acreage restriction to agricultural conservation. The change in practice, however, was less pronounced than the change in emphasis. The designated soil-depleting crops are much the same as the surplus crops under the old Act. Under the new Act rewards are granted for growing less of the soil-depleting crops.

The Act of 1938 is the basis of the

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present program. Its main addition was the ever-normal granary, a plan for accumulating the surpluses of fat years for use in lean years. The ever-normal granary through commodity loans is a part of the expanding attempt to influence prices. Acreage control, under whatever form it has taken under the various acts, has not been sufficient to bring about desired price changes. As a result it has been supplemented by other mechanisms. The more important are:

Commodity loans are designed to put a floor under prices. At present the government will lend to those complying with the programs 85 percent of parity on a fairly sizable list of agricultural commodities. This loan rate furnishes a minimum level below which prices are not likely to drop.

Marketing Quotas represent a shift in production control from acreage restriction to limitations on the amounts marketed. The Supreme Court in 1939 pronounced this to be a legal procedure. If a minimum of two thirds of the farmers voting favor marketing quotas, then each farmer growing the designated commodity must restrict the amounts marketed to his allotment. Amounts sold in excess of this allotment are subject to a heavy and what amounts to a prohibitive tax. At present marketing quotas apply to cotton, wheat and certain types of tobacco.

Surplus Commodity Purchases are designed to strengthen prices by removing a portion of the supply from the regular marketing channels. Some of these purchases are given to the needy through established relief agencies. Larger quantities are distributed through the Stamp Plan and through the School Lunch Program. Another outlet is diversion into commercial by-products. In a few instances the government has purchased for the purpose of maintaining a "pegged" price. The buying of butter upon different occasions has been with this end in view.

Export Subsidies represent another line of attack upon prices through the removal of surpluses. Exports of a number of commodities have been subsidized. Wheat and flour, corn, cotton and nuts have received the greatest sums for this purpose.

Parity Payments are designed to make up for the deficiencies of other methods. They are payments to farmers equivalent to the difference between the amount realized on his commodity and the parity price. Parity payments are confined to the basic commodities—cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco and rice. They are limited by the amounts annually appropriated by Congress. Until recently at least, Congress has never appropriated enough to make up the whole of the difference.

In brief, these are the main price-boosting features of present agricultural policy. But the war is complicating matters. The urge now is for more, rather than less. Agricultural prices hover around the goal of parity. Emphasis must be rapidly shifted and important changes are in prospect.

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Discussion

Interdependence and War

To the Editor:

My chief reaction to Mr. Chafee's article on international utopias (in your last issue) is that he is a sensible and clear-thinking man. I am not sure why he chose the four "utopias" which he used as a base for discussion, but even with insufficient materials he has drawn his conclusions with admirable logic.

Especially do I agree with his last conclusion, that the spirit is all-important. Professor Berdahl, in the same issue, shows that the American people accepted the League of Nations submitted to them by Woodrow Wilson; but they did not accept it with enough sincere belief and enthusiasm to enable their convictions to stand against the party campaign of denunciation led by Senator Lodge. There is much evidence that, this time, the American people have a deeper conviction of the need for a system to maintain order in the world and a clearer realization of the fact that they must share in the responsibility for making and maintaining it. Other peoples learned this lesson earlier since the teacher—suffering—visited them sooner and more often. It is not a cheering thought, either for democracy as a system or for humanity in general, that people must be taught by the shock of war. Whether we have learned enough yet to give us the deep conviction that we must work for international government remains to be seen. There is here an opportunity particularly for religious and intellectual leaders. No system of law or government will work unless it has behind it agreement based upon certain ethical, moral or spiritual principles. If the shock of this war and of other sufferings is not enough to convert men, the instruction of religious leaders as to the spiritual factors involved and of intellectual leaders as to the need and methods of the new system might be enough to turn the balance. In any case, and however this popular conviction is reached, it is these leaders who will have to translate it into a working system.

The blueprint is not so important now as the decision to build a structure of lasting peace. That decision involves such questions as the advantage to us, the cost of building and subsequent maintenance, the stresses to which it will be subjected and the purposes for which it is to be built.

The chief stresses which the structure will face will be those resulting from interdependence and war. To meet the former universal organization will be required; to meet the latter great strength will be needed. Interdependence does not stop at frontiers, and national sovereignty has been increasingly unable to hem it in at its borders. Regional organizations will not solve the problems of interdependence; they will only make the stress greater. Such organizations may be helpful but only, as Mr. Chafee points out, if they are subsidiary to world organization. Within any government it is desirable to have a balance of power; if an equilibrium of regional groupings could be established within an international government it might work more effectively. But independent regional organizations, with no machinery or authority to settle disputes, would simply mean bigger and better wars.

So far as I can determine from public opinion polls and from my own contacts with audiences over the United States the purpose which the American people have most in mind is to bring war under control. Unless this is done we cannot hope for peace or democracy or liberty nor can we hope to solve the economic problems arising from interdependence. But few of these people realize how much is involved in getting rid of so ancient and established an institution as war. It is the only means thus far provided by intelligent human beings to settle disputes o. uphold rights or remedy wrongs. If we deny to a nation the use of war, its only present means for securing justice for itself, we must provide a substitute for war which can satisfactorily assure justice for that nation. Mr. Chafee seems to accept the need of machinery both for sanctions and for peaceful change, but I should emphasize them as the principal parts of the problem. The fact is that if you wish to bring war under control you must build a complete international government.

There is nothing easy about this. Most people have not, in fact, got beyond the utopian stage in their thinking as yet. They accept a scheme, a label, without thinking of the problems behind it. Mr. Chafee is right again when he suggests slow development starting from what we have. Political development is always rooted in the past; not even revolutions represent a complete break

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with the past. To sell a completely new scheme to the world would be difficult; it would be more practical to begin with the League of Nations and see how far we can go. The distinction between this and a federal world is a matter of degree—of finding how far national sovereignty can be limited. *Solvitur ambulando* is a good rule but let us make sure that we are proceeding in the right direction. Step by step does not mean region by region; we must start toward a universal organization and step by step build it up.

One other matter deserves attention within this small space. Most of the plans dealing with the future reconstruction of the world pay much attention to the individual. In this respect they differ considerably from those of 1919 when the sovereign state was the center of attention. It is a recognition of the fact that political organization exists to uphold the dignity and to advance the welfare of the human being. Security for the individual in an intricate world must be the objective of domestic government; but the state is no longer able, alone, to provide this security. It, and the individuals who compose it, must look now beyond the state, must build an international government and develop a loyalty to it. On the other hand the international government must look beyond the sovereign state to the individual, and this will raise many important questions as to representation, jurisdiction and such matters. But it must never be forgotten that all political organization exists for the benefit of the individual and will and should fail if it forgets this duty.

CLYDE EAGLETON
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Justice, Not Sentimentality

To the Editor:

Mr. Chafee pricks the bubble of the utopians with vigor and skill. In place of their fantasies he joins others in advocating a revival of the League of Nations. And that is prudent, for an experiment which this time may start out with the United States and Russia as active members will enjoy better prospects than its ill-starred predecessor.

Yet there are features of Mr. Chafee's own thought which are disquieting. "You can have strong defense or you can have civilization," he remarks, "but you cannot have both." In point of fact, without the former the latter might be lost. More almost than anything else it was this false antithesis out of which came the self-betrayal of the West. And is that black cycle to recur? It will if the decent peace-loving countries themselves tolerate or find excuses again for much that is inimical to all they hold dear. After 1914-18 most people imagined that men everywhere wanted what they wanted; that theirs was an era in which evil and barbarism could not exist or at least were amenable to conciliatory treatment —economic, philanthropic, rhetorical. Mussolini, the war lords of Japan, the German militarists who were allowed under the Weimar Republic to pave the road for Hitler, taking note of this pacifist fallacy, rejoiced, turned it to their own advantage and prepared all the while to strike. If the two tragic decades prove anything it is that you can have civilization with strong defense or you will have no civilization at all.

But it is when Mr. Chafee employs the term "dictated peace" that one begins to wonder whether he has not reached the right conclusions for the wrong reasons. For here is a phrase which German revisionists and Nazi propagandists were able to exploit at home and abroad; in this context it entirely disregards the real character of Germany's repeated challenge to our free world order. A settlement may be negotiated in the manner of Vienna in 1815 or of Frankfort in 1871, of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, of Versailles in 1919 or of Munich in 1938; but, however arranged or framed, it is the power of the victor which finally must prevail. If he does not in this sense "dictate" he has not won. The issue is clear. The objective, at rock-bottom, for which we fight is to dictate rather than be dictated to.

The central problem of peace, which is Germany and the Germans, Mr. Chafee has still to face. After all, he argues, Europe has been federated industrially under Hitler. "May it not be possible to change the purposes and yet preserve the unity?" But how can Mr. Chafee contend that to the charnel house of Germanized Europe the terms federation or unity are in general even remotely applicable? Once there were Anglophobe radicals who whispered fiercely that, at any rate, Hitler was better than Chamberlain; for when Hitler disappeared his socialism would remain while Chamberlain could leave only Tory reaction. Of this undiscriminating cant the logical upshot was the Lindbergh cry about waves of the future. To company such as that, it need scarcely be said, Mr. Chafee does not belong. And he is on safer ground when he cites Napoleon. Yet what the French Revolution and the armies of Bonaparte spread through Europe and themselves provoked were sentiments of liberty and nationality. And if the recoil from the civilizing despotism of the French was so extreme,

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will Hitler's bestial grip have a weaker effect? The Europe he has conquered, organized and defiled is bound together through savage tyranny and nothing else. By liberators from without and by national impulses from within that unnatural structure will be overthrown, torn apart and swept away. Any scheme of European unity to be historical and realistic must allow for the basic and decisive aspiration of national freedom.

Before the war the danger was appeasement on the Right. During and after the peace-making there will be an equal menace—the appeasement of the sentimentalists; the assumptions of those who fancy that goodwill has alone been lacking or is alone required to paper over differences so profound as to have twice in one half-century rent the earth in two. Mr. Chafee, to be sure, is not one of them. But when he proposes an exchange of English and German workmen to assist in reconstruction or the re-establishment of youth hostels, his account ought to be carried a stage further. For of such well-intentioned projects Europe between wars was full. Where they ended and whose aims they served is known. That they are included quite seriously in a list of elements to heal the deep-seated agony of the modern age is enough to cause a shudder of dismay.

An English girl is quoted to warn us against spite, antipathy or even anger towards the German people. The letter is a portent and so is the impression it made. After the last war many of her elders were steeped in a spirit as cultivated, as high-minded and as essentially anarchic; because of it Britain was to be defenseless and Western society in peril. The blood of a generation and the labor of centuries is the price paid for that pervasive atmosphere of moral delusion. Yet the influence it had on the policies pursued towards Germany may be not wholly adverse if from their own errors the free peoples can profit. For they will perish unless they learn once and for all that forgiveness which acquiesces in iniquity is not a virtue but a mortal sin. Nor should their children, when properly taught, be unable to distinguish between turning the other cheek and laying their heads voluntarily on the executioner's block.

What revenge the twice outraged populace of Europe may exact none can foretell. Even the mood of the English-speaking peoples will be set by trials we have yet to endure. For we cannot sit in judgment on the rest; we are and will be as nearly involved as any. From futile vengeance and gross vindictiveness we might shrink back in horror. But self-preservation, in the future as in the present, demands the gravest counsel. More than a hardening of hearts at one extreme, sentimentality at the other can again undermine the peace and waste the victory. By innocents and interested parties alike the idea is being disseminated that the only alternative to a policy of sweetness and light is one ruthlessly harsh and utterly dark. But there is a middle way—a way that is informed, farseeing and firm; one that remembers, when so many forget, to be just to the victims of Germany as well as to the inveterate criminal in the dock. And among those victims, as trustees of civilization and guarantors of freedom, we must not omit to number ourselves.

LIONEL GELBER,
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International Authority and National Sovereignty

To the Editor:

Professor Chafee's article "International Utopias" stimulated and informed me but it did not convince. In deciding against Pritt, Bingham and Streit in favor of a modernized League of Nations he makes several very helpful suggestions for doing a better job next time but he completely misses the point which any ancient historian (or modern for that matter) must readily recognize as crucial—namely, the question of sovereignty. Professor Chafee writes that "Knowing the mistakes of the League we can tell what to avoid," but I suspect an inadequate view of these mistakes when he goes on to say "This may require some drastic changes in the Covenant" and illustrates such changes by proposing a League tax on international commerce. The elemental mistake of the League was its attempt to fuse international authority and national sovereignty, which are and always have been mutually exclusive.

Professor Chafee and other apologists for the League speak optimistically of "the so-called technical services in particular—health, labor etc." Precisely the same laudatory terms have been applicable, and for a much longer time, to the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, a kind of minuscule *ad hoc* League of Nations. Naturally such joint fact-finding enterprises work well. Why not? It is to no one's disadvantage that they should. Sovereigns can collect statistics till the cows come home *provided* no central authority attempts to make them act upon the information. But these "so-called technical services" are of a very different order from the League's executive functions; let the League try

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to command someone and the result is quite different. To gloss over the importance of sovereignty is to miss the one essential point.

Sovereignty is intimately related to power and morals, which Professor Chafee also refrains from discussing. The fact is that the League of Nations, or any future successor, consists of big Powers and little ones and the big ones are going to boss the little ones. This bossing may not be as crude as my statement of it but everyone knows that in practice when the British delegate presents the Empire's point of view toward a world problem he will be heard with an entirely different kind of respect from that accorded to the Peruvian spokesman. Everyone knows that in a showdown the little fellows do not expect, or even hope, to order the big ones around; that even if they did, the big ones would not tolerate it for a moment—unless perchance as an act of grace to show the world how magnanimously they are dedicated to the principle of an equal voice for everyone. Still less would they tolerate bossing from other big Powers. Imagine the Japanese and Argentines getting away with telling us to admit their respective excess population and beef! Such an opening of our ports might, of course, be a part of some advantageous horse-trade based on mutual bargaining power, but neither we nor any other sovereign would dream of voluntarily surrendering our own interests in purely altruistic deference to an elusive "general good."

Professor Chafee is either overcautious or over-naive in suggesting that "the League may not have worked because its members did not want very much to make it work." Of course they didn't want it to work! Why should they? Who is interested in evolving a system which he himself cannot beat with an appearance of legality? Certainly not the big Powers. The League, like the ancient Delian and Latin Leagues, tended to become the straw man of its leading members. Any League's public decisions have already been predetermined by the boys in the back room. Such Leagues may "work" in a certain sense but not in the sense which interests us. Everyone knows that the League did not apply sanctions to Italy as a matter of moral protest against aggression, but purely because the British had an equity in the Mediterranean and East Africa. Nor were the Italians the only ones to observe that His Majesty's Government's high moral position (via the League) on the matter of someone else's imperialism was a peculiarly sardonic instance of the devil turned monk.

As an alternative to any of the concepts which Professor Chafee discussed I should like to propose a point of view which has developed from a consideration of modern conditions and has been subsequently fortified by somewhat detailed examination of the suicidal errors of the Greek city-states after 431 B.C. These city-states were in every significant respect the ancient counterparts of modern nation-states. Of many compelling parallels between Greek cities and modern nations I select but one: Both were the ultimate political development of the respective racial genius, and both proved inadequate for their purpose. Non-political factors which baffled political techniques have operated to make both cities and nations incapable of living peaceably in the company of their neighbors, and in spite of "hoping much" to the contrary, Greek cities and modern nations hewed vigorously to the line of self-aggrandizement at the price of mutual destruction and even self-destruction. I take it that this was also in the mind of Dean Gauss, writing on page 368 of the same issue of *The American Scholar*. The sovereignty of which we have already spoken was at the bottom of the whole trouble. A. A. Trever put the story in a sentence: "The fatal weakness of Hellas, as of the modern world, was that neither statesmen nor citizens would brook the slightest limitation on the sovereignty of their state."

The Greeks could probably have saved themselves by throwing the whole city-state concept out the window and developing some larger-scale unity. Perhaps federation would have been the answer if they had not tried it too late and too ineffectively. Certainly the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues were the best thing yet, even though they failed to achieve the desired end. Better still would have been the unification of the whole of continental Greece and the adjacent islands into one centrally governed nation. Perhaps that idea was fantastic to the ancients; but it has come to pass. The practicability of such unthinkable unification has been illustrated dozens of times in European and other histories; why not do it again on the scale which the times demand? I am aware of the objections, which I shall not take space to refute now. My purpose is simply to point out that a League of Sovereign City-States was no more the answer to the Greek tragedy than is a League of Sovereign Nation-States to ours.

It is of no use to say that we must drastically revise the Covenant and glamorize the League. Even to proclaim that "everyone must be prepared to make sacrifices," as is sometimes said, doesn't touch the problem; for everyone knows that in practice such generalities merely mean that everyone *else* must be prepared to make them.

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The hard fact is that plural sovereignties are both the indispensable ingredient and the inevitable cause of wars. In spite of faith, hope and love, wars will continue so long as plural sovereignties exist. If one wishes to eliminate wars at their source, as I assume Professor Chafee does, why not start off by admitting as much and admitting that the galaxy of sovereignties must be abolished? It would seem to follow that the effective way to abolish sovereignties is to abolish them and not to pretend that two kinds of sovereignty can be mingled into some new kind of political formula which will attempt to save the pieces of an obsolete nationalism.

Is an all-out ecumenical concept practicable? Is it realistic? Yes; but this is not the place for the demonstration. Far more impressive is the unrealistic impracticability of anything else. Doubtless the Greeks who heard Isocrates plead for an elementary brand of Hellenic unity told each other that he was an impractical idealist—not realizing, first, that he was thoroughly practical (as they bitterly realized when Philip was through with them!) or, second, that the city-state nationalists were frantically trying to buck an irrestible wave of the future. None of the combinations which they attempted attacked the real problem, which is just as real and just as sinister now as it was then. Whether we like the problem or not, whether we can see our way through it or not, whether one or another solution for it is "practicable" or not—these subjective angles are very interesting to us, but supremely irrelevant. The heart of the problem is the unyielding matter of unyielding sovereignty, and any proposal which sidesteps it is visionary, unrealistic and foredoomed.

HOWARD COMFORT
Haverford, Pa.

"Hath Made of One Blood All Nations of Men"

To the Editor:

Allow me to endorse very sincerely the fine article in your Spring number by Ruth Benedict. Though not a professional anthropologist, my calling (I have been a missionary for 57 years) has demanded close study of the psychology and possibilities of my material, and in 83 years of life I have come to know pretty thoroughly the American Indians, the Negroes, the Jews, Chinese, Ibero-American Creoles, the industrial Indians of Central America and abundant representatives of most of the races and nations of Europe. It is not altogether presumption, therefore, that, on finding my conclusions closely duplicated by a good authority, I should write and say so.

Christianity, stripped of its clerical and ecclesiastical drapery down to its primitive principles, certainly takes the same ground and was meant from the first as a positive force against race prejudice and in favor of a square deal for all mankind (e.g., Matthew XXVIII, 19, 20; Acts XVII: 26; Revelation XIV: 6 etc.). Even the call of Abraham implies the same (Genesis XIII: 16). But apart from all religious considerations any careful study of the factors that make up the so-called "advanced" civilizations must certainly lead us to these same conclusions.

Some of us continue to think in terms of superior and inferior races and civilizations because our definitions of human civilization are incomplete, and hence our conclusions are partial and misleading. We assume that civilization consists of the latest scientific triumphs; or that it is an invincible military prowess; or that it is moral purity, piety, altruism. We overlook the fact that these splendid ideals are not the total we seek but merely factors in the equation and that their value depends on the sign they carry.

The Nordic may be laudably thorough, philosophical, courteous to equals and superiors, industrious, highly intellectual and ingenious—but what about his cruelty, his brutal overbearing to inferiors, his gross sensuality, his incapacity to recognize the natural rights of other individuals, nations and races? These defects may easily cancel a number of conspicuous virtues and even leave a minus total.

The intellectuality and sensitivity of the Samurai are true indices of civilization, as are the delicate Nipponese grace and artistic temperament that so charmed Lafcadio Hearn and every other responsive soul. These things do represent civilization, refinement, culture; but are they not outbalanced by the counterweight of an inexcusable invasion of a peaceful empire and the sheer infernality of an authorized Canton orgy?

We are justly proud of our famous American freedom but we too easily forget that its glory may be sadly dimmed by an unbecoming national vanity, gangster tendencies, provincial vulgarity, pluto-snobbery or a stupefying idolatry of money-making.

Then, too, we reach our anthropological conclusions too quickly. It takes time to prove the capability of a prostrate race. The present condition of the Guatemala Indian is the result of dozens of generations of oppression. This is not to be remedied overnight. It will take genera-

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tions of altruistic effort to undo the injustice. If in one generation we make little progress, we have no right to draw any absolute conclusions.

ED. M. HAYMAKER
Guatemala, C.A.

Art Patterns as Communication

To the Editor:

In his essay on "The Art of the Actor as a Psychological Problem" the late Kurt Koffka employs Wertheimer's gestalt-psychological theory of expression in a fruitful way. An old discrepancy between actual experience and psychological theory is removed. No longer do we have on the one hand the theatergoer who asserts that he *sees* the fear in Calpurnia's face and gestures just as directly as he distinguishes a square from a triangle, and on the other hand the psychologist who gives him the lie by revealing that such a face, such gestures are in themselves as meaningless as the words of a foreign language unless we have learned to interpret their meaning.

The specific achievement of the good actor, according to Koffka, consists in the fact that his body possesses the virtue of being immediately communicative to a high degree. The man in the street may have his mind perturbed by strong emotions but will not show it normally. The man on the stage is transparent, as it were. His emotions are open to our eyes, and that is how he succeeds in moving us so deeply. It is at this point that an art theorist feels tempted to carry the psychologist's thought one step further.

Undoubtedly we happen to live in a civilization in which it is considered bad manners to show too much of what may trouble us inside and in which one may have to pay dearly for a frank reaction to another person. Yet we meet free expression not only on the stage. Koffka quotes "instances in which other human beings appear to us full of inner life," he points to the "chimpanzee in rage," and he might have added that in young children, in members of primitive races etc. we find unbridled impulses mirrored in full expression. Is the actor then defined simply by a return to a state of natural frankness and also, perhaps, by particularly intense emotions which lead to intenser physical reflection?

Koffka indicates the correct answer when, at the end of his article, he says that "in creating persons with a heightened inner life the actor brings us closer to the essentials of human nature." Is there a way of relating the new psychological approach more concretely to art requirements?

The reader may remember the battles fought in the 19th century against the contention that the task of music consisted simply in communicating emotion. And he has only to think of the "gypsy" bands at Hungarian restaurants to realize that cheap music is much more efficient in overwhelming us, or many of us, with the expression of sheer emotion than, for instance, a prelude by Bach in which the natural flow of joy, sorrow, courage or devotion seems somehow neutralized by being fitted into an architectural structure of melody, harmony and rhythm. Similarly, the good dancer has his gestures and attitudes (which show a state of the body and thereby express a state of the mind) shaped into regular curves and lines, and these curves and lines form an organized whole analogous to what in painting is called "composition."

The function of composition, which distinguishes a work of art from things and happenings in real life, has often been explained by asserting that the artist in addition to reproducing facts of

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reality throws in a pleasing arrangement of forms. This theory, widespread though it still is, seldom fails to remind me of a gruesome sight: human bones displayed in ornamental patterns on the walls of subterranean funeral chapels in Rome. A more appropriate explanation might run in the following way. Shape and movement acquire strong and unambiguous expression when they approximate consistent forms and figures. Such figures have a twofold virtue: First, they trace the behavior of interplaying physical forces by showing rigidity by a straight line, flexibility by a curve etc. and thus express the character of correlated psychological forces; these are the "tertiary qualities" emphasized by gestalt psychology. Secondly, they allow the organization of clearly surveyable whole-patterns, showing harmony and disharmony, subordination and coordination, repetition and counterpoint, alliance and segregation etc. Far from being meaningless ornaments, these patterns represent in a purified way the play of the forces which constitute our world, physical as well as psychological—the struggle of a growing plant for wholesome balance as well as the troubles of conscience of a dramatic hero.

For the specific achievement of the good actor this means that he shapes his gestures, attitudes and the inflexions of his voice into regular patterns which reveal the character and interplay of the forces by which his body is governed, thus allowing a grasp of the correlated psychological forces inside. He invents a visible and audible "formula" for his Hamlet or Lear and develops this formula through the dynamic happenings of the plot just as a symphony presents the dramatic evolution of a theme. In this way, instead of simply transmitting emotions (which could never lead to Aristotle's cathartic effect) he becomes "the abstract and brief chronicle of the time" by offering a clarified, perceivable image of the conflicting forces which in a human being influence the achievement of his aims. As to the intensity of the actor's emotions, there is no reason to assume that they should be more violent, less controlled by the organizing mind, than those of a Flaubert or a Michelangelo who deeply experiences but at the same time creatively shapes the image of his Madame Bovary or Night.

RUDOLF ARNHEIM
New York City

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The Sense of the Present in Thomas Mann . . Edwin Berry Burgum
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About Our Authors

Double quotation marks usually indicate passages taken directly from autobiographical letters requested from the author.

Because the history of the editorial career of HENRY HAZLITT, newly-elected member of the Editorial Board, is so illuminating we shall present it almost in full. He traveled to the literary side of the editorial world via the financial. His first postion, held from 1913 to 1916, was as a member of the staff of the *Wall Street Journal*. Thence he went, but still on the financial page, first to the *New York Evening Post* and then to the *New York Evening Mail*. Thereafter he was successively editorial writer on the *New York Herald Tribune* and the *Sun*. For three years he was literary editor of the *Nation*, during 1933-34 editor of the *American Mercury*, and since 1934 has been a member of the editorial staff of the *New York Times*. He must write both night and day—witness his several books: *Thinking as a Science*, *The Anatomy of Criticism* and *A New Constitution Now*.

Almost six years ago (Vol. 5, No. 1) THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR carried an article, "A Nation in the Making—India," by the Earl of Lytton. It was a discussion, from a liberal British point of view, of the effort to resolve conflicting interests—communal, racial, religious, national and British—in India during the period between 1919 and 1936. The editors have frequently since that time canvassed the desirability of presenting a similar study from the "Indian" point of view. There is, however, no "Indian" point of view; there are many. RALEIGH PARKIN, Canadian, member of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and author (with W. E. Duffett and A. R. Hicks) of *India Today—The Background of Indian Nationalism*, wisely restricts his current study. In his own words: "In writing on Indian politics it is almost impossible to combine brevity with accuracy. Many questions I shall not answer or even ask." But he remarks further: "To solve our own problems at home we must in some reasonable measure understand the attitudes and problems of others. Therefore the political hopes and fears of one sixth of the human race necessarily become, under today's conditions, a part of the world's public business."

E. F. BURTON, for years member of the department of physics of the University of Toronto, has been head of the department and director of the physical laboratory since 1932. He was born in a small hamlet in the country and absorbed politics around the traditional biscuit barrel but migrated at an early age to Toronto. As an 1851 Exhibition Scholar, at Cambridge, he worked for several years at the Cavendish Laboratory under Sir J. J. Thomson. He feels he also owes much to Sir William Hardy, professor of physiology .... It is untelling whence he derives several of the major articles of his creed but the sources thereof are less important than the conviction that the young men and women of the New World can do anything that can be done anywhere, and the sanity that finds cynicism and fanatical mysticism equally objectionable .... *The Electron Microscope*, by W. H. Kohl and E. F. Burton, brought out a very short time ago by the Reinhold Publishing Corporation, New York, is commended to all whose imagination has been captured by the subject.

JUSTUS BUCHLER is not in an autobiographical mood these days but has vouchsafed a few salient facts about himself. He is a member of the philosophy department of Columbia University, author of *Charles Peirce's Empiricism* and editor of *The Philosophy of Peirce: Selected Writings*, both in the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method. [Almost concurrently with the publication of the former book THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR carried his study, "Charles Sanders Peirce, Giant in American Philosophy"—Vol. 8, No. 4.] He is co-editor of George Santayana's *Obiter Scripta* and has contributed to numerous philosophical and literary periodicals. His latest book, written in collaboration with John Herman Randall, Jr., is *Philosophy: An Introduction* .... At the time he contributed, three years ago, his article on Peirce he commented, "At present I am engaged in the business of making my statement come true: that Peirce will not remain a philosopher's philosopher"—a remark which has special bearing on his current study of William James as the philosopher of the common man.

YVAN GOLL, born in Saint-Dié, France, studied philosophy and law in Strasburg and Paris before he devoted himself to literature. From 1919 to 1939 (when he emigrated to this country) he lived in Paris and took part in the different avant-garde movements in the poetry of the twenties and thirties. We could list a number of his books, ranging from the satirical drama *Methusalem* and the near-poetry of *Lucifer Vieillissant* to many volumes of verse; but his main work is

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Jean Sans Terre, three volumes of which were published in Paris. A volume of his verse, made up of selections from the "Jean Sans Terre" sequence and a number of new ballads, is to be published this fall by the Colt Press, San Francisco. It should be of singular interest inasmuch as side by side with his poems, in French, will appear translations by such American poets as William Carlos Williams, John Peale Bishop, Clark Mills, Lionel Abel and Kenneth Patchen . . . . This past summer Yvan Goll has had the pleasure of a studio in the woods at the MacDowell Colony, Peterboro, New Hampshire—a place where deer come to pasture.

WILLIAM V. STRAUSS did both his undergraduate and graduate work at Harvard. For the past several years he has been engaged in business but has done a certain amount of writing on the side and has contributed articles to both the *Antioch Review* and *Common Sense* . . . . Early in the summer the editors raised a question as to the advisability of discussing a measure still in the legislative hopper. As long ago as July 13 the author commented: "It now seems clear that the new bill will emerge from Congress more or less as a stopgap measure and that fundamental changes in the fiscal structure will be postponed until at least 1943."

WILLIAM Y. TINDALL is assistant professor of English at Columbia University. He writes us: "Having left Vermont, where I was born, I became a Democratic County Committeeman for the 23d District, Manhattan. All the rest is literature. I received my degrees from Columbia (in the Lou Gehrig period), taught English at Washington Square College, New York University (in the Tom Wolfe period), and since 1931 I have lectured on contemporary literature in the Graduate School at Columbia. I became a patriot during the year I spent in England on a Cutting Fellowship. In 1934 I published a book on John Bunyan and in 1939 a book called *D. H. Lawrence and Susan His Cow* to which the article on Huxley is a sort of sequel. In 1940 I was Wordsworth's great grand-nephew for six weeks but this is a long story for which I cannot pause. At present I read *Finnegan's Wake* and the poems of Yeats when I am not distracted by giving my daughter her six o'clock bottle or by overhearing 'Invitation Please' on a neighbor's radio."

HEINZ SOFFNER has twice been a refugee—once when he was forced to flee Austria because of his anti-Nazi activities as a speaker, writer and organizer in Carinthia, "Austria's most Nazified province"; and again when, three years after he reached Paris, France capitulated. He was born in Vienna, which he calls "the home town of pictorial statistics." After he had completed his study of law at the University of Vienna he turned his energies into the white-collar-worker union movement. He was particularly active in workers' education, conducted classes for unemployed groups, youth groups, union officers etc. In Paris he became secretary-general of the non-partisan and interdenominational Federation of Austrian Emigrants and a member of the Refugee Committee of the League of Nations . . . . His publications include a book written as a result of investigation into the social and economic conditions of the working youth of Austria and, in this country, articles in *Survey Graphic*, *Commonweal*, the *Nation* and other magazines. His present discussion is based on his experience in trying to enliven his lectures on international affairs with maps, graphs and similar blackboard material.

Throughout the past six months GIOVANNI COSTIGAN has shown a reluctance to set down, even in the briefest fashion, matters which he assumes are chiefly of personal interest. He has overcome his objectivity to the extent of informing us that he is of Irish parentage, was born and educated in England and that after he left Oxford he came to this country and took his Ph.D. at the University of Wisconsin. For the past eight years he has been a member of the department of history at the University of Washington where he currently teaches such sundry courses as English constitutional history, England in the 18th century, in the 19th century and in the 20th century, and—for graduate students only—the philosophy of history.

ASHER HOBSON says "I am a sort of cross between a federal civil servant and a long-faced professor. On the government side I have held the positions of Assistant Chief, Office of Farm Management; American representative on the Permanent Committee of the International Institute of Agriculture at Rome; and Chief of the Division of Foreign Agricultural Service, the United States Department of Agriculture. Academically I have been a member of the staffs of the State College of Washington and of Columbia University and have served as chairman of the department of agricultural economics at the University of Wisconsin since 1932."

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Index to Volume 11

Names of authors in *italics;* main articles in **bold face.**
The pagination of the volume is divided as follows: Winter, 1-128; Spring, 129-256; Summer, 257-384; Autumn, 385-512.
Indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*

About Our Authors, 127, 255, 383, 509
Actor as a Psychological Problem, The Art of the, *Kurt Koffka,* 315
American, A Letter to a Young, *A Poem, Charles Edward Eaton,* 326
American Folk Drama Comes of Age, *William Peery,* 149
Anthropology and Cultural Change, *Ruth Benedict,* 243
Arnheim, Rudolf, 507
Art of Collecting, Dictators and the Gentle, *Douglas and Elizabeth Rigby,* 168
Art of the Actor as a Psychological Problem, The, *Kurt Koffka,* 315
Art Patterns as Communication, *Rudolf Arnheim,* 507
Bali and America, Community Drama, *Margaret Mead,* 79
Barker, Lewellys F., 201
Beiswanger, George, 228
Benedict, Ruth, 18, 243
Berdahl, Clarence A., 261
Brain, Electricity and the, *Hudson Hoagland,* 351
Brief for Britain, A, *John S. Nollen,* 249
Briggs, John DeQuedville, 252
Brinton, Crane, 5
Buchler, Justus, 416
Burton, E. F., 403
Can We Educate for Democracy? *Christian Gauss,* 359
Chafee, Zechariah, Jr., **275**
Change, Anthropology and Cultural, *Ruth Benedict,* 243
China and the Democratic Way, *Arthur W. Hummel,* 190
Cohen, I. Bernard, 328
Cohen, Paul, 122
Collecting, Dictators and the Gentle Art of, *Douglas and Elizabeth Rigby,* 168
College Survive? Will the American, *Frederick P. Keppel,* 158
Comfort, Howard, 504
Commitment, In Praise of Reflective, *Theodore M. Greene,* 59
Common Man and William James, The Philosopher, the, *Justus Buchler,* 416
Community Drama, Bali and America, *Margaret Mead,* 79
Costigan, Giovanni, 477
Cross-Fertilization in Letters, *B. W. Huebsch,* 304
Debt: Means to Postwar Prosperity, The National, *William Victor Strauss,* 437
Defense, Engineering and, *Paul Cohen,* 122
Democratic Way, China and the, *Arthur W. Hummel,* 190
Democracy? Can We Educate for, *Christian Gauss,* 359
Dictators and the Gentle Art of Collecting, *Douglas and Elizabeth Rigby,* 168
Dietz, David, 292
Dilemma of Progress, The, *Charles Frankel,* 181
Drama, Bali and America, Community, *Margaret Mead,* 79
Drama Comes of Age, American Folk, *William Peery,* 149
Eagleton, Clyde, 502
Eaton, Charles Edward, 326
Editorials: *William A. Neilson,* 3; *Crane Brinton,* 5; *Alvin Johnson,* 131; *Marjorie H. Nicolson,* 259; *Henry Hazlitt,* 387
Editors and Advisers—The Past Ten Years in the Arts and Sciences, 9
Electricity and the Brain, *Hudson Hoagland,* 351
Electron Microscope, The, *E. F. Burton,* 403
Engineering and Defense, *Paul Cohen,* 122
England and the English-Speaking People, *John Erskine,* 45
England, There'll Always Be an, *Giovanni Costigan,* 477
Erskine, John, 45, 251
Europe of Napoleon, The: A Synopsis, *Golo Mann,* 133
Evolution of Farm Relief, The, *Asher Hobson,* 495
Ferguson, DeLancey, 208
Frankel, Charles, 181
Gauss, Christian, 359
Gelber, Lionel, 503
Goll, Yvan, 427
Gorki, Maxim, *Avrahm Yarmolinsky,* 89
Green, Julian, 110
Greene, Theodore M., 59, 380
"Hath Made of One Blood All Nations of Men," *Ed. M. Haymaker,* 506
Haymaker, Ed. M., 506
Hazlitt, Henry, 387
Hoagland, Hudson, 351
Hobson, Asher, 495
Huebsch, B. W., 304
Hummel, Arthur W., 29, 190
Huxley, The Trouble with Aldous, *W. Y. Tindall,* 452
In Praise of Reflective Commitment, *Theodore M. Greene,* 59
Interdependence and War, *Clyde Eagleton,* 502
International Authority and National Sovereignty, *Howard Comfort,* 504
International Utopias, *Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,* 275
Jeans Sans Terre, *Yvan Goll,* 427
Johnson, Alvin, 131
Johnson, Austin, 381

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Justice, Not Sentimentality, *Lionel Gelber,* 503
Keppel, Frederick P., 158
Koffka, Kurt, 315
Konvitz, Milton R., 69
Larger Federal Citizenship, A, *Arthur H. Nethercot,* 250
Leadership, Scholarship and Democratic, *Roscoe Pound,* 220
Letters, Cross-Fertilization in, *B. W. Huebsch,* 304
Letter to a Young American, A, *A Poem, Charles Edward Eaton,* 326
Mann, Golo, 133
Maxim Gorki, *Avrahm Yarmolinsky,* 89
McConaughy, James L., 99
Mead, Margaret, 79
Medical Science, Psychotherapy—A Modern, *Lewellys F. Barker,* 201
Microscope, The Electron, *E. F. Burton,* 403
Milton, George Fort, 339
Modern World, Newton and the, *I. Bernard Cohen,* 328
Morris, Glyn, 251
Mr. Erskine Replies, *John Erskine,* 251
Munitz, Milton K., 254
Myths About the Peace Treaties of 1919-1920, *Clarence A. Berdahl,* 261
Napoleon: A Synopsis, The Europe of, *Golo Mann,* 133
National Debt: Means to Postwar Prosperity, The, *William Victor Strauss,* 437
National Harmony, Sour Notes In, *Fort Sumter and Pearl Harbor, George Fort Milton,* 339
Nationalism, The Pattern of Indian, *Raleigh Parkin,* 389
National Socialism, Richard Wagner: Oracle of, *George Beiswanger,* 228
Nation Within a Nation, A, *The Negro and the Supreme Court, Milton R. Konvitz,* 69
Neilson, William A., 3
Nethercot, Arthur H., 250
Newton and the Modern World, *I. Bernard Cohen,* 328
Nicolson, Marjorie H., 259
Nollen, John S., 249
Non-Public Not Undemocratic, *John De-Quedville Briggs,* 252
Parkin, Raleigh, 389
Pattern of Indian Nationalism, The, *Raleigh Parkin,* 389
Peace Treaties of 1919-1920, Myths About the, *Clarence A. Berdahl,* 261
Peery, William, 149
Philosopher, the Common Man and William James, The, *Justus Buchler,* 416
Politics, The Scholar and, *James L. McConaughy,* 99
Postwar Cooperation Needed, *Louis E. Van Norman,* 249
Pound, Roscoe, 220
Private Schools and Democracy, *Glyn Morris,* 251
Progress, The Dilemma of, *Charles Frankel,* 181
Prosperity, The National Debt: Means to Postwar, *William Victor Strauss,* 437
Psychological Problem, The Art of the Actor as a, *Kurt Koffka,* 315
Psychotherapy — A Modern Medical Science, *Lewellys F. Barker,* 201
Purpose and Intelligence, *Milton K. Munitz,* 254
". . . Put Away Childish Things," *W. W. Sleator,* 253
Reflective Commitment Attainable by Few, *John H. Ware, Jr.,* 379
Reflective Commitment: Ideal for All, *Theodore M. Greene,* 380
Refugee Scholars in the United States, *Herbert Solow,* 374
Richard Wagner: Oracle of National Socialism, *George Beiswanger,* 228
Rigby, Douglas and Elizabeth, 168
Scholar and Politics, The, *James L. McConaughy,* 99
Scholarship and Democratic Leadership, *Roscoe Pound,* 220
Scholars in the United States, Refugee, *Herbert Solow,* 374
Scholars Try to Think? Should, *Delancey Ferguson,* 208
Science and the Future, *David Dietz,* 292
Scripture," Translation and the "Fields of, *Julian Green,* 110
Should Scholars Try to Think? *DeLancey Ferguson,* 208
Sleator, W. W., 253
Soffner, Heinz, 465
Solow, Herbert, 374
Sour Notes in National Harmony, *Fort Sumter and Pearl Harbor, George Fort Milton,* 339
Strauss, William Victor, 438
There'll Always be an England, *Giovanni Costigan,* 477
Tindall, W. Y., 453
Translation and the "Fields of Scripture," *Julian Green,* 110
Treaties of 1919-1920, Myths About the Peace, *Clarence A. Berdahl,* 261
Trouble With Aldous Huxley, The, *W. Y. Tindall,* 452
Utopias, International, *Zechariah Chafee, Jr.,* 275
Van Norman, Louis E., 249
Vested Interests, Beware! *Austin Johnson,* 381
Wagner: Oracle of National Socialism, Richard, *George Beiswanger,* 228
War on the Visual Front, *Heinz Soffner,* 465
Ware, John H., Jr., 379
Will the American College Survive? *Frederick P. Keppel,* 158
Yarmolinsky, Avrahm, 89
Young American, A Letter to a, *A Poem, Charles Edward Eaton,* 326

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

This plate shows the comparison between pictures taken with the light microscope and the electron microscope. **A.** Normal picture of a new razor blade. **B.** Light microscope picture of small portion of the same with magnification ×315. **C.** Electron microscope picture of a small portion of **B** with total magnification about ×5,000. The width of the small line above **A** represents the total section included in **B** and the thick block over **B** represents the total width of the part of **B** included in **C.** **D** is an optical picture of asbestos powder (×1,100). **E** is the electron picture (×18,000) of the portion outlined by the small inked-in square area in **D.** The heavy bar in **E** is the hazy line through the square in **D.**

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

Tuberculosis bacillus (×31,400).



Tuberculosis bacillus (×26,400).
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